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FILED AT 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY 
Deputy 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 ORDER EXONERATING BAIL 
1 BOND PRIOR TO FORFEITURE 
VS. 1 
1 Bond Amt: $ 
1 Power No. 
I ]  Date Posted: 
Defendant. 1 Charge: 
WHEREAS, , bail of  the above-named 
defendant in this matter has filed a motion with this court requesting an Order 
exonerating it as bail of said defendant; and 
WHEREAS, said bail has filed with this court an executed Sheriffs Certificate of 
Acknowledgement of Surrender of defendant certifying that said defendant was 
incarcerated with the County Sheriff; and 
WHEREAS, said bail has certified t o  this court that timely notice of said bail's 
motion has been served upon the proper prosecuting attorney pursuant to I.C. 19-2924; 
and 
WHEREAS, said prosecuting attorney has not filed an objection to  said bail's 
motion; and 
WHEREAS, it appears to this court that the undertaking posted by said bail in this 
matter has not been heretofore forfeited. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the bail of the above-named 
defendant in this matter be, and hereby is, exonerated and discharged from all further 
liability of such bail. 
JUDGE- Date 
FILED AT .M. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
, ) 
Defendant. 1 
Case No. 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE 
AND EXONERATE BOND 
Bond Amt: $ 
Power No. 
Date Forfeited: 
, who heretofore posted the above- 
referenced undertaking of bond of the above-named defendant, said bond having been 
forfeited by this court, hereby moves this court for an Order setting aside said forfeiture of 
bail and exonerating the same pursuant to authority set forth in  Idaho Criminal Rule 46(e) on 
the following grounds: 
For Trial Court Administrator Date 
Fourth Judicial District 
Bail Agent Date 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. 
Plaintiff, ) 
) ORDER SETTING ASIDE FORFEITURE 
VS. 1 AND EXONERATING BOND 
) 
) Bond Amt: $ 
, ) Power No. 
Defendant. ) Date Forfeited: 
WHEREAS, , who heretofore posted the above- 
referenced undertaking of bond of the above-named defendant, has filed a motion with this 
court requesting an Order setting aside the forfeiture previously entered i n  this matter and 
exonerating the bond referenced above, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the forfeiture of the undertaking previously issued in 
this case evidenced by power of attorney be, and hereby is, set aside. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said bond is hereby exonerated. 
JUDGE Date 
Bail Agent's Name 
Address 
City, State, Zip 
FILED AT .M. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY 1 
wpm' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
1 Case No. 
) 
1 SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE OF 
1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF 
1 SURRENDEROFDEFENDANT 
1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
The undersigned Deputy Sheriff of County hereby certifies as 
follows: 
Cl That the above-named defendant was surrendered to me by 
hidher Bail Agent on at the hour of - .m. 
(Date) 
U Defendant was arrested on a warrant in this same case on 
at the hour of - .m. (Date) 
U Defendant was arrested on a warrant unrelated to this case on 
at the hour of - .m. (Date) 
Cl Defendant was in my custody on which is  the date and the 
reason helshe failed to appear in court on the above-referenced case. 
Defendant was surrendered for the following reason: 
Bond was Revoked by bail agent prior to forfeiture. 
Bond was forfeited by the court. 
Deputy Sheriff # Phone No. Date 
Next Court Date 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Bail agent hereby certifies that the following information is true and correct: 
Bond Amount: $ Date of Bond: 
Power No: Charge: 
Bail Agent Date 
SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE OF SURRENDER 
Bail Agent's Name 
Address 
City, State, Zip 
FILED AT .M. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
) Case NO. 
) 
1 PROOF OF: INCARCERATION 
1 OF DEFENDANT IN A PENAL 
1 INSTITUTION 
) i Bond Amt: $ 
1 Power No. 
9 1 Date Forfeited: 
Defendant. 1 Charge: 
Defendant's date of birth: Defendant's SSN: 
The undersigned employee of , a penal institution 
located in the state of , states as follows: 
That the above-named defendant was incarcerated in the above-referenced penal 
institution on 
That the defendant's retained jurisdiction end date is  on or about y 
the parole eligibility date i s  , and the full-term release date is  
Signature of Authorized Person Date 
Title Phone No. 
- 
Bail Agent's Name 
Address 
City, State, Zip 
FILED AT .M. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF M E  DISTRICT COURT 
BY , 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
7 1 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE OF 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CUSTODY 
OF DEFENDANT IN ANOTHER STATE 
Bond Amt: $ 
Power No. 
Date Forfeited: 
Charge: 
The undersigned Deputy Sheriff of County hereby certifies 
as follows: 
That on at the hour of .m., the above- 
(Date) 
named defendant was incarcerated in County, State of 
That the defendant is being held at that location on an Ada County warrant on case 
number 
That the defendant is expected to be released from custody or transported to Ada 
County, Idaho, to answer to charges in the case herein on 
(Date) 
That the defendant was in my custody on which is  the 
(Date) 
date and the reason helshe failed to appear in court on the above-referenced case. 
Deputy Sheriff # Phone No. Date 
Next Court Date 
SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE OF SURRENDER 
FILED AT .M. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
, ) 
Defendant. 1 
Case No. 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE 
AND REINSTATE BOND 
Bond Amt: $ 
Power No. 
Date Forfeited: 
, who heretofore posted the above-referenced 
undertaking of bond of the above-named defendant, said bond having been forfeited by 
this court, hereby moves this court for an Order setting aside said forfeiture of bail and 
reinstating the same pursuant to authority set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 46(e) on the 
following grounds: 
For Trial Court Administrator Date 
Fourth Judicial District 
Bail Agent Date 
FILED AT .M. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) Case No. 
Plaintiff, 1 
) ORDER SETTING ASIDE FORFEITURE 
VS. 1 AND REINSTATING BOND 
) 
1 Bond Amt: $ 
, 1 Power No. 
Defendant. 1 Date Forfeited: 
WHEREAS, , who heretofore posted the above- 
referenced undertaking of bond of the above-named defendant, has filed a motion with this 
court requesting an Order setting aside the forfeiture previously entered in this matter and 
reinstating the bond referenced above, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the forfeiture of the undertaking previously issued in 
this case evidenced by power of attorney be, and hereby is, set aside. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said bond is hereby reinstated. 
JUDGE Date 
FILED AT .M. I 
.I. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff, 
1 Case No. 
1 
) STIPULATION TO EXONERATE BAIL 
VS. 1 BOND DUE TO DEATH OF DEFENDANT 
) 
1 Bond Amt: $ 
, 1 Power No. 
Defendant. ) Date Forfeited: 
, who heretofore posted an undertaking of bail 
o n  behalf of the above-named defendant in  this matter, and the Trial Court Administrator 
o f  the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho or his delegate, hereby stipulate and agree 
that said undertaking of bail should be exonerated and discharged on the grounds that 
said defendant is now deceased. Said Trial Court Administrator certifies to this Court 
that proper documentation of the defendant's death has been presented to him and filed 
with the court in this matter and that all other applicable requirements of the Court's 
Guidelines for the Administration of Bail Bonds have been satisfied. 
For Trial Court Administrator Date Bail Agent Date 
Fourth Judicial District 
/ FILED AT . M  / 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
1 Case No. 
Plaintiff, ) 
) ORDER EXONERATING BAIL BOND 
VS. 1 DUE TO DEATH OF DEFENDANT 
1 
1 Bond Amt: $ 
, 1 Power No. 
Defendant. 1 Date Forfeited: 
WHEREAS, , who heretofore posted an 
undertaking of bail on behalf of the above-named defendant in this matter, and the Trial 
Court Administrator of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, having entered into a 
stipulation that said undertaking of bail should be exonerated and discharged on the 
grounds that said defendant is now deceased; and 
WHEREAS, proper documentation of the defendant's death having been filed with 
the court in this matter and all other applicable requirements of the Court's Guidelines 
for the Administration of Bail Bonds having been satisfied, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the undertaking of bail in this matter be, and hereby 
is, exonerated and discharged. 
JUDGE Date 
FILED AT .M. 1 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, I CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
1 CASE NO. 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
VS. ) MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION 
) OF BOND 
1 )  
Defendant. ) 
The undersigned hereby moves this court for an order to substitute bond 
which has been previously posted with this court in the above-referenced matter and 
further states that: 
A CASH BOND has been posted by the undersigned with this court for 
the above-named defendant's release from custody and movant now 
desires to substitute therefor a duly executed SURETY BOND equal to  
the amount of the bond ordered by this court, thereby releasing the 
cash bond previously posted. The surety bond is  attached hereto. 
A SURETY BOND has been posted with this court for the above- 
named defendant's release from custody and movant now desires to 
substitute therefor a CASH BOND equal to the amount of the bond 
ordered by this court, thereby exonerating the surety bond previously 
posted. 
Movant - Signature Date 
Movant - Printed Name 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY 
Deputy 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 CASE NO. 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
vs. 1 ORDER FOR SUBSTITUTION 
1 OF BOND 
1 
A Motion For Substitution of Bond having been filed with the court, and it 
appearing from said Motion and the Court record that: 
EII A CASHBDND has been posted by the movant with this court for the 
above-named defendant's release from custody and movant now desires 
to substitute therefor a duly executed SURETYBaND equal to the 
amount of the bond ordered by this court, thereby releasing the cash 
bond previously posted. The surety bond has been lodged. 
C3 A S U m W  has been posted with this court for the above-named 
defendant's release from custody and movant now desires to substitute 
therefor a CASX equal to the amount of the bond ordered by this 
court, thereby exonerating the surety bond previously posted. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT: 
U The CASH BOND previously posted in this matter be released by the 
Clerk of the Court and returned to the party posting the same, and that 
the SURFTY BOND now lodged with this court be accepted and 
substituted therefor. 
The SURETYBQW previously posted in this matter be and hereby is 
exonerated on the condition that a CASH R C ) M  in the full amount of the 
bond ordered by this court be posted with the Clerk of the Court and that 
said cash be substituted therefor. 
JUDGE Date 
PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT USING BLACK INK: 
PETITIONER'S NAME 
ADDRESS 
CITY, STATE, ZIP 
PHONE NUMBER 
FILED AT .M. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
RE: 1 CASE NO. 
) 
v 1 PETITION TO ADD AGENT'S NAME 
Petitioner. ) 
FILING FEE: $82.00 
COMES NOW, , the above-named 
Petitioner, and respectfully requests a hearing before the Administrative District Judge 
for the Fourth Judicial District. Petitioner requests a hearing to allow Petitioner the 
opportunity to submit evidence to show cause why Petitioner should be added to the 
authorized list of agents for posting bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial District. 
Petitioner's application to write bonds in  the Fourth District was denied due to the 
following reason@): 
[check appropriate boxes] 
I. The criminal history check revealed: 
(a) a felony crime for which the above Petitioner or the Petitioner's 
proposed insurance company was convicted, pled guilty, received a 
withheld judgment, or otherwise sentenced. 
0 (b) a misdemeanor crime involving drugs, theft, fraud, or other crime of 
moral turpitude for which the Petitioner or the Petitioner's proposed 
insurance company was convicted, pled guilty, received a withheld 
judgment, or otherwise sentenced. 
0 (c) three or more misdemeanor crimes for which the Petitioner or the 
Petitioner's proposed insurance company was convicted, pled guilty, 
received a withheld judgment, or otherwise sentenced. 
(d) a combination of three or more of the following in which the Petitioner 
was convicted, pled guilty, received a withheld judgment, or otherwise 
sentenced: failure to appear, contempt of court, or probation violation. 
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2. The application processing revealed the Petitioner failed to disclose information 
as requested on the Application form. 
3. The application processing revealed the Petitioner or the Petitioner's insurance 
company is not licensed by The Department of Insurance of the State of Idaho. 
4. The application processing revealed the Petitioner has four or more prior 
violations of these Guidelines which have not been excused by the 
Administrative District Judge following a hearing. 
5. The application processing revealed the Petitioner is currently employed in a 
Fourth District court-related position. 
6. The application processing revealed the Petitioner was denied the ability to write 
bonds or was removed from the list of authorized agents in another jurisdiction. 
17 7. The application processing revealed the Petitioner previously had a license 
suspension or revocation imposed by the department of insurance of any U.S. 
state. 
8. The application processing revealed the Petitioner or hislher insurance 
company has previously failed to have paid a forfeited bond. 
17 9. The application processing revealed the Petitioner is related by blood, marriage, 
or adoption to a Fourth District Judge. 
10. The application processing revealed financial insolvency of the Petitioner or 
hislher insurance company. 
Dated this day of ,20-. 
- 
Petitioner 
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PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT USING BLACK INK: 
PETITIONER'S NAME 
ADDRESS 
CITY, STATE, ZIP 
PHONE NUMBER 
RE: 
FILED AT .M. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
1 CASE NO. 
1 
I 1 PETITION TO REINSTATE 
Petitioner. 1 AGENT'S NAME 
) FILING FEE: $82.00 
COMES NOW, , the above-named 
Petitioner, and respectfully requests a hearing before the Administrative District Judge 
for the Fourth Judicial District. Petitioner requests a hearing to allow Petitioner the 
opportunity to submit evidence to show cause why Petitioner's name should be 
reinstated to the authorized list of agents for posting bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial 
District. 
Petitioner disputes the allegations of the Trial Court Administrator's Office as 
follows: 
[List AIIega tions] 
Dated this day of ,20-. 
Petitioner 
PETlTION TQ REINSTATE AGENT'S NAME 
PLEASE N P E  OR PRINT USING BLACK INK: 
PETITIONER'S NAME 
ADDRESS 
CIN,  STATE, ZIP 
FILED AT .M. 
I 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
PHONE NUMBER 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
RE: 1 
1 
9 
Petitioner. 
i 
1 
CASE NO. 
PETITION FOR REVIEW PRIOR TO 
REMOVAL OF AGENT'S NAME 
FILING FEE: $82.00 
COMES NOW, , the above-named 
Petitioner, and respectfully requests a hearing before the Administrative District Judge 
for the Fourth Judicial District. Petitioner requests a hearing to allow Petitioner the 
opportunity to submit evidence to show cause why Petitioner's name should not be 
removed from the authorized list of agents for posting bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial 
District. 
Petitioner disputes the allegations of the Trial Court Administrator's Office as 
follows: 
[L is f Allegations] 
Dated this day of 
Petitioner 
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LAWRENCE WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
Chief of Civil Litigation 
e> 
we++? %sY 
FILED A.M P.M 
JEREMY C. CHOU, ISB #5680 
Soo Y. KANG, ISB #6752 
Deputy Attorneys General 
650 W. State, Lower Level 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and 
Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSE;  and 
REBECCA SALINAS, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
LDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her 
official capacity as Administrative District 
Judge for the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District; LARRY D. REINER, in his 
official capacity as Trial Court Administrator 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District; and DIANE BURRELL, in her 
capacity as Assistant Trial Court 
Administrator for the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District, 
Defendants. 
) Case No. CV OC 07066 19 
) 
) ORDER RE BAIL BOND 
) GUIDELINES 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER RE BAIL BOND GUIDELINES - 1 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on stipulation of the parties, and good 
cause appearing, NOW, THEREFOE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Bail Bond Guidelines attached to the Stipulation, 
with the accompanying introduction letters, Bates Nos. 00001 through 00077, will henceforth be 
the version referred to in this litigation. 
SO ORDERED this 3 day of August, 2007 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I1 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3 5 a y  of August, 2007,I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 West Bannock 
Boise, ID 83701 
Soo Y. Kang 
Deputy AttorneyGeneral 
650 W. State, Lower Level 
PO Box 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0010 
C ]  U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
C ]  Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
ernight Mail 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 F 
C ]  Statehouse Mail 
[rl U.S. Mail 
C ]  Hand Delivery 
Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
Statehouse Mail 
Deputy Attorney ~ene fa l  
ORDER RE BAIL BOND GUIDELINES - 3 
LAWFENCE WASDEN 
ATTORNEYGENERAL 
J W I D  NAVARRO, Clerl. 
By A TOONE 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
Chief of Civil Litigation 
JEREMY C. CHOU, ISB #5680 
Soo Y. KANG, ISB #6752 
Deputy Attorneys General 
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doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and 
Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and 
REBECCA SALINAS, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her 
official capacity as Administrative District 
Judge for the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District; LARRY D. REINER, in his 
official capacity as Trial Court Administrator 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District; and DIANE BURRELL, in her 
capacity as Assistant Trial Court 
Administrator for the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District, 
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STATE DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INSUNCTION - 
i bozzo 
COME NOW Defendants the Honorable Darla S. Williamson, Larry D. Reiner, and 
Diane Burrell (collectively "State Defendants"), by and through their legal counsel, the Office of 
the Idaho Attorney General, and hereby file this response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction. 
I. LEGAL STANDARD 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the following grounds, as pertinent to this 
case, for granting a preliminary injunction: 
(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the 
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited 
period or perpetually. 
(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or 
continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or 
great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff. 
See I.R.C.P. 65(e). "The party seeking the injunction has the burden of proving a right thereto." 
Hal-ris v. Cassia Counv, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988, 993 (1984). Whether to grant or 
deny a preliminary injunction is a matter for the discretion of the trial court. Brady v. City of 
Hornedale, 130 Idaho 569, 572, 944 P.2d 704, 707 (1997). "A preliminary injunction is granted 
only in extreme cases where the right is very clear and it appears that irreparable injury will flow 
from its refusal." Harris, supra, citing Evans v. District Court of the FEfth Judicial District, 47 
Idaho 267,275 P.99, I00 (1 929) (emphasis added). 
11. ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction prohibiting the State Defendants fiom 
"enforcing Sections 4, 5, and 10 to 14 of the Guidelines during the pendency of this action." 
(See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction ("Plaintiffs' 
Memo in Support"), pg. 22.) In the alternative, the Plaintiffs ask that the State Defendants be 
preliminarily enjoined fiom removing Plaintiffs and their employees fi-om the List of Authorized 
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Bail Agents ("List") without first providing reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing. 
Id. 
The State Defendants respectfully request that the Court deny the Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction because the Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of proving a right to such an injunction. 
A. THE PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT SUFFERS FROM PROCEDURAL AND 
SUBSTANTIVE DEFECTS FATAL TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED AND, AS A 
RESULT, THE MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION UNDER 
1.RC.P. 65(e)(l) SHOULD BE DENIED. 
Plaintiffs' causes of action alleged in their Complaint for Declaratory Relief 
("Complaint") suffer fiom significant flaws, both procedurally and legally, which are fatal to 
their success. 
1. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled To The Relief Requested In Their Complaint And 
Therefore The Request For Preliminary Iniunction Should Be Denied. 
At the August 3, 2007, hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the State Defendants drew the 
Court's attention to the difference between a "facial" and an "as applied" challenge to the 
Guidelines. This difference is critical because it demonstrates the procedural infirmity of the 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and why the Plaintiffs will not succeed on their claims. 
The Plaintiffs ask this Court to decree the Guidelines, and in particular, Sections 4, 5, and 
10 to 14, as unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable as a whole. 
A court may hold a statute unconstitutional either because it is invalid "on its 
face" or because it is unconstitutional "as applied" to a particular set of 
circumstances. Each holding carries an important difference in terms of outcome: 
If a statute is unconstitutional as applied, the State may continue to enforce the 
statute in different circumstances where it is not unconstitutional, but if a statute is 
unconstitutional on its face, the State may not enforce the statute under any 
circumstances. Traditionally, a plaintiffs burden in an as-applied challenge is 
different from that in a facial challenge. In an as-applied challenge, "the plaintiff 
contends that application of the statute in the particular context in which he has 
acted, or in which he proposes to act, would be unconstitutional." Ada v. Guam 
Soc 'y of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 101 1, 1012, 113 S.Ct. 633, 
634, 121 L.Ed.2d 564 (1992)(Scalia, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 962 F.2d 
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1366 (9" Cir. 1992). Therefore, the constitutional inquiry in an as-applied 
challenge is limited to the plaintiff's particular situation. In comparison, the 
Court explained in Salerno that 
[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge 
to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that [an Act] 
might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is 
insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an 
"overbreadth" doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. 
481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. at 2100. In other words, a facial challenge to a statute 
should fail if the statute has a constitutional application. 
Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 193-94 ( G ' ~  Cir. 1997). By 
seeking a form of relief which renders the Guidelines, particularly Sections 4, 5, and 10 to 14, 
invalid as whole, a "facial challenge" is being proffered, rather than an "as-applied" challenge. 
A facial challenge is a matter "purely of law" and the Court need only look at the Guidelines, as 
written, to see if it passes constitutional muster. American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho 
Department of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, -, 154 P.3d 433, 441-42 (2007), citing State 
V. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197,969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998)("a facial challenge to a statute or rule is 
'purely' a question of law"). 
The facial challenge has been acknowledged as most difficult because success requires a 
showing that the offending statute or rule cannot be valid under any set of circumstances. See 
American Falls, 143 Idaho at -, 154 P.3d at 441-42 (for a facial constitutional challenge to 
succeed, the party must demonstrate that the law is unconstitutional in dl of its applications. . . . 
tlte challenper must establish that no set of circunzstances exists under which the law would be 
valid.)(emphasis added). Contrary to the Plaintiffs' assertions, the Guidelines, as written, 
- 
survive the constitutional challenges posed by Plaintiffs because: (1) it limits the scope of its 
application to only the Fourth Judicial District and does not regulate the baiVbond agent's license 
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thereby avoiding the separation of powers issue; (2) it affords bailbond agents with due process 
protections, although not required; and (3) it was adopted by Administrative District Judge 
Williamson under her inherent authority over the administration and operation of the judicial 
system. This has been addressed extensively by the State Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss, 
Memorandum in Support, Reply Memorandum, and oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss 
presented at the hearing on August 3, 2007. Further discussion on the separation of powers and 
due process issues is detailed below, limited to responding to the allegations specifically 
contained in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of their Preliminary Injunction. Assimilating 
the stance taken by the State Defendants shows the futility of trying to prove that the Guidelines 
are not valid under any circumstance. The arguments posited illustrate the opposite. 
The Plaintiffs focus, however, on the application of the Guidelines to the Plaintiffs' 
limited factual circumstances and contend that the Guidelines should be held unenforceable. The 
Plaintiffs confuse the two types of constitutional challenges and seek to use the application of the 
Guidelines to a particular set of circumstances ("as-applied" challenge) as a "springboard" to 
declare the Guidelines unconstitutional as a whole ("facial" challenge relief). In other words, the 
Plaintiffs request the Court to perform a "hybridized" test, in which the two tests are combined 
into a single analysis and declare the Guidelines as unconstitutional and, therefore, 
unenforceable. This is not permissible: 
A party may challenge a statute as unconstitutional "on its face" or "as applied" to 
the party's conduct. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 126, 132 
(2003). . . .Generally, a facial challenge is mutuallv exclusive from an as applied 
challenge. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 7 12,69 P.3d at 132. 
*** 
An "on its face" constitutional analysis may not be combined with an "as applied" 
constitutional analysis. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132. In other 
words, a court mav hear both types of challenges to a rule's constitutional 
validity; however, it mav not do a "hybridized" form of either test, in which 
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t w o  tests are combined into a single analysis. Id; see Lindstrom v. Dist. Bd. Of 
Health Panhandle Dist. I ,  109 Idaho 956,712 P.2d 657 (1985). 
American Falls, 143 Idaho a t ,  154 P.3d at 441-42 (emphasis added). The relief requested in 
the Complaint defines the Plaintiffs7 challenge as "facial" rather than "as-applied." As such, the 
Court should disregard the factual allegations contained in the Complaint and affidavits filed in 
support of the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Once the irrelevant factors are 
discarded the Court can look to the Guidelines, as written, and determine whether there are any 
circumstances under which the Guidelines may be deemed valid. The answer is a resounding 
"yes," and the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction under this basis must be denied. 
Even if the Court broadly interprets the Plaintiffs' Complaint to allege a separate "as- 
applied" challenge, it still does not afford the Plaintiffs the relief they seek. Assuming all the 
facts in Plaintiffs' Complaint are true and, without conceding, supports an unconstitutional 
application of the Guidelines, the relief must be tailored to the particular set of circumstances 
alleged. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 193-94 (an "as-applied" considers the challenge that the 
application of the statute to a particular context would be unconstitutional and is limited to the 
plaintiff's particular situation.) However, the relief requested extends beyond the limited 
circumstances of Mr. Garsky and Ms. Salinas. An "as applied" challenge, if proven, only affords 
the Plaintiffs with the limited relief as to the Euture application of the Guidelines to the particular 
set of facts asserted and the Plaintiffs still fail to show they are entitled to the relief requested in 
their Complaint. 
Under Rule 65(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a preliminary injunction may be 
granted "[wlhen it appears bv the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded." 
I.R.C.P. 65(e)(l)(emphasis added). The Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief demanded in their 
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Complaint. For the foregoing reasons, State Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction be denied. 
2 .  The Substantive Causes Of Action Alleged, Separation Of Powers And Due 
Process Violations, Are Le~allv Deficient Because Essential Elements Are 
Missing From The Prima Facie Case. 
Substantively, the Plaintiffs assert that the Guidelines, specifically the Sections dealing 
with the List, Sections 4, 5, and 10 to 14, violate the separation of powers doctrine and due 
process. The substantive arguments asserted by the Plaintiffs have been, again, addressed 
extensively by the State Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss, Memorandum in Support, Reply 
Memorandum, and oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss presented at the hearing on August 
3, 2007. In effect, for the Plaintiffs to succeed on the merits of their claims they will have to 
convince the Court to take a "leap of faith" and ignore the significant legal gaps in the Plaintiffs7 
causes of action. We urge the Court to decline that invitation for it is apparent that the Plaintiffs' 
arguments rests not on firm foundation, but, rather, quicksand. 
a. Adoption of the Guidelines does not violate the separation of powers 
doctrine because the scope of the Guidelines is limited to the Fourth 
Judicial District and does not affect the bailbond agent's producer license. 
The Plaintiffs argue that the Guidelines violate the separation of powers doctrine because 
the licensing of bail agents is properly within the province of the legislature. Plaintiffs latch onto 
the Department of Insurance's ("DOI") governance over producer licenses as their life preserver 
and turn a blind eye over the glaring detail that the Guidelines do not regulate a baihond agent's 
producer license. This is fatal to the Plaintiffs' claim as a matter of law. 
The Guidelines do not duplicate or overlap with the DOI's authority because the 
Guidelines do not affect a bailhond agent's producer license, but merely the right to present bail 
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bonds on behalf of a defendant in the Fourth Judicial District. Under the DOI's statutes, in order 
to hold oneself out as a bail agent, that person must possess a valid producer's license: 
No person shall hold himself out to be a bail agent or sell, solicit, negotiate, 
advise or consult regarding the terms of bail bond contracts in this state unless 
that person is licensed as a producer in the line of surety insurance. 
I.C. 5 41-1039 (emphasis added). If a bailbond agent is removed from the List, that bailbond 
agent retains the right to still hold himself or herself out as a bailhond agent throughout the rest 
of the state. The bailbond agent's producer license is not affected by the Guidelines: 
It shall be the responsibility of the Trial Court Administrator's Office of the 
Fourth Judicial District to maintain a list o f  bail anents who are authorized to 
present for acceptance a bail bond in the Fourth Judicial District. Persons 
authorized to accept bail bonds shall not accept a bail bond from a bail agent who 
is not on this list. The list will be faxed to the Sheriffs Department and to the 
Clerk of the Court for each of the four counties comprising the Fourth Judicial 
District on the day that it is updated. The purpose of the list is only to provide 
notice to the counties as to those bail agents who are authorized to present bonds 
for acceptance within the district and not for advertising or any other purpose not 
specifically authorized by the Administrative District Judge of the Fourth Judicial 
District. 
(See Guidelines, 10, Bates No. 00031) (emphasis added). Legal recognition as a bailbond 
agent even after removal from the List belies the Plaintiffs7 contentions that a separation of 
powers violation has occurred. 
The Plaintiffs, however, seek to divert the Court's attention to this detail by alleging that 
the consideration of the same and/or similar factors as the DO1 somehow violates the separation 
of powers doctrine. The Plaintiffs fail to point to any statutory language within the DO1 statutes 
that evidence legislative intent to deprive the judiciary of its inherent discretion over the approval 
or denial of bail, which itself would be problematic. Without that prerequisite factor there is no 
basis for contending that a court cannot consider similar factors in determining with whom it will 
accept bonds. 
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The approval and disapproval of bonds proffered to the Court remains within the Court's 
inherent discretion. See I.C. 19-2902; I.C.R. 46(a). Rule 46 of the Idaho Criminal Rules 
provides insight into some of the factors a court may reflect upon within its discretion in 
approving or denying a bond. Interestingly, "any" of the factors may be the dispositive factor in 
the Court's decision. lit. Among the factors that the Court may consider is "[tlhe persons who 
agree to assist the defendant in attending court at the proper time." I.C.R. 46(a)(5). Every factor 
that the Plaintiffs contend is duplicative relates to the Court's consideration of bailbond agents - 
the persons agreeing to assist the defendant in attending court at the proper time. 
The Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate, and cannot demonstrate, that the Guidelines affect the 
producer license of the bailbond agent or that the DO1 has deprived the judiciary of its inherent 
authority to approve or deny bail. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot succeed on their separation of 
powers claim as a matter of law and the Motion for Preliminary Injunction on this basis must be 
denied. See Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 5 13,5 18,681 P.2d 988,993 (1984) ("[tlhe party 
seeking the injunction has the burden of proving a right thereto"). 
b. The Guidelines do not violate due process because bail/bond agents do not 
possess a constitutionally recomized property right, - and, in the alternative, 
the Guidelines afford baifiond agents with due process protection. 
The Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their due process claim because the Plaintiffs do not 
possess a constitutionally recognized property right, a critical element to asserting a due process 
deprivation claim. In the alternative, the Guidelines provide the Plaintiffs with an opportunity 
for a hearing. 
1. Plaintiffs do not possess a constitutionally recognized property 
right which would support their claim for a due process violation. 
Plaintiffs contend that "[blecause Plaintiffs have complied with the licensing process 
described in Title 41 of the Idaho Code, they have more than a unilateral expectation of being 
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eligible to post bail bonds." (See Plaintiffs' Memo in Support, pg. 12.) As a result of this 
"unilateral expectation" bail/bond agents have a constitutionally recognized property right 
entitling them to all due process protections, including the right to a hearing before deprivation. 
The State Defendants respectfully disagree. 
The Plaintiffs loosely apply the constitutional inquiry in determining a property right and 
build upon that interpretation to transform "eligibility" into a right. 
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an 
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation 
of  it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim o f  entitlement to it. It is a 
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which 
people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It 
is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a 
person to vindicate those claims. 
EJarkness v. City of Burley, 110 Idaho 353, 355-56, 715 P.2d 1283, 1285-86 (1986), citing Board 
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (emphasis 
added). The Plaintiffs wish the Court to equate "property right" with the baihond agent's 
producer license. However, the Guidelines do not affect producer licenses, but, instead, are an 
exercise of the court's discretion preapproving bonds proffered by certain bail/bond agents. (See 
Affidavit of Darla S. Williamson ("Williamson Affidavit"), 71 4.) The question is not one of 
licensure, but, rather, the exercise of the Court's inherent authority and discretion to approve and 
deny bonds presented. The inquiry should therefore be limited in scope and ask whether a 
"property right7' exists in having a bond accepted by a court. The answer is "no." 
A bailibond agent cannot have more than a unilateral expectation of or a legitimate claim 
of entitlement to have their bond accepted because acceptance is within the discretion of the trial 
court. State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 541, 700 P.2d 942,944 (1985); I.C.R. 46. Matters of 
discretion cannot equate to an expectation of or a legitimate claim of entitlement. See Richurds 
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v. City of Columbus, 92-7359, 1993 WL 413911 (October 12, 1993); Baldwin v. Daniels, 250 
F.3d 943,947 (5th Cir. 2001). 
Since bailhond agents do not possess a constitutionally recognized property right their 
due process challenge fails. 
. . 
11. Plaintiffs are provided with due process protection under the 
Guidelines. 
Assuming, without conceding, that a bailhond agent possesses a constitutionally 
recognized property right, the Guidelines still afford baiVbond agents with all due process 
protections. 
Plaintiffs contend that the bailhond agents are not provided with an opportunity for a 
hearing prior to being removed from the List: 
Section 14(B) of the Guidelines authorizes the TCA's office to remove an agent 
from the authorized list if it determines the agent failed to timely "rectify" a 
violation notice. If an agent believes he or she should not have to "rectify" a 
violation, the Guidelines provide a mechanism for the agent to request a hearing 
prior to removal. However, where the agent attempts to comply and rectify a 
violation, the Guidelines permit the TCA's office to unilaterally determine that 
such compliance was inadequate and to effectuate the removal without providing 
prior notice or an opportunity to be heard. 
(See Plaintiffs' Memo in Support, pg. 13.) The Plaintiffs misinterpret the Guidelines. 
When a violation has occurred a letter is sent to the bailhond agent notifying him or her 
of such violation. (See Affidavit of Diane Burrell ("Burrell Affidavit"), f 4.) With respect to 
forfeitures and exonerations, Sections 14(B) and (D), if a forfeited bond has not been paid by the 
date due, then a violation letter is sent asking for the bail agent to cure the defect within ten (10) 
days or risk being removed from the List. (See Burrell Affidavit, f 5; Guidelines, 5 14(B) and 
(D), Bates Nos. 00038-41.) At this point, the bail agent can either cure by payment or by filing a 
motion for exoneration. Id. If the motion for exoneration suffers &om some mechanical 
STATE DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 1 1 
00238 
deficiency, then the bail agent is afforded an opportunity to correct the deficiency. (See Burrell 
Affidavit, f 6; Guidelines, 14(D), Bates No. 00041 .) If there is no payment and no motion for 
exoneration is filed, then the bail agent's name can be removed from the List. (See Burrell 
Affidavit, f j  6.) If the bail agent disagrees with the TCA's Office regarding the matter, then he or 
she can ask for the TCA Office to review the reasons for the action intended andor petition the 
court for a hearing prior to the expiration of the ten (10) days. (See Burrell Affidavit, 1 7; 
Guidelines, Cj 14(B) and (D), Bates Nos. 00038-41) (emphasis added). If a hearing is requested, 
then the bail agent remains on the List until the hearing is held. Id. Contrary to the Plaintiffs' 
assertions, if a hearing under Sections 14(B) and (D) is not conducted prior to removal, it is 
because the Plaintiffs have waived their rights to such a hearing. 
Section 14(C) of the Guidelines provides for the immediate temporary removal from the 
List without prior notice under three specific circumstances: (1) the bailibond agent's residence 
producer license has expired, been suspended, or revoked by the Department of Insurance; (2) 
the baiVbond agent has "bounced" a check in payment of one or more forfeited bonds; and (3) 
the bail agent's insurance company or supervising agent requests that the agent be removed from 
the List. (See Guidelines, Cj 14(C), Bates Nos. 00039-40.) The Plaintiffs contend that permitting 
removal without providing a prior opportunity to contest the removal violates due process. (See 
Plaintiffs' Memo in Support, pg. 15.) However, as Plaintiffs concede, in extraordinary situations 
where some valid governmental interest is at stake a prompt hearing after the temporary removal 
is constitutionally acceptable. 
In Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979), the United States 
Supreme Court dealt with an action challenging the constitutionality of a New York statute 
which authorized summary suspensions of harness racing trainers' license without a 
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presuspension hearing. The Barchi Court held that a post termination hearing is acceptable if the 
government has an interest and a prompt hearing is afforded after the termination. Barchi, 443 
U.S. at 63,99 S.Ct. at 2648. 
On June 22, 1976, Be Albert, a harness race horse trained by John Barchi ("Barchi") 
finished second in a race. Barchi, 443 U.S. at 59, 99 S.Ct, at 2646. Two days later a post race 
urinalysis revealed a drug in Be Albert's system. Id. Although Barchi proclaimed his innocence, 
pursuant to the trainer's responsibility rules and evidentiary presumption arising thereunder, 
Barchi was suspended for fifteen (15) days. Id. The Barchi Court held that the summary 
suspensions without a presuspension hearing did not affront the Due Process Clause: 
We do not agree with Barchi's basic contention, however, that an evidentiary 
hearing was required prior to the effectuation of his suspension. Unquestionably, 
the magnitude of a trainer's interest in avoiding suspension is substantial; but the 
State also has an important interest in assuring the integrity of the racing carried 
on under its auspices. In these circumstances, it seems to us that the State is 
entitled to impose an interim suspension, pending a prompt judicial or 
administrative hearing that definitely determine the issues, whenever it has 
satisfactorily established probable cause to believe that a horse has been drugged 
and that a trainer has been at least negligent in connection with the drugging. 
[inner citation omitted] In such circumstances, the State's interest in preserving 
the integrity of the sport and in protecting the public from harm becomes most 
acute. At the same time, there is substantial assurance that the trainer's interest in 
not being baselessiy compromised. 
Barchi, 443 U.S. at 59, 99 S.Ct. at 2646. Considering each of the three reasons for temporary 
removal under Section 14(C) will evidence the Fourth Judicial District's interest in preserving 
the judicial system. 
First, the Guidelines do not regulate the bailhond agent's license; it is regulated by the 
Department of Insurance. (See Williamson Affidavit, 7 13.) The Legislature, through the DO1 
statutes, has determined that a person cannot hold himself or herself out as a bail agent without a 
valid producer license. See I.C. $ 41-1039. Second, a "bounced" check is a testament to the 
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ethics, character, and veracity of the person committing such an offense. The Fourth Judicial 
District is relying on those very characteristics when entrusting a defendant into the care of a 
bailhond agent. (See Williamson Affidavit, 7 14.) If the person with whom the defendant is 
entrusted has no qualms about breaking the law, then his or her character deserves 
reconsideration by the court prior to further entrustment. Lastly, requests for removal by the 
baiVbond agent's supervisor and/or insurance company raises red flags that should not be 
ignored. The supervising agent takes on the responsibility for those that work underneath his or 
her care. The consistent interactions between the two parties provide the supervising agent with 
the first line of defense when it comes to unethical or improper behavior. The TCA's office 
should thus defer to the supervising agent's request. (See Williamson Affidavit, 7 15.) Under 
these circumstances, it is clear that the Fourth Judicial District Court has an interest in immediate 
temporary removal for sake of preserving the integrity of the judicial system. 
The issue then becomes whether the hearing provided after the temporary removal 
affords the bailhond agent with due process: 
That the State's presuspension procedures were satisfactory, however, still leaves 
unresolved how and when the adequacy of the grounds for suspension is 
ultimately to be determined. As the District Court found, the consequences to a 
trainer of even a temporary suspension can be severe; and we have held that the 
opportunity to be heard must be "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner." [inner citation omitted] Here, the provision for an administrative 
hearing, neither on its face nor as applied in this case, assured a prompt 
proceeding and prompt disposition of the outstanding issues between Barchi and 
the State. Indeed, insofar as the statutory requirements are concerned, it is as 
likely as not that Barchi and others subject to relatively brief suspensions would 
have no opportunity to put the State to its proof until they have suffered the full 
penalty imposed. Yet, it is possible that Barchi's horse may not have been 
drugged and Barchi may not have been at fault at all. Once suspension has been 
imposed, the trainer's interest in a speedy resolution of the controversy becomes 
paramount, it seems to us. . . . it would seem as much in the State's interest as 
Barchi's to have an early and reliable determination with respect to the integrity 
of those participating in state-supervised horse racing. 
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In these circumstances, it was necessary that Barchi be assured a prompt 
postsuspension hearing, one that would proceed and be concluded without 
appreciable delay. Because the statute as applied in this case was deficient in this 
respect, Barchi's suspension was constitutionally infirm under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Barchi, 443 U.S. at 66, 99 S.Ct. at 2650. Cognizant of the consequences to bailbond agents 
removed from the List pursuant to Section 14(C), the Guidelines provide for an "immediate" 
hearing under such circumstances. (See Guidelines, tj 14(C), Bates Nos. 00039-40.) Thus, 
unlike the Barchi case, due process protection is afforded by providing for an immediate post- 
removal hearing. 
Due process requires "an opportunity to be heard" "at a meanin,riful lime and in a 
meaningful manner." Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 927, 950 P.2d 1262, 1266 
(1998)' quoting Sweitzer v. Dean. 118 Idaho 568, 573, 798 P.2d 27, 32 (1990). Because the 
State Defendants have a significant interest in temporarily removing the bail agents from the List 
for the three above enumerated circumstances and the bailhond agent is provided an 
"immediate" hearing following such removal, the bailhond agent's due process rights are 
protected under the Guidelines. 
B. THE PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE ANY INJURIES THAT RISE TO THE 
LEVEL OF BEING "IRREPARABLE" AND THEREFORE THE REQUEST FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD BE DENIED, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDIES EXIST UNDER THE GUIDELINES AND THE 
EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD 
BE RESERVED. 
Plaintiffs contend that they expend time and resources, including retaining the services of 
an attorney, defending against alleged violations of the Guidelines. (See Plaintiffs' Memo in 
Support, pg. 17.) As a result, Plaintiffs assert the enforcement of Sections 4, 5, and 10 to 14 of 
the Guidelines during the pendency of this action will cause them irreparable injury. (See 
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Plaintiffs' Memo in Support, pg. 18.) Once again the focus of Plaintiffs' contentions is the 
creation and maintenance of the List. 
"A preliminary injunction is granted only in extreme cases where the right is very clear 
and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal." Harris v. Cassia County, 106 
Idaho 513, 681 P.2d 988 (1984), citing Evans v. District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, 47 
Idaho 267,275 P.99, 100 (1929) (emphasis added). The preliminary injunction should be denied 
because: (1) the injury complained of is speculative and does not support the Plaintiffs' request; 
and (2) Plaintiffs are afforded adequate remedies at law under the Guidelines. 
1. The In-juries Alleged Are Not Irreparable And Therefore The Preliminary 
Injunction Pursuant To I.R.C.P. 65(e)(2) Should Be Denied. 
Plaintiffs contend that they allegedly suffer the following irreparable injures when they 
are removed from the List: 
1. Loss of opportunity to enter into agreements with new clients; 
2. Erosion of reputation and as a result inability to grow its business; and 
3. Litigation expenses, including paying for the services of an attorney. 
(See Plaintiffs' Memo in Support, pg. 17.) These alleged injuries are insufficient to support the 
Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. 
a. Lost opportunities can be remedied by monetary damages and therefore 
are not deemed irreparable. 
The Plaintiffs contend that when a bailibond agent is removed from the List, irreparable 
injury follows in the form of lost opportunity to enter into agreements with new clients. (See 
Plaintiffs' Memo in Support, pg. 17.) Because the injury asserted is monetary in nature and 
could be redressed with damages, it does not provide support for Plaintiffs' request for 
preliminary injunction. 
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It has been held that where damages may be addressed by monetary damages, 
preliminary injunction relief should be denied, as the standard of irreparable harm is not met. 
First National Bank and Trust Compuny of Michigan v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Detroit Branch, 495 F .  Supp. 154, 157 (W.D. Mich 1980); Udell v. Idaho State Board of Land 
Commissioners, 119 Idaho 1018, 812 P.2d 325 (199l)(district court had denied preliminary 
injunction because Udells failed to demonstrate irreparable injury which could not be 
compensated by monetary damages.); Farm Service, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 90 Idaho 
570, 586, 414 P.2d 898, 906 (1966), (when seeking protection of a claimed intangible right, the 
court should consider the availability to plaintiff of other remedies such as damages.) 
Monetary damages being available, the loss of opportunity for new clients is not 
sufficient to meet the requirements of irreparable injury. The Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary 
injunction should be denied on this basis. 
b. Plaintiffs' assertion for loss of reputation resulting in an inability to mow 
its business is speculative and cannot sustain a motion for preliminary 
injunction. 
Plaintiffs state that they will suffer irreparable injury because their reputation has been 
eroded resulting in an inability to grow its business. (See Plaintiffs' Memo in Support, pg. 17.) 
Speculative injuries do not rise to the level of "irreparable" to support a grant of preliminary 
injunction: 
An injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy designed to prevent serious 
harm. It is an equitable remedy which is not issued as of course or to restrain an 
act that injurious consequences of which are merely trifling; an injunction ought 
not to be issued except for the prevention of great and irreparable mischief. . . . 
Nor will an injunction issue where the irzjurv suffered involves mere 
inconvenience, or is technical and inconsequential; fanciful, imaginary and 
sentimental; doubtful, eventual or contingent; far-fetched; nominal or theoretical; 
speculative; insubstantial; or merely tenuous or conjectural. This rule applied 
even though an action at law might be maintained for the same injury. 
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43A C.J.S. Injunctions (j 50 (2007)(emphasis added). To support their claim of loss of reputation 
there has to be some measurable effect to their business. 
The bail bond relationship has been defined as contractual with the state on one side and 
the accused and hislher bail agent on the other. State v. Abracadabra, 13 1 Idaho 1 13, 1 16, 952 
P.2d 1249, 1252 (Ct.App. 1998). Thus, Plaintiffs' business and reputation must be considered 
from two perspectives, that of the courts (State) and accused. 
With regard to the courts, if a bailhond agent is removed from the List then his or her 
bond is not accepted by the Fourth Judicial District. (See Guidelines, 5 10, Bates Nos. 0003 1 .) 
However, once that person or entity is returned to the List, there are no lingering effects and the 
bailhond agent is allowed to post bonds without restraint. Id. No measurable damage to a 
bailhond agent's reputation is evidenced in this relationship. 
In the relationship with the accused, a demonstration of loss of reputation leading to an 
inability to grow its business requires the Plaintiffs to show that they attempted to solicit 
business and their offer was rejected because: (1) the accused knows that a particular bailhond 
agent or Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds ("Aladdin"), in their respective entirety, 
were removed from the List; (2) the nature of the removal; and (3) that the removal fiom the List 
was the reason the accused does not want to retain the services of Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs have 
not shown that such has occurred or will occur in the future, and thus, the loss of reputation 
leading to the inability to grow its business remains in the realm of speculation and cannot 
support a request for a preliminary injunction. See Conway v. City of Kenosha Wisconsin, 409 
F.Supp. 344, 349 (E.D.Wash. 1975) (speculative damages to a plaintiff's "good name, character, 
standing and reputation" does not qualify as "irreparable injury7'). 
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c. It is well established that litigation expenses do not constitute as 
irreparable iniury. 
In support of an irreparable injury, Plaintiffs state that they "expend time and resources 
on a daily basis defending and responding to alleged violations of the List." (See Plaintiffs' 
Memo in Support, pg. 17.) These expenses include retaining the services of an attorney. Id. It is 
well settled, however, that "[mlere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable costs, 
does not constitute irreparable injury." Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 
U.S. 1, 24, 94 S.Ct. 1028, 1040, 39 L.Ed.2d 123 (1974); Arnold v. Commodity Futures Trading 
Coinm 'n, 987 F.Supp. 1463, 1469 (S.D.Fl. 1997). 
Since litigation expenses do not constitute irreparable injury, the grant of a preliminary 
injunction on this basis fails. 
2. A Preliminary Iniunction Is Not Warranted Because The Guidelines Provide 
Plaintiffs With An Adequate Legal Remedy. 
"Equitable claims will not be considered when an adequate legal remedy is available." 
Iron Eagle Development, LLC. v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 65 P.3d 509 
(2003). Plaintiffs are provided with a process whereby they can appear before the administrative 
judge and appeal the decision of removal prior to being removed from the List. (See Guidelines, 
5 14, Bates Nos. 00037-00041.) In those three specific circumstances where the baibond agent 
is temporarily removed from the List without a hearing, the bailhond agent is provided an 
immediate hearing to address the removal. Id. If the bailhond agent disagrees with the 
administrative district judge's ruling, then that decision can be appealed. Bailbond agents are 
also afforded an opportunity to request a hearing for reinstatement to the List. 
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By this process, an adequate remedy at law exists to address a bailibond agent's removal 
from the List. Because an adequate legal remedy is available for bailhond agents, the extreme 
remedy of a preliminary injunction should be denied. 
3. The Fourth Judicial District Will Suffer Irreparable Injuries If The Preliminary 
Injunction Is Granted. 
During the motion to dismiss hearing, conducted on August 3, 2007, Plaintiffs admitted 
that a judge, on an individual basis, possesses discretion to approve or deny a bond. See I.C.R. 
46. If the Court were to grant the preliminary injunction, the irreparable injury to the State 
Defendants would occur by creating a backlog of cases within the district. No longer may 
sheriffs and clerks accept bonds preapproved by the Fourth Judicial District. Instead, during the 
pendency of this case, the Fourth Judicial District would have to force judges to add listening to 
each and every bail matter to their already busy dockets. This would create a domino effect 
affecting every case before the judge in terms of time and speedy resolution. 
Furthermore, without the Guidelines, the Fourth Judicial District would be deprived of 
uniformity. For example, a bailbond agent who has failed to secure the presence of the 
defendant in front of Court A can turn around and go to Court B and post bonds for numerous 
defendants, then do the same in Courts C, D, and E. Without the benefit of a mechanical device, 
such as the List, the individual court is deprived of an effective procedure by which it can 
uniformly conlmunicate which bailbond agents cannot be entrusted with a defendant. Contrary 
to the Plaintiffs' assertions, payment is not the main concern of the court: 
[Blail bonds are guaranteed by sureties that have been reviewed and approved by 
the DOI. These sureties are required to be financially solvent and bear the 
responsibility of paying forfeited bonds. Thus, notwithstanding Defendants' 
alarmist concerns to the contrary, there is no real risk of "irreparable injury" to 
Defendants. 
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(See Plaintiffs' Memo in Support, pg. 19.) Payment of forfeited bonds is merely a deterrent to 
assure that bail/bond agents understands the serious nature of their undertaking. However, the 
main concern of the Fourth Judicial District is not the forfeiture, but, rather, securing the 
appearance of the accused back at court. See State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 541, 700 P.2d 
942,944 (1985); United States v. Bass, 573 F.2d 258,260 (5ih Cir. 1978). Without the benefit of 
a uniform system the risks of releasing a defendant into society without a responsible bailhond 
agent to secure the defendant's reappearance in court multiplies. 
Fore the foregoing reasons, the State Defendants respectfully request that the Court, in its 
discretion, maintain the status quo and deny the preliminary injunction request. 
111. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that they are entitled to the relief demanded in their 
Complaint and their request for a preliminary injunction under I.R.C.P. 65(e)(l) should be 
denied. 
Procedurally, as the Complaint seeks the Court to declare the Guidelines unenforceable 
as a whole, a "facial" challenge is being asserted. Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the 
Guidelines, as written, are constitutionally invalid under every conceivable circumstance. 
Furthermore, even if the Court broadly interprets the Plaintiffs' Complaint as asserting an "as- 
applied" challenge, and without conceding, the Plaintiffs prevail, the relief requested in the 
Complaint would exceed the scope of relief allowed. 
Substantively, the Plaintiffsy causes of action for violations of separation of powers and 
due process fail because there are significant factors missing to sustain such claims. With regard 
to the separation of powers violations, the Plaintiffs fail to show how the Guidelines affect a 
bailbond agent's license. The Plaintiffs also fail to show a constitutionally recognized property 
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right, wluch is essential to a due process challenge. Regardless, the Guidelines provide the 
Plaintiffs with all due process protections. 
Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction under I.R.C.P. 65(e)(2) also fails because 
they have not asserted an irreparable harm which would support their motion. Furthermore, 
there are adequate legal remedies afforded under the Guidelines under which the Plaintiffs may 
address removal from the List. 
Fore the foregoing reasons, the State Defendants respecthlly request that the Court, in its 
discretion, maintain the status quo and deny the preliminary injunction request. 
DATED this I q*day of August, 2007. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19 day of August, 2007, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Scott McKay 
NEVIN, BENJAMIK, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 West Bannock 
Boise, ID 83701 
Honorable James J. Judd 
6498 N. Antler Place 
Boise, ID 83703 
US.  Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
C] Overnight Mail 
C] Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
Statehouse Mail 
C] U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
C] Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
Overnight Mail 
C] Facsimile: 
C] Statehouse Mail 
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David Z. Nevin (ISB# 2280) 
Scott McKay (ISB #4309) 
Robyn Fyffe (ISB #7063) 
NEVIN. BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS FRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINIw, INC, a California corporat~on ) 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and ) 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and ) CASE NO. CV OC 0706619 
Anytinlc Bail Bonds; JAMES CARSKE; ) 
and REBECCA SALINAS, ) 
1 
Plaintiffs, 1 
vs. ) 
PLAINTIFFS' RIOTION FOR 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTtI ) LEAVE 'TO AUGMENT THE 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE S T A R  OF ) RECORD RE: PENDING MOTION 
IDAHO, DARLA S. LVILLIAMSON, 111 her ) FOR PREL,IILIINARY 
official capacity as Administrat~ce District ) INJUNCTION 
Judge for the District Court of t11c Foi~rtii ) 
Judicial Dtstnct; LARRY D. REINER, In ) 
h ~ s  official capacity as Trial Court 1 
Adin~nistrator for the District Court of the ) 
Fourth Judicial District; and DIANE 1 
BURRELL, ~ I I  her capacity as Assistant ) 
Trial Co~trt Administrator for the Distnct ) 
Court of the Fourth Judicial District, i 
) 
Defendants. 1 
1 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAL'E TO AUGMENT THE RECORD RE: PENDING 
hlOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Pla~ntiffs, through their attorneys, respectfully move the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
7(b)(l) and 65(e)(2) to augment the record In this case with the record and pleadings from a 
recent ball bond agent hearing, h Re Jli~trrr Ilavls, Fourth Judicial District Case No. CV OT 
0716914. cind to consider that matter in support of Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Preliminary 
Inj~tnctlo~l 
Good cause exists for this rnot~on. blr. Davis is employed by Aladdin Bail Bonds as a 
bail agent Notwithstanding his licens~lre by the Idaho Department of lns~irance and his work as 
a bail agent in the Third Judicial District, Mr. Davis was denied placement on the Fourth Judicial 
District bail agent's list by the Trial Co~il-t Administrator because he mistakenly failed to list on 
his appl~c,it~otl for placement a mlsdemcanor charge for which he recei~ed a withheld judgment 
approxim,~tely seven years ago. Mr. I>a\ is thereafter was compelled, through counsel, to pay a 
filing fee ,111ci petition the Fourth Judic~~il Dlstrlct Court for placement on the list. Following a 
hearing bclore the Administrative District Judge (ADJ), Mr. Davis was permitted placen~ent on 
the I~st so long as he agreed to a term of "probation" devised by the AD.I at the hearing which 
permits LII Davis' removal from the ball agent llst after two "strikes" ~nstead of the four 
"strikes" p~ ovided by the current Rail Bonct Guideli~les. 
l'l~tts, the record in Justtn I)in>rs tlzmonstrates the lack of coiinect~on between 
Defendanti' extensive supervision of bar1 bond agents and the dally operatton of the courts and 
establ~slic~ tliat the Bail Bond Cuidel~nes \ lolate constitutional separat~on of powers. 
Additional 11, the record in Justin DLII'IJ demonstrates the repetitic e and fi-equent recurrence of 
the injur~c\ inflicted by Defendants rise to the level of irreparable and great injury. This motion 15 
2 PL..\INTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AUGMENT TI! E RECORD RE: PENDING 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 1N.JUNCTION 
supported by the record in this case and the contemporaneously filed memorandum of counsel 
and affidavit together with exhibits. 
F. 
DATED this & day of November, 2007. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Scott McKay L-' 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on November &, 2007,I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document to be 
- mailed 
)( hand delivered 
-
- faxed 
to Honorable James F. Judd, 6498 N. Antler Place, Boise, ID 83703 and Mr. Soo Y. Kang, 
Deputy Idaho Attorney General, Statehouse Room 210, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720 
P-+-  
Scott McKay 
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M & LINDR JUDD 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT I 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
1 TWO JINN, INC., dba ALADDIN BAIL) 
BONDS and ANYTIME BAIL ) 
BONDS; JAMES GARSKE; AND 1 case NO. C\I OC 07 0661 9 REBECCA SALINAS, 1 
1 ORDER PERMITTING Piaintiffs, ) AUGMENTATION OF THE 
VS. 1 RECORD AND SETTING 1 TIME FOR ANY 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ) RESPONSE BY STATE 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE ) DEFENDANTS 
OF IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, ) 
in her official capacity as 1 
Administrative District Judge; 1 
LARRY D. REINER, in his official 1 
capacity as Trial Court 1 
Administrator; and DIANE 1 
BURRELL, in her official capacity as) 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator, ) 
) 
Defendants. 1 
On November 16,2007 Two Jinn filed documents seeking to augment 
the record with additional materials. 
In the interest of judicial economy, it is appropriate such augmentation 
be permitted. Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Two Jinn's filings shall be accepted as an augmentation of the record. 
2. The State  Defendants shall be permitted to file their response, if any, 
ORDER PERMIWING AUGMENTATION OF THE RECOW AND 
SETTING TlME FOR ANY RESPONSE BY STATE DEFENDANTS Page 1 of 2 
7 3 : 2 6 P H  & L I N D A  JUDD 
to Two Jinn's augmentation no later than November 28. 2007. 
3. Two Jinn shall file their reply, if any, no later than December 4, 2007. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition to any original pleading, 
motion, brief or memorandum hereafter filed with the Clerk of the Court, a 
chamber's copy of the same shall be provided to the undersigned at his 
residence address which may be obtained from Deputy Clerk Nicol Tyler 
(208) 287-7691. 
4 
DATED this 1 7 ' day of November, 2007 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE G' 
I hereby certify that on the ( ?  day of November, 2007 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid or, if the Fax service block is checked. sent a copy via 
facsimile to: 
David 2. Nevin 
Scott McKay 
Fax Service 
- 
Robyn ~yfTe 
N W I N ,  BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLEU LLP 345-8274 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ldaho 83701-2772 
Fax 
Service. 
Jeremy C. Chou 
Soo Y .  Kang d' 
Deputy Attorneys General 854-8073 
Statehouse, Room 21 0 
P,O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010 
Clerk of the D3strict Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO J N ,  mC., a California corporation 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and 
Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and 
REBECCA SALNAS, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her 
official capacity as Administrative District 
Judge for the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District; LARRY D. RENER, in his 
official capacity as Trial Court Administrator 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District; and DIANE BURRELL, in her 
capacity as Assistant Trial Court 
Administrator for the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District, 
Defendants. 
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c 0 h 4 ~  NOW Defendants the Honorable Darla S. Williamson, Larry D. Reiner, and Diane 
Burrell (collectively "State Defendants"), by and through their legal counsel, the Office of the 
ldaho Attorney General, and hereby file this Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to 
Augment the Record RE: Pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
1. ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' seek to augment the record with In Re Justin Davis ("Davis Record"), Fourth 
Judicial District Case No. CV OT 07'16914. (See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Augment the Record ("Augment Memo"), pg. 2.) The Motion for Leave to Augment concerns 
Plaintiffs' wish to include the Davis Record in this proceeding to "illustrate how the Guidelines 
violate separation of powers and how [State] Defendants' u n l a h l  enforcement of the 
Guidelines inflicts Plaintiffs with injuries of a repetitive and frequent nature." (See Augment 
Memo, pg. 2.) Such "illustration," however, is simply unnecessary and adds nothing to the 
present case. 
The Davis Record adds nothing of value other than another example of the court 
exercising its authority under the Guidelines. The factual circunlstances contained in Mr. Davis' 
individual case does not assist this Court in analyzing the ultimate issue in the proceedings: 
whether the Guidelines, as written, are enforceable. Because the Davis Record fails to provide 
anything of value to that issue the State Defendants respectfully request that this Court deny 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Augment. 
A. THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR MR. DAVIS IS TO FILE AN APPEAL - NOT 
TO SUBMIT HIS CASE FOR CONSIDERATION IN THESE PROCEEDINGS. 
If Mr. Davis has issue with the decision rendered by Judge Williamson in his case, then 
he has the ability to appeal that decision. Instead, the application of the Guidelines to Mr. Davis' 
situation is being used by Plaintiffs to invalidate the Guidelines, as a whole. The State 
STATE DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AUGMENT 
THE RECORD RE: PENDING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 2 
aoass 
Defendants reiterate that there is a distinction between an as-applied challenge and a facial 
challenge. Use of Mr. Davis' particular set of circumstances does not get the Plaintiffs the relief 
they seek in this case, which concerns a facial challenge. 
A facial challenge is one "purely of law" and the Court need only look at the Guidelines, 
as written, to see if it passes constitutional muster. American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. 
Idaho Department of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, , 154 P.3d 433,441-42 (2007), citing 
State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998)ra facial challenge to a statute or 
rule is 'purely' a question of law"). 
A court may hold a statute unconstitutional either because it is invalid "on its 
face" or because it is unconstitutional "as applied" to a particular set of 
circumstances. Each holding carries an important difference in terms of outcome: 
If a statute is unconstitutional as applied, the State may continue to enforce the 
statute in different circumstances where it is not unconstitutional, but if a statute is 
unconstitutional on its face, the State may not enforce the statute under any 
circumstances. Traditionally, a plaintiffs burden in an as-applied challenge is 
different from that in a facial challenge. In an as-applied challenge, "the plaintiff 
contends that application of the statute in the particular context in which he has 
acted, or in which he proposes to act, would be unconstitutional." Ada v. Guam 
Soc i, of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 101 1, 1012, 1 13 S.Ct. 633, 
634, 121 L.Ed.2d 564 (1992)(Scalia, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 962 F.2d 
1366 (9& Cir. 1992). Therefore, the constitutional inquiry in an as-applied 
challenge is limited to the plaintiffs particular situation. In comparison, the 
Court explained in Salerno that 
[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge 
to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that [an Act] 
might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is 
insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an 
"overbreadth" doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. 
481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. at 2100. In other words, a facial challenge to a statute 
should fail if the statute has a constitutional application. 
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Women S Medical Proft.ssional Cory. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 193-94 (6" Cir. 1997). Two 
Jinn seeks to use Mr. Davis' situation to support its position that the Guidelines, as a whole, are 
unenforceable. This particular situation, however, is irrelevant to the matter before the Court. 
During oral argument, Plaintiffs represented to the Court that the "as-applied v. facial" 
analysis is only relevant to actions by the legislature, i.e. challenging the validity of a statute. 
This is incorrect. If the basis of the challenge is constitutional the "as-applied v. facial" analysis 
is applicable, even to rules adopted by a court. See Kansas Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 
F.Supp.2d 1209, 1228-1238 (D.Kan. 2006) (as-applied and facial analysis applied to a 
constitutional challenge of judicial canons adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court). 
Because the relief sought is the invalidation of the Guidelines as a whole (facial 
challenge), the application of the Guidelines to Mr. Davis' factual circumstances is irrelevant, 
and frankly prejudicial, to the pending proceedings. Furthennore, an as-applied challenge may 
not be pursued because Mr. Davis is not a party to this action. The Davis Record is thus 
irrelevant to the pending proceedings and the Court should deny Plaintiffs' request to augment 
the record. 
B. THE KELEASE OF A DEFENDANT ON BAIL IS A CONTRACTUAL MATTER 
BETWEEN THE COURT AND THE BAIL AGENT. 
In their request to augment the record, the Plaintiffs continue to maintain that the bail 
bond profession is solelv within the purview of the Department of Insurance (.'DOI"). (See 
Augment Memo, pg. 5.) The Plaintiffs contend the court's continued enforcement of the 
Guidelines, as in the case of Mr. Davis, interferes with the DOI's statutorily charged duty to 
regulate the bail bond profession. Id. Conspicuously absent in the Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Augment, and the present record before the Court, is citation to any authority - case law, 
statutory, or other authority - which substantiates their position. To the contrary, settled law iiz 
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Idaho provides tlzat matters regarding a defendant's release on bail are between tlze court and 
the bail anent. See I.C. fj 19-2901 (only the court can set the bail); I.C. 5 19-2902 (the court 
decides the amount of bail, the court forfeits the bail, the court exonerates bail, and the court 
revokes bail)(emphasis added). 
When a bail agent promises that a criminal defendant will appear at a time certain, that 
promise is to the court and not the DOI. The appearance of a defendant before the court is 
central to the administration and daily operation of the courts. See State v. Simpson, 839 A.2d 
896, 900-902 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 2003). The ADJ has inherent authority in matters of 
administration over the management and supervision of a unified court system, including 
entering into contracts, on behalf of the State, with bail agents for release of defendants to their 
care. See Abracadabra, supra; Idaho Const., art. V, 5 2; I.C. 5 1-907; Order dated August 4, 
2005. This relationship is separate and distinct from the DOI's statutory authority regulating the 
licensure of bail agents. The application of the Guidelines to Mr. Davis' situation is irrelevant to 
these proceedings because it does not assist with the resolution of the issues before this Court, 
namely, whether the ADJ has the authority to promulgate the Guidelines and contract with bail 
agents. 
C. RESPONSIBILITY V. OBLIGATION 
The Plaintiffs contend that because the surety insurance company is liable to the court if a 
defendant fails to appear, the bail agent owes no responsibility to the court. (See Augment 
Memo, pg. 5)("As a licensed bail agent in the line of surety insurance, Mr. Davis is authorized to 
deliver and execute bail bonds on behalf of the surety insurance company. The surety, not the 
agent, is liable to the court if a defendant fails to appear.") There is a distinction between 
responsibility and obligation. 
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The United States District Court for New Jersey summed up the responsibility/obligation 
distinction as follows: 
New Jersey's courts, like most court systems, permit individuals and companies 
to post bail bonds for criminal defendants in return for a fee. Once the bondsman 
posts bail, it then becomes his responsibility to get the defendant to court. If the 
defendant fails to appear, then the bail posted is forfeited, and the bondsman 
either becomes responsible for the amount of bail or for ensuring that the fugitive 
defendant is captured and brought to court. The bondsman's obligation to satisfy 
the bail in the event the defendant absconds may be underwritten by insurance 
companies licensed to do business in New Jersey. 
Capital Bonding Corp. v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 127 F.Supp.2d 582, 584 (D.N.J. 2001). 
The bail agent is responsible for the reappearance of the defendant in court. The surety 
insurance company is obligated to satisfy the bond should the defendant abscond. The surety 
insurance company assumes that obligation from the bail agent. However, the responsibility to 
get the defendant in court remains with the bail agent. The courts need to have some mechanism 
to ensure that the administration of bail bond issues proceed efficiently and effectively. To do 
that, it is not unreasonable for the courts to look to the bail agent as the "point person." The bail 
agent secures the defendant's release by presenting a bond. That bail agent is the "face" of the 
bail and the person who the court deals with directly when issues arise regarding the bond. That 
the surety insurance company is liable for the financial ramifications should the defendant 
abscond does not relieve the bail agent of his or her responsibility. This is further supported by 
the language found in the bail statutes, chapter 29, title 19, Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code 8 19-2910 lists among the qualifications to be a bail a requirement that the 
bail be "a resident, householder or freeholder within the state . . . ." Idaho Code 8 19-2910(1). 
Only natural persons can be residents, householders or freeholders. While a corporation or other 
legal entity is, of course, domiciled in a particular state, this is not the same as being a resident, 
householder or freeholder. Idaho Code 5 19-2930 fixther provides that upon the death of "his 
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bail," a defendant may be arrested and recommitted to custody. Idaho Code $ 19-2930(2). 
While a corporation or other legal entity might become defunct, bankrupt or even dissolved, it is 
hard to envision the use of the word *'dead" when referencing such entities. Rather, this term is 
restricted to referring to the status or condition of a human being. Thus, the "bail" referenced in 
these statutes, and to whom a defendant is released, is the bail agent and not a surety insurance 
company. 
Historically, this makes sense. The courts have always looked to the bail agent as the 
person responsible for defendants released to his or her care. Chapter 29, title 19, Idaho Code 
were promulgated in 1864 by the territorial legislature, and it is probably a safe assumption that 
in the mid-Nineteenth Century the territorial government had in mind a living, breathing person 
when contemplating a bail agent. Afier all, this was a time in our history long before the advent 
of formal surety companies writing bail bonds covering criminal defendants in the West. Thus, 
the court in entering into a contract for the release of the defendant on bail is not contracting with 
the surety insurance company, but, rather, the bail agent. 
The factual circumstances underlying Mr. Davis' case is irrelevant to these proceedings. 
To effectively counter the appointment of the bail agent as the responsible party requires the 
Plaintiffs to modify the bail statutes. Mere blanket statements are not enough to counter over a 
century of history. See In re Olen Leader, 143 Idaho 635, 15 1 P.3d 83 1, 836 (2007)("Modifying 
statutes to make them applicable to bail bond agents and surety companies is the province of the 
legislature.") 
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D. EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS AND RESOURCES ADDRESSING MR. DAVIS' 
APPLICATION AROSE OUT OF' MR. DAVIS' FAILURE TO TRUTHFULLY 
SUPPLY INFORMATION REQUIRED BU THE APPLICATION AND 
GUIDELINES. 
Plaintiffs argue that they are "forced" to expend time and resources addressing 
interference with their business. (See Augment Memo, pg. 5.) Interestingly, the Plaintiffs do not 
deny Mr. Davis violated the terms of the Guidelines in applying to submit bail in the Fourth 
Judicial District. The resulting hearing arose because Mr. Davis failed to truthfully answer 
questions contained in the application. Mr. Davis' failure to truthfully answer the questions in 
the application does not assist the Court in determining the validity of the Guidelines. 
11. CONCLUSION 
In light of the facts and legal authority presented, the State Defendants respectfully 
request the Court deny the Plaintiffs Motion to Augment the Record. 
DATED this 28' day of November, 2007. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By 9. i i. : C 
Soo Y. KANG .# i /  
Deputy Attorney General 
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Scott McKay 
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Honorable James J. Judd 
6498 N. Antler Place 
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Hand Delivery 
Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
[I] Overnight Mail 
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Hand Delivery 
C]  Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
Overnight Mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
1 
TWO JINN, INC., dba ALADDIN > 
BAIL BONDS and ANVTXME, 1 
BAIL BONDS; JAMES GARSKE; 1 case NO. CV OC 07 06619 
AND REBECCA SALINAS, 1 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION 
PZaintz@c, 1 AND 
'C'S . 1 ORDER I 
DISTIUCT COURT OF TWE 1 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ) 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO; 1 
DARLA S. WLLWWON, in her 
official capacity as 1 
Administrative District Judge; 1 
LARRY D. REINER, in his official ) 
capacity as Trial Court 1 
Admidstrator; and DUNE 1 
BURRIELL, in her official 1 
capacity as Assistant Trial Court 1 
Administrator, 1 
1 
Defendants. 1 
State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss: DENIED. Two Jinn, Inc. 
et al's Motion for Preliminary Injunction: DENIED. 
David Z Nevin, Scott MeKay and Robyn Fyffe, Boise, 
Lawyers for Two Jinn, Inc., James Garske, Rebecca Salinas and 
Swlshine Musik, Plaintiffs. 
Jeremy C. Chou and Soo Y. Kang, Deputy Attorneys 
General, Boise, Lawyers for District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District, Hon. Darla S. Williamson, Administrative District 
Judge, Larry D. Reiner, Trial Court Administrator and Diane 
Burrell, Assistant Trial Court Administrator. 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff, Two J~M, Inc., dba Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail 
Bonds, is licensed by the State of Idaho as and is engaged in the bail bond 
agency business in Idaho. Plaintiff James Garske is licensed by the State of 
Idaho as a bail bond agent and is employed by Two Jinn as a supervising bail 
bond agent. Plaintiff Rebecca Salinas is licensed by the State of Idaho as a 
bail bond agent and is employed by Two Jinn as a bail bond agent. The 
Plaintiffs will hereinafter collectively be referred to as "Two Jinn." 
As relevant to this action, Two Jinn's business activities are in the 
courts of the Fourth Judicial District and are conducted pursuant to the Bail 
Bond Guidelines adopted by the Fourth Judicial District. Two Jinn believes 
that it has been wrongfully and adversely impacted by the Fourth Judicial 
District B d  Bond Guidelines. Two Jinn has brought this action for a judicial 
determination of the cons~tutiondity, scope and application of the Fourth 
Judicial District Bail Bond Guidelines. 
The named Defendants are the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho; Darla S. Williamson, in her official capacity as 
Administrative Dishict Judge; Larry D. Reiner, in his official capacity as 
Trial Court Administrator; and Diane Burrell, in her official capacity as 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator (hereinafter the defendants shall be 
collectively referred to as the "State Defendants'). The District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District (herein after Fourth Judicial District) is a state 
judicial administrative district of the courts located in the counties of Ada, 
Boise and Elmore. Judge Darla S. Williamson is the duly acting 
Administrative District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District and as such is 
charged with the overall administration of the courts in the Fourth Judicial 
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District. Judge Williamson will herein after be referred to as the "ADJ". 
Larry D. Reiner and Diane Burrell are employed respectively as the Trial 
Court Administrator and Assistant Trial Court Administrator of the Fourth 
JudiciaI District and hereinafter be referred to respectively as the "TCA" and 
the "Assistant TCA". 
The State Defendants have moved for dismissal pursuant I.R.C.P. 
12@)(6) and Two Jinn has moved for a preliminary injunction pursuant to 
1.RC.P. 65(e)(i). Although the two matters were argued separately, t?aey are 
intertwined and will be addressed in this single opinion. 
ISSUES 
The parties have identified various issues including: 
1. Does the Administrative District Judge have the authority to 
adopt Bailbond guidelines? 
a. Do the Guidelines as adopted exceed the ADJ's authority? 
3. Do the Guidelines as adopted exceed the due process rights of 
Bail bents? 
4. Do the Guidelines as adopted conflict with the insurance statutes 
regulating Bail Agents? 
5. Does the Bail Agents' acknowledgement, waiver, and certification 
in acceptance of the Guidelines form an enforceable contract 
between the 4fh District Courts and the Bail Agent? 
6. Are the Two Jinn plaintiffs entitled to the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of Sections 4, 
5 and 10 to 14 of the Guidelines? 
These issues will be addressed below, but not necessarily in the order listed. 
The matters presented to this court relate to the authority to adopt 
Guidelines and their operation. Questions as to the necessity or wisdom of 
the Guidelines adopted are not within the scope of this action. 
S m Y  JUI)Gl!vlENT STANDARD 
Although the State Defendants have characterized their motion as 
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being brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12 (b)(6), they have presented and are 
asking the court to consider significant materials outside of the Complaint, 
the only pleading of record. Thus the last sentence of Rule 12 (b) 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss 
for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and 
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
compels that their motion be treated .as one for summary judgment. 
The standard for summary judgment was set forth in Shawver u. 
HuckIeberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354,360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004) 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, 
and discovery documents on file with the court, read in a light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no 
material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
As relates to this motion, the basis for granting of a preliminary 
injunction is controlled by I.R.C.P. 65(e) which provides in pertinent part: 
A preliminary injunction may be granted in the following cases: 
(1) W e n  it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is 
entitled to the relief demanded, and such relief, or any part 
thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance 
of the acts complained of, either for a limited period or 
perpetually. 
(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the 
commission or continuance of some act during the litigation 
would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury to the 
plain tie. 
An injunction will be granted only in extreme eases and the party seeking 
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an injunction has the burden of proof. See Ha& u. Cassia County, 106 
Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.nd 988, 993 (1984). 'The granting or refusal of an 
injunction is a matter resting largely in the trial court's discretion." Conley 
u. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265,272,985 P.nd 1127,1135 (1999). 
HISTORY OF W L  BONDS 
The term "bail" has various meanings, i.e. : 
The term "bail" has been used to refer to the means of 
procuring the release from custody of one charged with an 
offense, while also ensuring his or her future attendance in 
court and compelling him or her to remain within the 
jurisdiction of the court. Bail is a device which exists to ensure 
society's interest in having an accused answer to a criminal 
prosecution, without unduly restricting his liberty and without 
ignoring the accused's right to be presumed innocent. The word 
"bail" may also be used to refer to the security or bond for a 
defendant's appearance in court and also to designate the 
person in whose custody the defendant is placed when released 
fTom jail and who acts as a surety for the appearance of the 
defendant or party under arrest. This person is also sometimes 
described as the "surety," or the "bailor." A person released on 
bail is generally referred to as the "principal." "Bail" has been 
used as a verb meaning the delivery of an accused to persons 
who by law become security for his appearance in court when it 
is required. 
# * *  
While released on bail prior to trial, a defendant is still 
considered to be within the constructive custody of the law. 
The fixing of bail and release from custody are matters 
traditionally within the discretion of the courts. 
Within the context of the issues before the court and in order to avoid 
confusion, the parties involved in a bail transaction will be characterized as 
follows: 
The Defendant is the "principal." 
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The entity providing the bond is the "surety." 
The individual acting for the surety is the 'bail agent." 
The agency employing bail agents is the 'bail bond agency." 
The managing agent for a bail bond agency is the "supervising bail 
agent." 
In order to address the issues raised, it is important to clarify the 
purpose of bail, the traditional statutory methods of posting the same and 
the current use of surety insurance. 
It has been said that the purpose of bail is to ensure the 
presence or secure the attendance, of the accused at trial, that 
is, to guarantee the appearance of the accused before the court 
at such times as court may direct; 
U Y W  
The purpose of bond is not to collect revenue. Nor, due to 
the presumption of innocence, is the object of bail to effect 
punishment in advance of conviction; bail is a device which 
exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer 
to a criminal prosecution without unduly restricting his or her 
liberty and without ignoring the accused's right to be presumed 
innocent. Nor is bail a method to punish sureties. 
* + *  
8AAm Jur ad 5 2. 
The Supreme court reviewed the history of bail and the application of 
the Idaho bail statutes to bail bonds in Leader u. Reiner, 143 Idaho 635, 
639-640,151 P.gd 831, 835-836 (2007) where it provided: 
Many of the Appellant's arguments made below center 
upon applying specific provisions and words in Idaho's bail 
statutes to bail bonds. The problem with that approach is that 
most of the applicable statutes were enacted before there were 
bail bonds. The bail statutes provide that to be released from 
custody on bail, the defendant first had to have a judge set the 
dollar amount of bail. I.C. 5 19-2901 & 19-2902. The defendant 
then had two statutory options. One option was to deposit cash 
with the clerk of the court in the amount that the judge set for 
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bail. I.C. 5 19-2922. The other option was to have two 
sufficient sureties execute and acknowledge before the judge 
the undertaking of sufficient bail. I.C. 19-2909. In the 
undertaking, the sureties promised to pay the sum specified by 
the judge as bail if the defendant Eailed to appear or to hold 
himself amenable to the orders and process of the court. Id. 
The sureties each had to be a resident, householder, or 
freeholder in this state, and they each had to be worth the 
amount specified in the undertaking exclusive of property 
exempt from execution. I.C. 9 ig-2910. The court could also 
require that they be residents of the county where the bail is 
offered. Id. The sureties had to sign affidavits showing that 
they possessed the statutory qualifications to be bail, and the 
court could examine them under oath regarding their 
sufficiency to pay the amount of the undertaking. I.C. 5 ig- 
2911. All of the statutes cited in this paragraph were adopted in 
1864 by the territorial legislature. None of them have since 
been amended except Idaho Code 5 19-2909, and the 
amendments to that statute were not substantive. These 
statutes do not address bail bonds because bail bonds did not 
exist when they were enacted. Appellant is attempting to make 
them apply to the bail bond agents, supervising agents, and 
surety companies that exist today. Neither the bail bond agent 
nor the surety company fits the statutory qualifications of the 
two sufficient sureties set forth in Idaho Code 5 19-2910. 
Nodifylng the statutes to make them applicable to bail bond 
agents and surety companies is the province of the legislature. 
The use of bail surety bonds was approved by the Idaho Legislature 
when it enacted I.C. 541-2604 (S.L. 1961, ch. 330, 8557) which permitted 
surety insurers qualified under the Idaho Insurance statutes to become the 
sole surety on bonds. When it adopted the Idaho Criminal Rules and the 
Misdemeanor Criminal Rules in 1979, effective July I, 1980, the Supreme 
Court explicitly recognized the posting of bail by use of a surety bond. 
I.C.R. 46(d) and M.C.R. 13(c)(3). 
In State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 116, 952 P.2d 
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1249,1252 (Ct. App 1998), Idaho clearly established that: 
A bail bond agreement is a suretyship contract between 
the state on one side and an accused and his or her surety on 
the other side, whereby the surety guarantees the appearance of 
an accused. . . . The extent of the surety's undertaking is 
determined by the bond agreement and is subject to the rules of 
contract law and suretyship. 
. . . (Citations omitted). 
The absence of legislation or Supreme Court rules relating to bail 
surety bonds has led to the adoption of guidelines such as those in question 
in this action. 
BAIL AGENTS RELATIONSHIP WS-A-VIS THE SURETY 
Only surety insurance companies licensed by the Idaho Department of 
Insurance may lawNly issue bail bonds. I.C. 55 41-305, 41-507 and 41- 
2604. Bail bond agencies and bail agents such as the plaintiffs are each 
licensed by the Idaho Department of Insurance as "a producer in the line of 
surety insurance. " I.C. 941-1039. 
The relationship of a bail agent to the bail bond agency and to the 
surety is grounded in agency law and is that of an agent to a disclosed 
principal. See the bail bond exemplar, Plaintiff's Exbibit 1. Absent 
provisions in the agreements between I) the surety and the bail bond agency; 
2) the surety and the bail agent; and 3) the bail bond agency and the bail 
agent,' the bail agent is not a party to the suretyship contract between the 
state on one side and an accused and his or her surety on the other side. 
See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. flcrner ins. Agency, Inc., 96 
Idaho 691,696-697,535 P.nd 664, 669-670 (1975). 
I Although copies of the bail agent's contract with the surety and/or the agents contract 
the supervising agent are required to be submitted to the TCA under 5 11 of the 
Guidelines, no exemplars have been included in the record. 
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Sureties are given wide latitude in dealing witb bonded defendants 
who default in making a court appearance. The common law scope of this 
authority has been stated in Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371-372, 21 
L.Ed. 287 (1872) as: 
When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the 
custody of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the 
original imprisonment. Whenever they choose to do so, they 
may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge; and if that 
cannot be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be 
done. They may exercise their rights in person or by agent. They 
may pursue him into another State; may arrest him on the 
Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and enter his house for 
that purpose. The seizure is not made by virtue of new process. 
None is needed. It is likened to the rearrest by the sheriff of an 
escaping prisoner. * * *. [I]t is said: 'The bail have their 
principal on a string, and may pull the string whenever they 
please, and render him in their discharge.' 
Given the corporate nature of the surety insurance companies authorized to 
issue bail bonds, they must of necessity act through agents, i.e. bail agencies 
and bail agents. 
AUTHORITY OF ADMIN1ISTRATIVE DISTRICT JUDGE 
Judicial rule making power is inherently vested in the "Supreme Court, 
district courts, and such other courts . . . ." Art. V §§ 2 and 13 Idaho 
Constitution. Also see I.C. $8 1-212 and 1-213. Inherent and specific rule 
making authority has been vested in'administrative district judges by (I) I.C. 
5 1-90?, which provides in part: 
The administrative judge or acting administrative judge in each 
judicial district, subject to the rules of the Supreme Court, shall 
have administrative supervision and authority over the 
operation of the district courts and magistrates in the district.; 
by (2) I. CAR. 42(e), which provides: 
'The powers and duties of the administrative judge include all 
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those powers and duties as established by the Supreme Court," 
and by (3) the August 4, 2005 Idaho Supreme Court Order regarding the 
job description, power and duties of an administrative district judge which 
provides in pertinent part: 
(17) delegate powers and duties to judges and court personnel 
as necessary and appropriate;. 
(18) establish guidelines for bail bonds with regard to posting, 
forfeiture, exoneration and all other matters; 
The scope of this rule making authority relates to procedural matters 
as opposed to substantive ones. See State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862,863,828 
P.nd 891, 892 (1992). In trying to distinguish procedural matters from 
substantive ones, the Supreme Court in State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 
541,700 P.nd 942,944 (1985), quoting State v. Smith, 84 Wash-ed 498, 527 
P.ad 674,676-77 (19741, established the following guidance: 
Although a clear line of demarcation cannot always be 
delineated between what is substantive and what is procedural, 
the following general guidelines provide a useful framework for 
analysis. Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct 
and punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, 
and regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and 
procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of 
the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are 
effectuated, 
The ADJ had and has the authority to adopt bail bond guidelines. 
ADOP'I'TON OF THE GUIDELINES 
The Fourth Judicial District Bail Bond Guidelines were adopted by the 
ADJ on April 16, 2004. The ADJ subsequently modified the Guidelines on 
July 16, 2004, August 25, 2004, October 1, 2004, December 9, 2005, 
October 17, 2006, and November 13, 2006. A complete copy of tbe 
Guidelines as modified, together with copies of the various transmittal 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Page 10 of 17 
documents have been filed as an exhibit in this matter. AU references to the 
Guidelines will be to the Guidelines as stated in that exhibit. 
?'he adoption of the Guidelines prior to the entry of the August 4,2005 
Idaho Supreme Court Order regarding the job description, power and 
duties of an administrative district judge does not vitiate either the ADJ's 
authority or the adoption of the Guidelines. 
SCOPIE OF THE GUIDELINES 
The foci of Two Jinn's complaints are the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 
and lo through 14 of the Guidelines. In large part these sections deal with 
establishment of a list of approved bail agents, the process of being placed on 
or removed from the list of authorized bail agents and the requirement that 
only bail bonds filed by authorized bail agents are to be accepted as bail in 
the Fourth Judicial District. 
It is the long recognized general rule that the "fixing of bail and release 
from custody are matters traditionally within the discretion of the courts. 
We believe that these matters are most wisely left to the trial judge." State 
v. Fry,  128 Idaho 50, 53, 910 P.ad 164, 167 (Ct. App. 1994); Stah v. 
Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 541, 700 P.ad 942, 944 (1985); State v. 
Kerrigan, 98 Idaho 701~ 571 P.nd 762 (1977); State u. Jiminez, 93 Idaho 
140, 456 P.ad 784 (1969); State v. Dunn, 91 Idaho 870,434 P.nd 88 (1967). 
This discretion also extends to the approval of the bail agents and bail bond 
agencies who post bail bonds as agents of the surety. See 8A Am Jur ad 03. 
It should be noted that the Guidelines make no attempt to approve 
sureties or bail bond agencies. The scope is strictly limited to bail agents 
and supervising bail agents. 
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LIST OF AUTHORIZED BAIL AGENTS 
At1 parties concede that the maintenance of a list of authorized bail 
agents is an administrative efficiency. Thus each trial judge could establish 
and maintain a list of authorized bail agents. However with 29 trial judges in 
the Fourth Judicial District, the maintenance of individual lists would be 
cumbersome and inefficient. Additionally, the establishment of the amount 
of bail for certain offenses is established by Supreme Court rule and for 
offenses not listed in the approved bail bond schedule, a bail schedule maybe 
established by individual judges. See M.C.R 13(a) and (b). Support for such 
a district wide list is found in the provision of M.C. R 13(c)(3) that provides: 
(3) Surety bail bond. By depositing, in lieu of cash, a bond or 
bond certificate which guarantees payment of the amount of the 
bail bond in the event the person charged fails to appear when 
required by the court. A fidelity, surety, guaranty, title or trust 
company authorized to do business in the state of Idaho and 
authorized to become and be accepted as sole surety on 
undertakings and bonds may execute the written undertakings 
provided for in these rules, which may be accepted by the 
person receiving the bond without prior approval by a judge 
unless otherwise ordered by the administrative judge 
of the judicial district. (emphasis added). 
The establishment of a district wide list of authorized bail agents is an 
appropriate exercise of an AD J's authority. 
PROCEDURE FORACCESS AND -0V;QC 
The dispute concerning the authorized list of bail agents relates to how 
one is placed on the list and how one maybe removed from the list The 
Guidelines' requirements are substantially the same as the Department of 
Insurance's requirements for licensure. The State Defendants maintain that 
the Guidelines' requirements are procedural requirements to assist the 
judiciary in its discretionary determination of whether or not to accept a 
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bond filed by a bail agent. The State Defendants support the procedural 
aspects of the Guidelines as being necessitated by conclusory statements in 
the ADJ's August LQ, 2007 affidavit, to-wit: 
6. The critical factor in assuring that the accused returns to 
court at the appointed time is the bail agent to whom the 
accused is being released. It is the bail agent who makes 
contact with the accused and determines the risks of writing the 
bonds on his or her behalf. By writing the bond, the bail agent 
undertakes to assure the accused's appearance, and the 
corollaries of that obligation are the duty to monitor and 
supervise the accused after release on bail and to recapture 
should he or she fail to appear. 
* * *  
14. The character of the bail/bond agent is a criticd factor for 
the courts in releasing an accused into his or her care. If the 
bail/bond agent engages in criminal activity, such as writing a 
check with insufficient funds, then that person's character, 
ethics, and veracity is called into question. The very 
characteristics considered when releasing an accused into his or 
her care. If the bailbond agent cannot be trusted to ensure 
that the accused returns to court at the appointed time, then the 
judicial system, along with the public's welfare is affected. 
Y * Y  
. . 
As indicated above, these conclusions, while perhaps based upon evidence 
not in the current record, ignore the principals of agency law and the nature 
of the suretyship contract between the state and the surety. The conclusions 
are insufficient to support the State Defendants' requested summary 
judgment. 
However under the current record, the Guidelines do create 
substantive requirements by requiring the bail agent to assume 
responsibility to 
ensure that a forfeited bond is timely paid, notwithstanding the 
right of the state of county to pursue collection of a forfeited 
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bond from the insurance company, and notwithstanding and 
agreement between the bail agent and the insurance company." 
Guidelines 81. 
This requirement is enforced by 517 of the Guidelines that requires the 
bail agent within ninety (go) days of a bond forfeiture to: 
(I) Surrender the defendant; or 
(2) Pay to the Clerk of the Court the full amount of the 
forfeited bond; or 
(3) File with the court a sufficient motion for exoneration or to 
set aside the forfeiture . . . . 
The potential consequences for a bail agent who fails to comply with 617 are 
removal from the list of authorized bail agents as provided in 014 of the 
Guidelines. This requirement in effect makes the bail agent a co-surety and, 
unless licensed as a surety, in violation of the provisions of I.C. PI 41-305,41- 
507 and 41-2604. 
Based upon the record before me at this time and for purposes of these 
motions, the provisions of the Guidelines that ignore the agency relationship 
between the bail agent and the surety are substantive in nature and would 
constitute an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power. I.C. 91-213. 
REMOVAL OF BAIL AGENT - DUE PROCESS 
While I have h d  that the adoption of the Guidelines is within the 
discretion and authority of the ADJ, the procedure followed is sufficiently 
similar to a licensing scheme that I deem that a property right attaches to a 
bail agents authorization to file bonds under the Guidelines. Thus the bail 
agent is entitled to due process in any proceeding to remove him or her from 
the list of authorized bail agents. 
The Idaho Supreme Court discussed the nature of due process in 
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P-ad 917, 
926 (1999) holding: 
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Procedural due process requires that "there must be some 
process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived 
of his rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions. 
This requirement is met when the defendant is provided with 
notice and an opportunity to be heard." * * * The opportunity 
to be heard must occur "at a meanin@ time and in a 
meaningful manner" in order to satisfy the due process 
requirement. * * * Due process "is not a concept to be applied 
rigidly in every matter. Rather, it 'is a flexible concept calling 
for such procedural protections as are warranted by the 
particular situation.' * It * (Internal citations omitted) 
The provisions of 88 11 and 14 of the Guidelines provide due process 
regarding issues raised under the Guidelines as to individuals being added or 
removed from the List of Authorized Bail Agents and issue relating to the 
exoneration or the setting aside of the forfeiture of bail. 
The standards for testing alleged due process violations were recently 
discussed in American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. of Water 
Resources, 143 Idaho 862,870-871,354 P.3d 433,441-442 (2007) 
A party may challenge a statute as unconstitutional "on its face" 
or "as applied" to the party's conduct. * * * A facial challenge to 
a statute or rule is "purely a question of law." * * * Generally, a 
facial challenge is mutually exclusive from an as applied 
challenge. * * * For a facial constitutional challenge to succeed, 
the party must demonstrate that the law is unconstitutional in 
all of its applications. Id. In bthther words, "the challenger must 
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the 
[law] would be valid." Id. In contrast, to prove a statute is 
unconstitutional "as applied, the party must only show that, as 
applied to the defendant's conduct, the statute is 
unconstitutional. * * * 
* * *  
An "on its face" constitutional analysis may not be combined 
with an "as applied" constitutional analysis. * * * In other 
words, a court may hear both types of challenges to a rule's 
constitutional validity; however, it may not do a "hybridized" 
form of either test, in which the two tests are combined into a 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Page f 5 of 17 
--I z u  L U U ~  /:43PM fke-T L R S E R J E T  3330 
Z L%% 
single analysis. * * * 
Facially, the provisions if properly followed would provide sufficient 
due process to meet constitutional standards. See Aberdeen-Springfield 
Canal Company supra. 
The record reflects some problems with an "as applied" analysis of the 
due process provisions. In a few instances, Judge McKee found that the 
Assistant TCA's commenting on petitions or motions without notice to the 
bail agent or his or her counsel might implicate a violation of due process. 
The matters in question were decided on other due process grounds. See 
Ada County cases H 0700165 and H 0601174. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The ADJ has authority to adopt the Guidelines and to establish a list of 
authorized bail agents. 
Two Jinn has raised triable issues relating to the justifications 
supporting the Guidelines treating bail agents as sureties; the summary 
removal of bail agents; and the necessity for a character evaluation of bail 
agents. 
Two Jiin's claims are not irreparable and it is unclear on this record 
that Two Jim is entitled to the relief requested. 
ORDER 
1. The State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Two Jinn's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied. 
ENTERED this / 8 by of ~ecember, 2007 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JLNN, INC, a California corporation ) 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and ) 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and ) CASE NO. CV OC 0706619 
Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; ) 
and SHANTARA CARLOCK, ) 
1 
Plaintiffs, 1 
VS. 
) 
) FIRST MENDED 
1 COMPLAINT FOR 
DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH ) DECLARATORY RELIEF 
JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF ) 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her ) 
official capacity as Administrative District ) 
Judge for the District Court of the Fourth ) 
Judicial District; LARRY D. REINER, in j 
his official capacity as Trial Court ) 
Administrator for the District Court of the j 
Fourth Judicial District; and DIANE ) 
B W L L ,  in her official capacity as 1 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator for the ) 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,) 
1 
Defendants. ) 
1 
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COME NOW Plaintiffs, Two Jinn, Inc., James Garske and Shantara Carlock, through 
counsel, and for a cause of action against Defendants, complain and allege as follows: 
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff Two Jinn, Inc. is a California corporation duly qualified to do business in 
Idaho and doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds (hereinafter 
"Aladdin"). 
2. Aladdin's primary business is writing and issuing surety bonds, as provided in Titles 
19 and 41 of the Idaho Code. Thus, Aladdin is authorized by an insurance company, Lincoln 
General Insurance Company (hereinafter "Lincoln General"), to enter into agreements on Lincoln 
General's behalf with the courts and criminal defendants being held in custody, to post sufficient 
bond to secure the criminal defendant's release from custody. 
3. Aladdin offers bail bonds in each of the seven judicial district courts of the State of 
Idaho. Aladdin is the largest bail bond agency in the State of Idaho with approximately one- 
hundred employees, including over fifty bail bond agents, eleven who are supervisors, statewide. 
4. Plaintiff James Garske resides in Ada County, Idaho and is employed by Aladdin as a 
supervising bail bond agent. 
5. Mr. Garske has worked in the bail bond profession for approximately forty years and 
has been employed as a supervising agent for Aladdin in Idaho since 2003. Mr. Garske 
supervises Aladdin employees, including bail bond agents transacting business in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court. 
6. Mr. Garske holds an active producer license issued by the Idaho Department of 
Insurance (hereinafter "DOI"), which authorizes him to post surety bail bonds. 
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7. Plaintiff Shantara Carlock is employed by Aladdin as a bail agent. She has worked for 
Aladdin as a bail agent in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Judicial Districts. 
8. Ms. Carlock holds an active producer license issued by the DOI, which authorizes her 
to post surety bail bonds. 
9. The State of Idaho is divided into seven judicial districts. Defendant District Court of 
the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho (hereinafter "Fourth Judicial District Court") 
encompasses the counties of Ada, Boise, Elmore and Valley and is comprised of various district 
and magistrate court judges with jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters. 
10. Defendant Honorable Darla S. Williamson is the duly appointed Administrative 
District Judge for the Fourth Judicial District Court (hereinafter "ADJ") and, in this capacity, 
maintains an office at the Ada County Courthouse in Boise, Idaho. 
11. Defendant Larry D. Reiner, having been appointed by the ADJ and the 
Administrative Director of the Idaho Courts, is the Trial Court Administrator for the Fourth 
Judicial District Court (hereinafter "TCA) and, in this capacity, maintains an office at the Ada 
County Courthouse in Boise, Idaho. 
12. Defendant Diane Burrell is described by the Fourth Judicial District Court as the 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator. In this capacity, she maintains an office at the Ada County 
Courthouse in Boise, Idaho. Upon information and belief, Ms. Bunell is an employee of Ada 
County. 
NATURE OF ACTION 
13. In this Complaint, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the implementation, application 
and enforcement of certain provisions of the "Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial 
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District" (hereinafter "Bail Bond Guidelines") by Defendants is unlawful and unconstitutional. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
14. A bail bond is a suretyship contract between the state, the surety and a criminal 
defendant. The terms of the surety bond must comply with Title 41 and are regulated by the 
DOI. 
15. Lincoln General authorizes Aladdin, through its bail agents, to act on Lincoln 
General's behalf by executing and delivering surety bail bonds to secure the release of criminal 
defendants from custody. A true and correct copy of a sample Power of Attorney and General 
Agent Bond Receipt utilized by Lincoln General and Aladdin is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
16. In executing a bail bond, Aladdin binds Lincoln General to pay the amount of the 
posted bond in the event the criminal defendant fails to appear in court as ordered for further 
proceedings. In reliance on these terms, the court releases the criminal defendant from custody 
pending further proceedings in his or her case. A true and correct copy of an exemplar bail bond 
utilized by Lincoln General and Aladdin is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
17. Title 41 defines a "bail agent" as a licensed producer in the line of surety insurance 
that is authorized by an insurer to execute or countersign undertakings of bail in connection with 
judicial proceedings. 
18. A person applying for a producer license must submit an application to the DOI, 
certify that the information contained therein is true and complete, and pass a written 
examination. 
19. Before receiving a producer license, the applicant must submit to a criminal history 
check through the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the DO1 must conclude that the applicant 
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has not committed any act that is a ground for denial, suspension or revocation of the license. 
20. On or about April 16,2004, the ADJ promulgated the Bail Bond Guidelines and from 
time to time has amended the Bail Bond Guidelines. (A true and correct copy of the current Bail 
Bond Guidelines and related correspondence and orders were filed on August 1,2007 in the 
instant litigation pursuant to the parties' Stipulation Re: Bail Bond Guidelines (BBG) Bates Nos. 
00001 -77.) 
2 1. Pursuant to the ADS'S Administrative Order dated April 16,2004, the Bail Bond 
Guidelines must be followed in the Fourth Judicial District Court by all persons or entities 
offering bail bonds and by the TCA, judges, clerks and sheriffs. (BBG, Bates Nos. 000 18- 19.) 
22. Section 1 of the Bail Bond Guidelines defines a "bail agent" as the responsible party 
to ensure that a forfeited bond is timely paid, notwithstanding the right of the state or county to 
pursue collection of a forfeited bond fi-om the insurance conlpany or any agreement between the 
bail agent and the insurance company. (BBG, Bates Nos. 00022.) 
23. Section 4 of the Bail Bond Guidelines prohibits sheriffs and clerks of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court from accepting bail bonds from any person not on the authorized list of 
bail agents maintained by the TCA and Section 10 of the Bail Bond Guidelines directs the TCA 
to maintain this list. (BBG, Bates Nos. 00025, 3 1 .) 
24. Through application and enforcement of Sections 5 and 1 1 through 14 of the Bail 
Bond Guidelines, Defendants have created a licensing procedure in addition to the DOI licensing 
requirement. 
25. Pursuant to Section 11 of the Bail Bond Guidelines, a bail agent must complete an 
application process that encompasses a character and fitness evaluation similar to that conducted 
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by the DO1 to procure placement on the authorized list maintained by the TCA. (BBG, Bates 
26. Pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 of the Bail Bond Guidelines, a bail agent must submit 
to a criminal history check to procure placement on the authorized list maintained by the TCA. 
(BBG, Bates Nos. 00032-35.) 
27. The application process for bail agents to be placed on the authorized list provides 
for the evaluation of bail agents' character and fitness by Defendants because the ADJ has 
determined that it is in the best interest of the public and the court to ensure that persons who are 
permitted to present bail bonds for acceptance possess qualifications of good character and 
conduct their business in an ethical, prompt and law-abiding manner. (BBG, Bates Nos. 00018- 
19.) 
28. Acting pursuant to Section 11 of the Guidelines, the TCA and his assistant refuse to 
place bail agents on the authorized list who are duly licensed by the DO1 and who are otherwise 
qualified and authorized to execute and deliver surety bonds on behalf of a bail agency and 
insurance company. (BBG, Bates Nos. 00032.) 
29. Section 11 of the Guidelines permits the TCA and his assistant to refuse to place a 
bail agent on the authorized list who is duly licensed by the DO1 based on their unilateral 
determination that the agent did not accurately complete his or her application for placement on 
the authorized list of bail agents, failed a criminal history check or is otherwise unfit. (BBG, 
Bates Nos. 00032-34.) 
30. The application for placement on the authorized bail agent list requires bail agents to 
disclose certain offenses, including misdemeanors, with which an agent has been previously 
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charged regardless of whether those charges were subsequently dismissed. The Defendants have 
interpreted this requirement to encompass allegations raised in juvenile court, including 
dismissed juvenile proceedings. (BBG, Bates Nos. 00055.) 
3 1. When the TCA and his assistant refuse to place bail agents on the authorized list, 
those agents must petition the ADJ for placement on the list pursuant to Section 11 of the Bail 
Bond Guidelines, pay a filing fee and wait for a hearing date, which often is several weeks from 
the date the petition is filed. That agent is unable to post bonds in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court while awaiting a hearing. 
32. On or about November 23,2007, Plaintiff Shantara Carlock, a bail agent employed 
by Aladdin and duly licensed by the DO1 with experience working for Aladdin as a bail agent in 
other judicial districts, applied for placement on the bail agent list maintained by the Fourth 
Judicial District. On or about December 10, 2007, the Assistant TCA sent Ms. Carlock a notice 
denying her placement on this list based upon her purported failure to disclose on her bail agent 
application a juvenile proceeding that had been dismissed approximately seven years earlier. On 
December 12,2007, Ms. Carlock, through counsel, filed with the court, together with the 
required filing fee, a petition requesting review of this denial and a prompt hearing. A hearing 
was then scheduled by the ADJ for January 9,2008, at which Ms. Carlock appeared with 
counsel. At the hearing, the TCA's office, through its counsel, the Ada County Prosecuting 
Attorney, advised the ADJ that it no longer objected to the placement of Ms. Carlock on the 
Fourth District list. As a result, Ms. Carlock was added to the Fourth District list on or about the 
following day. 
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33. Section 5 of the Bail Bond Guidelines requires bail agents to submit to a criminal 
history check and to complete an updated application for placement on the authorized list of 
agents prior to expiration of an agent's DO1 licenses. (BBG, Bates Nos. 00026.) 
34. Through Section 14 of the Bail Bond Guidelines, the ADJ, TCA and his assistant 
have assumed the authority to suspend the ability of licensed bail agents to engage in their 
profession on bases other than revocation of the DO1 license or revocation of authority to execute 
and deliver bail bonds on behalf of an insurance company and bail agency. (BBG, Bates Nos. 
35. Pursuant to Section 14(1)(A)(2) of the Bail Bond Guidelines, the TCA or his 
assistant may petition for removal of a bail agent from the authorized list when, in the opinion of 
the TCA or his assistant, the agent did not provide complete and truthful information on the 
application for placement on the authorized list of bail agents. (BBG, Bates Nos. 00037.) 
36. Pursuant to Section 14(1)(A)(3) to Section 14(1)(A)(6) of the Bail Bond Guidelines, 
the TCA or his assistant may petition for removal of a bail agent from the authorized list if the 
bail agent has been convicted or sentenced for certain criminal offenses, regardless of whether 
the DOI takes action on the bail agent's producer license for the same criminal offense. (BBG, 
Bates Nos. 00037.) 
37. Pursuant to Section 14(1)(A)(9) of the Bail Bond Guidelines, the TCA or his 
assistant may petition for removal of a bail agent from the authorized list when, in the opinion of 
the TCA or his assistant, the agent has used fraudulent or dishonest practices or has shown 
himself or herself in any way to be incompetent, untrustworthy, or a source of injury and loss to 
the public, the court or others. (BBG, Bates Nos. 00037.) 
8 FURST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF 
38. Pursuant to Section 14(1)(A)(10) of the Bail Bond Guidelines, the TCA or his 
assistant may petition for removal of a bail agent from the authorized list when, in the opinion of 
the TCA or his assistant, the agent provides any false, incorrect or incomplete information in any 
format to the TCA's office or to any deputy court clerk, clerk or judge. (BBG, Bates Nos. 
00038.) 
39. Pursuant to Section 14(1)(A)(11) of the Bail Bond Guidelines, the TCA or his 
assistant may petition for removal of a bail agent from the authorized list when, in the opinion of 
the TCA or his assistant, the agent violates any Bail Bond Guideline or bail related 
administrative order, rule or statute. (BBG, Bates Nos. 00038.) 
40. Pursuant to Section 14(1)(A)(14) of the Bail Bond Guidelines, the TCA or his 
assistant may petition for removal of a bail agent from the authorized list when, in the opinion of 
the TCA or his assistant, the agent violates any Bail Bond Guideline or for any action or inaction 
that the TCA or his assistant deem detrimental to the administration of bail bonds. (BBG, Bates 
Nos. 00038.) 
41. Acting pursuant to Section 14(1)(A) of the Bail Bond Guidelines, the TCA and his 
assistant have petitioned for the removal of duly licensed bail agents employed by Aladdin from 
the authorized list on several occasions, 
42. Acting pursuant to Section 14 of the Bail Bond Guidelines, the TCA and his assistant 
regularly issue "violation notices" based on their unilateral detemination that an agent has 
violated the Bail Bond Guidelines. 
43. Section 14 of the Bail Bond Guidelines authorizes the TCA and his assistant to 
petition for a bail bond agent's removal from the authorized list upon the mailing of the fourth 
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such "violation notice," even where the alleged violations referred to in the previous notices have 
been timely remedied or where the violations are de minimis and do not effect the orderly 
administration of the Court's business. 
44. Pursuant to Section 14(1)(B) of the Bail Bond Guidelines, the TCA and his assistant 
have issued violation notices to individual bail agents where a bond has not been paid within 90 
days of forfeiture, notwithstanding the fact that Idaho statutes require the bond to be exonerated. 
(BBG, Bates Nos. 00038-39.) 
45. In order to remove violation notices from an agent's record where a forfeited bond 
has been paid or a court finds that the bond should be exonerated or reinstated, Plaintiffs must 
submit a copy of the order exonerating or setting aside forfeiture to the TCA's office and request 
that the violation be removed. (BBG, Bates Nos. 00012.) 
46. Section 14(1)(B) of the Bail Bond Guidelines permits the TCA and his assistant to 
issue violation notices, threaten to remove and actually remove bail agents from the authorized 
list for failing to ensure that a forfeited bond was timely paid, including situations where the bail 
agent has changed employment or has no authority to act on the surety's behalf. (BBG, Bates 
Nos. 00038-39.) 
47. By requiring individual bail agents to be responsible for forfeited bonds 
notwithstanding any ongoing authority to act on behalf of the surety or bail agency, Sections 1 
and 14(1)(B) of Bail Bond Guidelines make individual bail agents co-sureties on bail bonds. 
48. Acting pursuant to Section 14 of the Bail Bond Guidelines, the TCA and his assistant 
have removed and threatened to remove bail agents employed by Aladdin from the authorized list 
as a result of erroneous determinations that they violated the Bail Bond Guidelines, including 
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erroneous determinations that the requirements for license renewal had not been met or that an 
agent had not submitted to a renewed criminal background check. 
49. Pursuant to Section 14(B) of the Bail Bond Guidelines, the removal of a supervising 
agent from the authorized list automatically results in the removal of all bail agents who list that 
agent as their supervisor. Because Plaintiff James Garske is the supervising agent for Aladdin 
bail agents, a threat to remove or the actual removal of Mr. Garske from the list of authorized 
agents involves a threat to remove or actual removal of multiple Aladdin bail agents. 
50. On one occasion and without prior notice to Aladdin, Mr. Garske or the affected bail 
agents, the Assistant TCA removed Mr. Garske and thirty-eight other Aladdin bail agents under 
his supervision from the authorized list on the Friday prior to a holiday weekend based on the 
assistant TCA's mistaken belief that Mr. Garske had failed to submit to a criminal history check 
as part of the application renewal process required by the Bail Bond Guidelines. As a result, Mr 
Garske and these bail agents were deprived of their right to practice their profession for four 
days. 
5 1. Acting pursuant to Section 14 of the Bail Bond Guidelines, Defendants have 
threatened to remove or actually removed from the authorized list Mr. Garske and other duly 
licensed bail agents employed by Aladdin on numerous occasions. 
52. Through application and enforcement of Sections 11 and 14 of the Bail Bond 
Guidelines, Defendants have vested the assistant TCA with broad discretion to determine 
Plaintiffs' ability to work in the Fourth Judicial District. (BBG, Bates Nos. 00032-34, 00037- 
40.) 
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53. The TCA, through his assistant, routinely appear and are represented by counsel, the 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, in proceedings and hearings on petitions to remove bail agents 
from the authorized list pursuant to Section 14 of the Bail Bond Guidelines and petitions to place 
agents on the authorized list pursuant to Section 11 of the Bail Bond Guidelines. During such 
proceedings, the TCA's office often advocates for or against a bail agents' placement or removal 
from the authorized list. 
54. Through the application and enforcement of Section 14(1)(D) of the Bail Bond 
Guidelines, the TCA and his assistant are permitted to determine when an entity posting bail is 
entitled to exoneration or reinstatement. (BBG, Bates Nos. 00040-41 .) 
55. The TCA, through his assistant, regularly appears at hearings in Ada County on 
Aladdin's motions for exoneration or to set aside forfeiture and, through counsel - e.g. the Ada 
County Prosecutors, Boise City Attorneys or Garden City Prosecutors - advocates for the denial 
of those motions. 
56. The Bail Bond Guidelines limit the exercise ofjudicial discretion in determining 
whether to grant Plaintiffs' motions for exoneration or to set aside forfeiture. 
57. Through implementation and enforcement of Section 14(1)(D) of the Bail Bond 
Guidelines, the Defendants frequently deny and otherwise interfere with the statutory entitlement 
to exoneration by permitting the TCA or his assistant to annotate Plaintiffs' motions for 
exoneration or to set aside forfeiture with unsworn statements asserting that Plaintiffs' motions 
are legally deficient. At times, such assertions have been made by the TCA or his assistant ex 
parte and without notice to Plaintiffs. (BBG, Bates Nos. 00040-41.) 
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58. Through implementation and enforcement of Section 14(1)(B)(2) of the Bail Bond 
Guidelines, the Defendants interfere with the Plaintiffs' right to appeal a court's denial ofthe 
motion for exoneration or to set aside forfeiture by requiring agents to post a cash bond in the 
amount of the forfeited bond when filing an appeal from a decision denying such a motion. 
(BBG, Bates Nos. 00039.) 
59. Although the TCA's office faxes updates to the list of authorized bail agents to 
sheriffs and clerks on the day the list is updated, the TCA's office does not provide Plaintiffs 
with a copy of the updated list. 
60. Upon information and belief, the TCA and his assistant routinely engage in ex parte 
contact with the ADJ regarding substantive and procedural matters concerning the Bail Bond 
Guidelines and their application to Plaintiffs. 
61. Defendants have vested the assistant TCA with the discretion to interpret statutes, 
rules and Bail Bond Guidelines that pertain to forfeiture and exoneration. 
62. Although some of the other Idaho judicial districts in which Plaintiffs conduct their 
business have implemented various bail bond guidelines, no other judicial district has utilized the 
guidelines' operation and application to terminate or threaten to terminate Plaintiffs' ability to 
post bonds in those districts. 
LEGAL VIOLATIONS AND EFFECTS 
I. THE BAIL BOND GUIDELINES ARE AN UNLAWFUL EXERCISE OF 
AUTHORITY UNDER I.C. tj 1-907 
63. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 62 as though set forth fully herein. 
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64. The regulation and licensure ofbail bond agents as provided in Sections 5 and 11 to 
14 of the Bail Bond Guidelines, does not relate to "the operation of the district courts and 
magistrates in the district" as contemplated by I.C. 1-907. 
65. The ADJ lacks the authority to require judges to follow the Bail Bond Guidelines in 
determining whether to grant a motion for exoneration or to set aside forfeiture. 
66. The ADJ's "administrative supervision and authority over the operation" of the 
courts pursuant to I.C. 5 1-907 does not extend to limiting the exercise ofjudicial discretion in 
determining whether a motion to exonerate or set aside forfeiture should be granted. 
67. The ADJ exceeded her authority over the operation of the courts by enacting Bail 
Bond Guidelines that make individual bail agents responsible for the payment of forfeited bonds. 
68. The ADJ exceeded her authority by enacting Bail Bond Guidelines, which direct the 
TCA and his assistant to condition placement on the authorized list of bail agents on bases 
beyond ensuring that the agent holds a DO1 license and is authorized to act on behalf of a bail 
bond agency and insurance company. 
69. The ADJ exceeded her authority under I.C. 5 1-907 by vesting the TCA and his 
assistant with the authority to suspend and threaten to suspend Plaintiffs' ability to post bonds in 
the Fourth Judicial District based on factors other than the status of those agents' licenses with 
the DO1 and their authority to act on behalf of the bail bond agency and surety. 
70. The ADJ exceeded her authority under I.C. 4 1-907 by permitting the TCA and his 
assistant to advocate for the denial of Plaintiffs' motions to exonerate or to set aside forfeiture 
and to offer legal interpretations of statutes and guidelines. 
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71. The ADJ exceeded her authority under I.C. tj 1-907 by permitting the TCA and his 
assistant to annotate motions to exonerate or to set aside forfeiture with comments that go 
beyond noting clerical errors such as incorrect power numbers or failing to sign a motion. 
11. THE BAIL BOND GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT'S 
AUGUST 2005 ORDER 
72. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 71 as though set forth fully herein. 
73. On August 4,2005, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an order setting forth the ADJ'S 
job description, including authorization for the establishment of "guidelines" for bail bonds. 
74. The Bail Bond Guidelines mandate conduct. Failure to comply with the Bail Bond 
Guidelines can result in suspension of a bail bond agent's ability to write bail bonds in the Fourtl~ 
Judicial District Court by removing the agent's name from the authorized list. 
75. The Bail Bond Guidelines are not "guidelines" and, instead, are rules. 
76. In establishing and enforcing the Bail Bond Guidelines, the ADJ exceeded the 
authority bestowed by the Idaho Supreme Court to establish bail bond guidelines. 
111. THE BAIL BOND GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
DOCTRINE 
77. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 76 as though set forth fully herein. 
78. Under the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho Supreme Court has the inherent power to 
make rules governing procedure in Idaho courts. 
79. The Idaho Supreme Court does not have the authority to define substantive rights. 
The power to define substantive rights lies with the legislature. 
80. The Bail Bond Guidelines that create a contractual relationship between individual 
bail agents and the court are substantive in nature. 
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8 1.  Bail Bond Guidelines that make individual bail agents co-sureties on bail bonds are 
substantive in nature. 
82. Bail Bond Guidelines that make individual bail agents co-sureties on bail bonds 
violate Title 41 of the Idaho Code. 
83. Defendants' actions in permitting the TCA and his assistant to act as parties to the 
bail bond contract between the state, the defendant and the surety, encroaches upon the 
legislature's inherent authority to define substantive rights and the executive branch's inherent 
authority to effectuate and enforce the laws duly enacted by the legislature. 
84. The insurance laws regulating the bail bond and surety professions define the 
substantive rights of persons to engage in those professions and of bail bond companies to enter 
into contracts with employees, criminal defendants and the courts. 
85. Those Bail Bond Guidelines that ensure that bail agents possess good character and 
conduct their business in an ethical, prompt and law-abiding manner infringe on the legislature's 
inherent power to regulate the right to practice professions impactiiig public safety. 
86. Those Bail Bond Guidelines that place requirements on the right to practice in the 
bail bond or surety professions beyond holding a DO1 license encroach upon the legislature's 
inherent authority to define substantive rights and the executive branch's inherent authority to 
effectuate and enforce the laws duly enacted by the legislature. 
87. Regulation of the bail bond profession, as reflected in the Bail Bond Guidelines and 
their application to Plaintiffs, falls outside the authority of the Idaho Supreme Court and 
Defendants to make rules governing procedure in Idaho courts. 
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88. The foregoing Bail Bond Guidelines, as implemented, applied and enforced by 
Defendants, violate the requirement of separation of powers as set forth in Article 11, Section 1 of 
the Idaho Constitution. 
IV. THE BAIL BOND GUIDELINES VIOLATE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
89. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 88 as though set forth fully herein. 
90. The Bail Bond Guidelines permit Defendants to exclude Plaintiffs from their 
profession without providlng adequate procedural safeguards and therefore violate the due 
process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
91. The Bail Bond Guidelines permit the TCA to deny an agent's application for 
placement on the authorized list without court approval or providing the agent an adequate 
opportunity to be heard. 
92. Ex parte contact between the TCA, his assistant and the ADJ regarding matters of 
substance violates Plaintiffs' right to an impartial tribunal as required by procedural due process 
of law. 
93. Permitting the TCA and his assistant to simultaneously act as agents of the Court and 
parties to motions to exonerate or set aside forfeiture violates procedural due process. 
94. Implementation and enforcement of the Bail Bond Guidelines, which allows 
Defendants to deny, interfere with and define Plaintiffs' statutory entitlement to exoneration, 
violates the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
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95. These violations are further exacerbated by those Bail Bond Guidelines that threaten 
to remove or permit removal of an agent from the authorized list for committing clerical errors, 
for failing to pay bonds that should have been exonerated pursuant to statute or for failing to post 
a cash bond upon filing a notice of appeal. 
V. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO DECLARATORY RELIEF 
96. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 95 as though set forth fully herein. 
97. Plaintiffs' status and legal relations are affected by implementation, operation and 
enforcement of the Bail Bond Ciuidelines. 
98. Whether the Bail Bond Guidelines are lawfully implemented, applied and enforced 
presents a real and justiciable controversy, in which the Plaintiffs have a substantial stake in the 
outcome. 
99. The Court's order granting relief as herein requested would terminate the controversy 
giving rise to this proceeding. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEEFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief against Defendants as follows: 
1. For the judgment and decree of this Court declaring that Defendants have no right or 
power to: 
a. conduct a character and fitness evaluation of bail agents as set forth in Sections 5 
and 1 1 to 14 of the Bail Bond Guidelines as a condition for placement on the 
Fourth Judicial District's authorized list of bail agents; 
b. vest the TCA's office with the authority to refuse to place or threaten to remove 
bail agents from the authorized list based on the determination by the TCA or his 
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assistant of matters set forth in Sections 1 1 (2), 1 1 (4), 1 1 (6), 1 l(1 I), 14(2), 14(9) 
through 14(1 I), 14(14), 14(15) and 14(17); 
c. refuse to place bail agents on the authorized bail agent list or to remove agents 
from the same who are duly licensed by the DO1 and authorized by a bail agency 
to execute and deliver bail bonds on behalf of a duly licensed surety; 
d. authorize the TCA's office to annotate motions to exonerate or to set aside 
forfeiture, other than noting clerical errors; 
e. promulgate and enforce Bail Bond Guidelines that create individual bail agent 
responsibility for forfeited bonds; 
f. remove bail agents from the authorized list based on the TCA office's 
determination that a forfeited bond has not been paid; 
g. permit the TCA's office to appear through counsel in proceedings and hearings on 
Plaintiffs' motions to exonerate or to set aside forfeiture and to advocate for the 
denial of the same; and 
h. remove bail agents from the authorized list without adequate prior notice and an 
opportunity to be heard for any reason other than revocation of a DO1 license or 
authority to act on behalf of the bail agency or surety. 
2. That Defendants be permanently enjoined from: 
a. further implementation or enforcement of the unlawfuI portions of the Bail Bond 
Guidelines. 
3.  For their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of this action 
pursuant to LC. $5 10-1210, 12-119 and 12 -121. 
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4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this 1" day of February, 2008. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTFY that on February 1,2008, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be 
mailed 
)( hand delivered 
- faxed 
to: Honorable James F. Judd, 6498 N. Antler Place, Boise, ID 83703; and 
Mr. Steven L. Olsen and Mr. Karl T. Klein, Deputy Attorneys General, Len B. Jordan 
Bldg, Lower Level, 650 W State Street, PO Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Scott McKay -------I 
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p** 
"" 
%# "- 6  L3 ---a POWER OF ATTORNEY 
LINCOLN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
Mondav. June 2.2008 
-. 
***5000.00*** LG5-566517 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that Lincoln General Insurance Company, a corporation duly organized and existin under the laws of the 
State of Pennsylvania and by the authority of the resolution adopted by the Board of Directors at a meeting duly called and h3d on May I ,  2002 whic 
said Resolution has not been amended or rescinded, does constitute and appoint and by these presents does make, constitute and appoint the 
named agent its true and lawful Attorney-in-Fact for it and in its name, place and stead, to execute seal and deliver for and on its behalf and a s  ~ t s  a c  
and deed, as surety, a bail bond only. Authority of such Attorney-in-Fact is limited to appearance bonds and cannot be construed to guarantee 
defendant's future lawful conduct, adherence to travel limitations, fines, restitution, payments or penalties, or any other condition imposed by a court 
not specifically related to court appearance. 
Exec. Agent Signature -'4 = / * PV,,$'- 
'~~~~~II~llliil\\,~\~~\ 
Date Filed Date to Appear 
Case No. Court 
If rewrite, Original Power No. 
Was Collateral taken: y e a  ~671 
If Yes, Describe Collateral: 
Time 
- 
City - 
Original Amount 0.00 - 
Corrections to Printed info 
Agent Name oise2, b Agent Signature 
6z 
P- 
*L~R~COLN GENERAL *' d 
fMSURANCE COMPANY 
Oesignated AgenirPerson 
to receive! all notices: 
AIaddinlAnytime Bail Bonds 
80 M. Cole Rd. 
Boise, ID 83704 
Anytime Bail Bonds 
80 N. Cole Rd 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
Telephone (208) 323-2245 
(PLACE BAIL AGENT'S ADDRESS STAMP HERE) 
BAIL BOND 
NO, 
(POWER OF ATTURNEY WITH THIS NUMBER MUST BE ATTACHED) 
IN THE COURT OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF STATE OF IDAHO. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Defendant. 
Defendant hav~ng been admrtted to bail rn the 
(NAME Of  DEFENDANT) 
Sum of Ooilars ($ 1 
And ordered to appear in the above-entitled court on 20 on 
(DATE OF APPEARANCE) 
Chargels; 
Now, the LINCOLN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Pennsylvan~a Corporation hereby undertakes that the abave-named defendant *~li appear In 
the above-named court on the date above set forth to answer any charges tn any accusatory pleading based upon the ass supporbng the complatnt tileu 
agatnst hun/her and a s  duly author~ed amendments thereof, In whatever court rt may be fiied and prosecuted, and wrll at all ttmes hold himiherself 
amenabk? to the orders and process of the court, and rf convtcted, will appear for pronouncement of judgment or grant of probatton, or rf helshe falls to 
perform either of these ~ondittons, that the LINCOLN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Penn~ykanra Corporatron, wtll pay the people at the State 
of Idaho the sum of dollars ($ ) 
If the forfeitute of this bond be ordered by the Court, judgment may be summartly made and entered forthwith agatnst the satd LINCOLN GENERAL 
BNSURANCE COMPANY, a Pennsylvania Corporation, for the amount of &s undenakmng heretn as provided by State Law 
THlS BOND IS VOID IF WRITTEN FOR AN MOUNT GREATER 
THAN THE POWER QF ATTORNEY ATTACHED HERETO, IF 
MORE THAN ONE SUCH POWER IS ATTACHED, OR IF 
WRI?TEN AFTER THE EXPIRATION DATE AS SPECIFIED ON 
f HE ATTACHEDPOWER OF ATTORNEY, 
LINCOLN GENERAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
(A 
BY 
I certify under penalty of perjury that I am a licensed ball agent af the LINCOLN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and 
that I am executing this bond on 
(DATE) 
{NAME OF AGENTJ (SIGNATURE OF LEEPlSED AOEN'f) 
NOTE: ??I& is an Appmtgnce Bond and cannot be construed as a guarani&! for &ilum to pmvide payments, back alimony 
Paymentst Flnes, or Wege Law &aims, nor can it be used# a Bond on Appeal 
JJL (11102) 
LAWRENCE WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
Chief of Civil Litigation 
KARL T. KLEIN, ISB #5 156 
Len B. Jordan Building, Lower Level 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4533 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
1 
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation ) 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and ) 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and ) 
Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and ) 
SHANTARA CARLOCK, 1 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) Case No. CV OC 07066 19 
1 
VS. 1 
) ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED 
DISTRICT COLJRT OF THE FOURTH ) COMPLAINTFOR 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF ) DECLARTORY RELIEF 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her ) 
official capacity as Administrative District ) 
Judge for the District Court of the Fourth ) 
Judicial District; LARRY D. WINER, in his ) 
official capacity as Trial Court Administrator ) 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial ) 
District; and DIANE BURRELL, in her ) 
capacity as Assistant Trial C o u r t )  
Administrator for the District Court of the ) 
Fourth Judicial District, ) 
) 
Defendants. 1 
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF - 1 
\ J% j 
- -  - - - -  
Defendants the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Administrative Judge Darla S. Williamson, Trial Court Administrator for the Fourth 
Judicial District Larry D. Reiner, and Assistant Trial Court Administrator for the Fourth 
Judicial District Diane Burrell (collectively "Defendants"), through counsel, answer the 
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief ("Complaint") as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Defendants deny each and every allegation in the Complaint not specifically 
and expressly admitted herein. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Answer to Specific Allegations 
Parties and Jurisdiction 
1. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Complaint. 
2. In answer to the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Complaint, Defendant 
answers that it lacks sufficient knowledge and information to form a belief in the truth or 
falsity of Plaintiffs' allegation as to what California corporation Aladdin's "primary 
business" may be. Defendants otherwise admit the allegations in paragraph 2 to the 
extent they are not inconsistent with the Idaho insurance Code and Lincoln General's 
written contracts and/or other authorizations to Aladdin, which speak for themselves. 
3. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Complaint by 
admitting that Aladdin is the largest bail bond agency in Idaho. Defendants lack 
sufficient knowledge and information to form a belief in the truth or falsity of the 
remaining allegations in paragraph 3, and therefore deny the same. 
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4. In answer to the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Complaint, Defendants admit 
only that Mr. Garske has been represented in court filings to be a supervising agent. 
Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and information as to the nature of Mr. Garske's 
employment relationship with Aladdin to form a belief in the tmth or falsity of the 
remaining allegations in paragraph 4, and therefore deny the same. 
5. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint by 
incorporating their answer in paragraph 4, above. Defendants also lack information 
sufficient to fonn a belief in the allegation that Mr. Garske has been employed in the 
bond industry for approximately 40 years. 
6. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 6 of the Complaint to the extent 
they are not inconsistent with the Idaho Insurance Code. 
7. In answer to the allegations in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, Defendants admit 
that Aladdin employs Carlock as a bail agent who has worked for Aladdin in the Fourth 
Judicial District. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and information to form a belief 
in the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 7, and therefore deny the 
same. 
8. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 8 of the Complaint to the extent 
they are not inconsistent with the Idaho Insurance Code. 
9. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraphs 9, 10, 1 1, and 12 of the 
Complaint. 
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Nature of Action 
10. In answer to the allegations in paragraph 13 of the Complaint, Defendants 
aver that the Complaint speaks for itself. 
General Allegations 
11. Paragraph 14 states legal conclusions to which no answer is required. To the 
extent and answer may be required, Defendants admit that a bail bond has been described 
as stated, and that the DO1 generally regulates the bail bond industry in Idaho under the 
Idaho Insurance code. 
12. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint to the 
extent they are not inconsistent with the Idaho Insurance Code and Lincoln General's 
actual written contracts and/or other authorizations to Aladdin, which speak for 
themselves. 
13. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 16 by averring that the 
executed bail bonds speak for themselves. Regardless of what a bond says, whether a 
criminal defendant is released is a matter of the judge's discretion. 
14. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 17 by averring that Title 41 
speaks for itself. Defendants aver that Idaho Code 5 4 1- 1038 contains the referenced 
definition. 
15. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Complaint 
by averring that Title 4 1 sets forth the prerequisites to obtaining a producer license and 
speaks for itself Idaho Code $8 4 1- 1006, 1007, and 101 1 appear to discuss the 
referenced subjects. 
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16. In answer to the allegations in paragraph 20 of the Complaint, Defendants 
aver that the original bail bond guidelines pre-date 2004. Defendants otherwise admit the 
allegations in paragraph 20. 
17. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraphs 21,22,23, 24, 25, and 26 by 
averring that the referenced Guidelines speak for themselves. 
18, Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 27 by averring that the April 
16, 2004 Administrative Order speaks for itself. 
19. In answer to paragraphs 28 and 29 of the Complaint, Defendants aver that the 
April 16, 2004 Administrative Order requires the TCA and his assistant to follow the 
Guidelines, which in turn require the TCA and his assistant to add or not add individuals 
to the List of Authorized Bail Agents in the Fourth Judicial District according to the 
policies set fonh in Section 11 of the Guidelines, which speak for themselves. 
20. Defendants answer paragraph 30 of the Complaint by averring that the 
referenced Application speaks for itself. It states: "List every felony for which you have 
been charged, every fraud or thefr-related misdemeanor for which you have been charged 
within the last ten (10) years, and all other misdemeanors for which you have been 
charged within the last five (5) years. For every offense, list the outcome thereof. DO 
NOT INCLUDE TRAFFIC INFRACTIONS (if necessary, use additional sheet of paper 
and attach to this application)" 
2 1. Defendants answer paragraph 3 1 of the Complaint by incorporating their 
answer from paragraph 19, above. Under Guideline Section 1 1, if a disqualified 
applicant "disagrees with the disqualification, he or she may, within thirty (30) days of 
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF - 5 
the date of the disqualification determination notice, file a petition with the Clerk of the 
Court requesting a hearing before the Fourth District Administrative District Judge to 
show why the applicant should be allowed to offer for acceptance bail bonds in this 
district." 
22. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 32. However, Defendants 
qualify the admission by averring that the charge Plaintiff Carlock failed to disclose on 
her application was a felony but that prior to the hearing the TCA's office was provided 
with additional, material information which mitigated the grounds for disqualification 
that prompted the disqualification determination notice. 
23. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 33 of the Complaint by 
averring that the referenced Guidelines speak for themselves. 
24. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 34 of the Complaint. 
25. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 35, 36,37, 38, 39, and 40 of 
the Complaint by averring that the referenced Guidelines speak for themselves. 
26. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 41. The TCA office has 
petitioned the ADJ for the removal of an Aladdin bail agent from the list of authorized 
bail agents only once, not "on several occasions." The Aladdin bail agent was former 
Plaintiff Rebecca Salinas. The TCA office had discovered that Ms. Salinas had failed to 
disclose a criminal charge. 
27. Defendants do not know how Plaintiffs define "regularly" in the allegations of 
paragraph 42 of the Complaint, and also are unsure if Plaintiffs are referring to Aladdin 
agents only or to all agents. Defendants therefore lack knowledge and information 
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sufficient to form a belief in the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 42. 
Defendants admit that the TCA office does issue notices as referenced in Section 14 of 
the Guidelines. 
28. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 43 of the Complaint by 
averring that Section 14 of the Guidelines speaks for itself. 
29. Defendants lack knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief in the 
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 44 of the Complaint, and therefore deny the 
same. 
30. In answer to the allegations in paragraph 45 of the Complaint, Defendants 
answer that per Administrative Order Amendment to Bail Bond Guidelines #06- 1 1 - 13 
(Bates No. 00012), if "the bail agent has filed a sufficient motion in the trial court to set 
aside the forfeiture and/or for exoneration by the 93rd day after the forfeiture, and the 
judge sets aside the forfeiture in the underlying case, the violation for the forfeiture will 
no longer be considered a violation of the guidelines if the agent provides the TCA a 
copy for the order setting aside the forfeiture." Defendants deny the allegations in 
paragraph 45 to the extent inconsistent with the foregoing. 
3 1. Defendants' answer the allegations in paragraph 46 of the Complaint by 
averring that the referenced Guidelines speak for themselves. Defendants deny that the 
TCA or his assistant "threaten" bail agents. 
32. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 47 of the Complaint. 
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33 .  Defendants lack knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief in the 
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 48 of the Complaint, and therefore deny the 
same. Defendants deny that the TCA or his assistant "threaten" bail agents. 
34. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 49 of the Complaint by 
averring that the referenced Guideline, Section 14.B., speaks for itself. It states: "If the 
removed bail agent is a supervising agent, all bail agents who have listed the supervising 
agent on their Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent Within the Fourth 
Judicial District will also be removed from the list of authorized agents." Mr. Garske has 
at times been removed from the list. If Mr. Garske was a supervising agent who was 
removed from the list, then all bail agents who listed him on their application would 
likewise have been removed. Defendants deny making a "threat" to Mr. Garske or other 
bail agents. 
35. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 50  of the Complaint. 
36. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 5 1 of the Complaint by 
incorporating their answer from paragraph 34, above. 
37. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 52 by averring that the 
referenced Guidelines speak for themselves. 
38. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 53 of the Complaint. 
Defendants qualifj the admission by averring that at the hearing, and consistent with the 
Guidelines, the TCA office appears in its capacity as court staff to present information in 
the court's files bearing on whether a particular agent should be placed on, or removed 
from, the list, 
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39. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 54 of the Complaint. 
40. In answer to the allegations in paragraph 55 of the Complaint, Defendants 
admit and aver that consistent with the Guidelines the TCA office reviews the referenced 
motions and offers comments to the presiding judge, based on the TCA office's review of 
information in the court's file, bearing on whether the bail should be exonerated or 
forfeited depending on the circumstances. 
41. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 56, 57, and 58 of the Complaint. 
The 1'CA's office is not a party and does not engage in exparte contact as implied by 
Plaintiffs. Further, on October 17, 2006, the ADJ entered administrative order 06- 10- 17 
as follows: ". . . in the event the bail bond agent provides a facsimile phone number on 
the motion to exonerate, the office of the Trial Court Administrator shall fax a copy of 
any recommendation of denial of the motion to the bail bond agent and shall indicate on 
the face of the motion to exonerate the basis for the recommended denial and the date the 
facsimile copy was sent so that the presiding judge has this information." See BBG, 
Bates No. 00013. The TCA office complies with this order. 
42. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 59 of the Complaint. 
43. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 60 of the Complaint. 
44. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 61 of the Complaint. The 
forfeiture of a bond or the setting aside of a forfeiture are matters within the judge's 
discretion. 
45. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge and information to form a belief in the 
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph 62 of the Complaint. 
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Legal Violations and Effects 
Section 1: alleged violation of I.C. 5 1-907 
46. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 63 of the Complaint by 
incorporating their preceding answers. 
47. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 64 of the Complaint. 
48. No answer is required to the allegations in paragraph 65 of the Complaint, 
which state a legal conclusion premised on hypothetical facts. To the extent an answer 
may be required, Defendants aver that the Guidelines are not intended to, and do not, 
interfere with judges' discretion to grant or deny a motion to exonerate or set aside 
forfeiture. 
49. Paragraph 66 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no answer is 
required. To the extent an answer may be required, Defendants aver that the Guidelines 
are not intended to, and do not, interfere with judges' discretion to grant or deny a motion 
to exonerate or set aside forfeiture. 
50. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 67, 68, 69, 70, and 71 of the 
Complaint. 
Section 11: alleged violation of ldaho Supreme Court's Order 
5 1. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 72 of the Complaint by 
incorporating their preceding answers. 
52. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 73 of the Complaint, noting 
that the Idaho Supreme Court's August 4,2005 order regarding the job description, 
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powers and duties of an ADJ include establishing "guidelines for bail bonds with regard 
to posting, forfeiture, exoneration and all other matters." 
53. In answer to the allegations in paragraph 74 of the Complaint, Defendants 
aver that a bail agent may be removed from the list of authorized bail agents for the 
Fourth Judicial District as set forth in Section 14 of the Guidelines, which speak for 
themselves. 
54. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 75 and 76 of the Complaint. 
Section 111: alleged violation of separation of powers 
55. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 77 of the Complaint by 
incorporating their preceding answers. 
56. Paragraphs 78 and 79 of the Complaint states legal conclusions to which no 
answer is required. 
57. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 80 of the Complaint. 
Defendants aver that an individual bail agent may agree "to be bound by and to comply 
with [the) Guidelines, and that [the agent's] offering of bail bonds for acceptance within 
the Fourth Judicial District shall be done in conformity with these Guidelines." See 
BBG, Bates No. 00057. 
58. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 8 1 and 82 of the Complaint 
because the Guidelines do not make individual bail agents co-sureties on bail bonds. 
Paragraph 8 1 states a legal conclusion premised on hypothetical facts. 
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59. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 83 of the Complaint because the 
TCA and his assistant do not act as parties to bail bond contracts. Paragraph 83 states a 
legal conclusion premised on hypothetical facts. 
60. Paragraph 84 of the Complaint states a legal conclusion to which no answer is 
required. Defendants acknowledge that the Idaho Insurance Code sets forth laws bearing 
on the bail bond industry. These laws do not guarantee a particular bail bond agent or 
agency has a right to contract with third parties against their will. 
61. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 85, 86, 87, and 88 of the 
Complaint. 
Section IV: alleged procedural due process violations 
62. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 89 of the Complaint by 
incorporating their preceding answers. 
63. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 90 of the Complaint. 
64. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 90 of the Complaint to the 
extent they imply that the Guidelines violate procedural due process or permit the TCA to 
deny an agent's application while leaving the agent with no avenue of review. 
Defendants aver that the TCA office reviews an agent's application for placement on the 
authorized list, and if the application fails to comport with the Guidelines, the TCA office 
will so notify the applicant in writing. If the applicant disagrees with the disqualification, 
the applicant may file a petition with the Clerk of the Court requesting a hearing before 
the ADJ to show why the applicant should be allowed to offer for acceptance bail bonds 
in the Fourth Judicial District. 
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65. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 92,93,94, and 95 of the 
Complaint. Further the TCA and his assistant are not parties to motions to exonerate and 
are not engaged in ex parte contact as implied by Plaintiff. 
Section V: alleged declaratory relief request 
66. Defendants answer the allegations in paragraph 96 by incorporating their 
preceding answers. 
67. In answer to paragraphs 97-98 of the Complaint, Defendants deny that the 
Guidelines are unlawfully implemented, applied, or enforced, that they adversely affect 
Plaintiffs' status and legal relations in any improper way, and that Plaintiffs are entitled 
to declaratory relief. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE the Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiffs take nothing by 
their Complaint and that the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, that judgment be 
entered in favor of the Defendants on all claims, that the Defendants be awarded their 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending against this action pursuant to Idaho Code 
$5 10- 12 10, 12- 1 17 and/or 12- 12 1, and that Defendants be awarded such other relief as 
the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this 1 1 th day of February, 2008. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly ) 
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing 1 
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime 1 
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and ) Case No. CV OC 07066 19 
SHANTARA CARLOCK, ) 
) MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
Plaintiffs, ) LACK OF JURISDICTION 
) OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR 
VS. ) RECONSIDERATION OF 
) PRIOR SUMMARY 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ) JUDGMENT RULING 
JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, et. al; 
) 
1 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Defendants move this Court under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) to dismiss Plaintiffs' action. The 
grounds for this motion are that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action 
because all Plaintiffs lack standing, and the issues are moot. 
If the Court does not dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction, then the Defendants 
alternatively move the Court under I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B), 12(b)(6) and 56 to reconsider its 
December 17,2007 order declining to grant summary judgment in Defendants' favor. The Court 
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ORIGINAL 
should reconsider its order denying summary judgment because Defendants are presenting the 
Court with additional argument and evidence bearing on the order's correctness. Defendants ask 
the Court to decide the dispositive legal issue articulated, but not analyzed, by the Court in its 
December 17,2007 Order: "whether the bail agents' acknowledgement, waiver, and certification 
in acceptance of the Guidelines forms an enforceable contract between the 4th District courts and 
the bail agent." (Order, p. 3). Defendants argue in the alternative that no triable issues of fact 
exist. This argument is based in part on new affidavits, attached to the memorandm in support 
of this motion. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this ! ff' day of July 2008. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MELISSA MOO@ 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I/?'' day of July 2008, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Scott McKay 
Robyn Fyffe U.S. Mail 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP C ]  Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2772 C ]  Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
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Boise, ID 83701 C ]  Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 C ]  Statehouse Mail 
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6498 N. Antler Place 
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U.S. Mail 
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C ]  Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
C ]  Overnight Mail 
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MELISSA MOODY -J 
Deputy Attorney General 
LAWRENCE WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
Chief of Civil Litigation 
MICHAEL S. GILMORE, ISB # 1625 
KARL T. KLEIN, ISB # 51 56 
MELISSA MOODY, ISB # 6027 
Deputy Attorneys General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
micl~ael.gilmore@ ag.idaho.gov 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly 
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing 
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime 
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and 
SHANTARACARLOCK, 
Plaintiffs, 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her 
official capacity as Administrative District Judge 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official 
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and 
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant 
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District, 
Defendants. 
) Case No. CV OC 0706619 
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) RIXONSIDERATION 
) 
1 
1 
) 
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) 
1 
) 
) 
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1. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth District's Bail Bond Guidelines are designed to protect the courts and the 
public. Two Jinn does not like being regulated by the Guidelines because it interferes with Two 
Jinn making money. Specifically, Two Jinn does not like: (1) having its agents removed from 
the approved list; (2) having its agents denied approval to be on the list in the first place; and (3) 
the Assistant Trial Court Administrator purportedly acting as a party on motions to exonerate or 
set aside forfeiture and writing notes on motions in those cases.' 
To "remedy" the Fourth District's regulation, the Plaintiffs ask this Court to strike down 
the offending provisions of the Guidelines, i.e. those provisions that permit the judges of the 
Fourth Judicial District to have any say whatsoever in who conducts business in their 
courtrooms. If this Court would simply grant the Plaintiffs' request, they promise to go away. 
("If this Court enjoins enforcement of Sections 1 to 4 and 10 and 14 of the Guidelines, the instant 
controversy wi 11 be terminated." Plctintiffs ' Opposition, p.6.) Unfortunately for the Plaintiffs, the 
"controversy" is non-existent, in the legal sense of a live case-or-controversy. None of the 
Plaintiffs before this Court have an ongoing or imminent future injury, or an injury that can be 
redressed through the relief requested by Two Jinn. 
Even if Plaintiffs had alleged a credible threat of future injury that was not already moot, 
which they have not, all of their claims would be barred because Mr. Garske and Ms. Carlock 
signed a contract, and they are bound by the contract's terms. 
1 Plaintiffs correctly point out that they raised this third issue in their Amended Complaint and that Defendants did 
not address it in their Motion to Dismiss. Defendants are filing a separate Motion to Dismiss these allegations; 
therefore, this third issue is not addressed here. The Court should defer any decision on this third issue until it is 
fully briefed. 
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Plaintiffs mention in a footnote that the Guidelines are currently being revised, but that 
any revisions to the Guidelines will not moot this action because the revisions will not address 
Plaintiffs' challenges. (Plaintiffs' Opposition, p.9). Plaintiffs' claim is pure speculation. It is 
impossible to know if Plaintiffs' assertion is true, as no revised Guidelines have been finalized, 
no revised Guidelines are presently before this Court, and it remains unknown what issues may 
be addressed through any revisions. 
11. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing: They Have Failed to Show Injury for (1) Agents Who are 
Removed from the List and (2) Agents Who Are Denied Placement on the List 
1. There Is No Iniurv With Respect to Agents Who Are Removed from the List 
(Mr. Garkse) 
Plaintiffs present a common-sense argument for injury. They contend that "[ilt is 
difficult to perceive how Guidelines that directly prevent and interfere with Aladdin's ability to 
conduct its business.. .can be construed as other than causing an actual injury." (Plaintiffs ' 
Opposiiion, pp.5-6).2 Under standing jurisprudence, common sense is not the test for injury. 
To obtain injunctive or declaratory relief, a Plaintiff must show that, in addition to having 
suffered an injury in the past, the injury is either ongoing, or likely to occur in the future. "Past 
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding 
injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." Los Angeles 
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). 
2 Common sense only goes so far in making Plaintiffs' argument, and seems to disappear entirely where Plaintiffs 
must straddle the gap between conducting business with the Fourth Judicial District courts and simultaneously 
providing no useful service. (Compare: "...Two Jinn's sole business and Mr. Garske and Ms. Carlock's livelihoods 
involve bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial District, "(Plaintiffs ' Opposition, p.8), with: "Bail agents provide no service 
to the Court, particularly in their capacities as individuals."(Plainriffs ' Opposition, p. 13)). The curious addendum 
"particularly in their capacities as individuals," only compounds the Plaintiffs burden of explaining how bail agents 
conduct business in the courts but provide no useful service. 
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In Lyons, the Plaintiff sued the L.A. Police Department because he was rendered 
unconscious by a chokehold that damaged his larynx in a routine traffic stop. The U.S. Supreme 
Court held that he did not have standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief, as the requested 
relief rested "on the speculative nature of his claim that he will again experience injury as the 
result of that practice even if continued." Id. at 109. The Plaintiff was required to allege a live 
case-or-controversy. The Court noted that the reasonableness of the Plaintiff's fear depended 
upon the likelihood of a recurrence of the allegedly unlawful conduct. "It is the reality of the 
threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiff's subjective 
apprehensions." Id. at 107, n.8. 
Plaintiffs' version of ongoing or future injury in this case is: as long as the Guidelines 
are being enforced, our bail agents and our company will be injured. (Plaintiffs' Opposition, 
p.9). Plaintiffs' argument fails for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs have not named an individual 
who continues to be, or will be injured, nor have they certified a class. Second, Plaintiffs' 
underlying assumption regarding future injury resulting from continued enforcement of the 
Guidelines is directly refuted by the evidence before this Court. Plaintiffs incorrectly assume 
that bail agents Carlock and Garske will continue to violate the Guidelines. The evidence before 
this Court is that they have promised, by the terms of their contract, to do the opposite. (See 
7M08 Affidavit of Diane Burrell, Exhibits 8 & 9, contracts of James Garske and Shantara 
Carlock with the Fourth Judicial District). 
Agents cannot be removed from the list for no reason. The reasons for removing an 
agent from the list are set forth in the Guidelines. Before agents can be removed from the list, 
they must violate the Guidelines. In other words, before the Guidelines can be enforced, they 
must be violated. For future injury to occur, i.e. the alleged negative results from enforcing the 
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Guidelines, agents will have to again violate the Guidelines. Both Plaintiffs in this case (Carlock 
and Garkse) have promised by the terms of their contract with the Fourth District not to violate 
the Guidelines. That is the evidence before this Court. 
Plaintiffs' claim for prospective injury rests on this Court holding that, in the fbture, the 
Plaintiffs will do something they have promised not to do: violate the Guidelines. Only by 
violating the Guidelines can they invoke enforcement, thereby creating an alleged injury. The 
only way for this Court to craft an ongoing or prospective injury to catapult Plaintiffs through the 
courthouse doors is to assume that Plaintiffs have lied to the Fourth Judicial District. For the 
Plaintiffs to have an injury in the legal sense - ongoing injury or credible threat of imminent 
future harm - with respect to being removed from the list, they must present individuals to this 
Court who intend to violate the Guidelines, to cause enforcement, and then be removed from the 
list. They have not presented a single Plaintiff of this variety nor any such class. 
2. There Is No In iu r~  with Respect to Agents Who Are Not Placed on the List (Ms. 
Carlock) 
Plaintiffs have not presented a single individual to this Court who suffers the ongoing or 
future imminent harm of not being placed on the list. 
Mr. Garske has no complaint whatsoever with respect to being denied a place on the list 
in the first instance. 
Ms. Carlock was initially denied a place on the list because she did not disclose a felony 
juvenile charge that had been dismissed. She was placed on the list after a hearing. Ms. Carlock 
has not alleged that she is currently suffering the harm of not being placed on the list; indeed, she 
is on the list and currently writing bonds. Ms. Carlock has not alleged that she suffers the 
imminent threat in the future of not being placed on the list. 
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No Plaintiff has alleged that s/he is currently being kept off the list or suffers a credible 
threat of being kept off the list in the future. Plaintiffs have not met the legal requirement for 
injury with respect to agents who are not placed on the list. To argue that it virtually certain to 
happen to an unknown person at an unknown time in the future is not sufficient for the legal 
requirement of injury. 
B. The Remedies that Plaintiffs Seek Have Already Been Provided; therefore, they 
Lack Standing Based on Redressability and Their Claims Are Moot 
1. Plaintiffs Have the Burden of Demonstrating that Their Claims Are Not Moot 
Plaintiffs appear to misstate the law on the burden of proof regarding mootness. 
Plaintiffs write: "Defendants cannot meet their burden to prove that [removals fiom the list] are 
not likely to be repeated." (Plaint@ ' Opposition, p.9). Later, Plaintiffs argue: "[tlo the extent 
standing turns on any agent's current placement on the authorized list, Defendants will be unable 
to show that further removals are not capable of repetition." (Plaintiffs ' Opposition, p. 10). 
This is a misstatement of the law. The burden of proof to show this exception to the 
mootness doctrine is on the Plaintiffs, not the Defendants. "[Tlhe burden [of] showing a 
likelihood of recurrence [is] firmly on the plaintiff." Nelsen v. King Counfy, 895 F.2d 1248, 
125 1 (9'h Cir. 1990), quoting Sample v Johnson, 77 1 F.2d 1335 (9" Cir. 1985). 
It seems that Plaintiffs have selected the wrong legal category: the burden of proof on 
mootness in the situation where the government acts illegally, ceases the conduct during the 
pendency of the litigation, and then argues that the case is moot. In such a situation - which is 
not this situation - the standard set forth by the Plaintiffs would apply. See Verson, a Div. of 
AlIied Products Corp. v. US., 22 C.I.T. 15 1, 5 F. Supp. 2d 963 (CIT 1998) (distinguishing the 
different burdens of proof associated with the doctrine of mootness). 
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That the situation before the Court is not one in which the Defendants have ceased the 
complained-of conduct (removing Aladdin's agents from the list) is easily recognized in the fact 
that Mr. Garske, a named Plaintiff, was again removed from the list on December 13, 2007, 
while this action was pending. (See 7/9/08 Affidavit of Diane Burrell, Exhibits 3 & 4, a letter 
notjfiing of Mr. Gurske 's imminent removal, and a second letter confirming that removal.) 
In this case, the burden of proving that the alleged wrong is capable of repetition, yet 
evades review, falls squarely on the Plaintiffs. They have not met this burden. 
2. With Respect to Agents Who Are Removed from the List, Mr. Garske Has 
Already Received All the Relief to Which He Is Entitled; the Case Is Moot 
The first prong of the standing requirement (injury) has been discussed above (Sections 
A1 & A2). The second prong of the standing requirement (redressability) overlaps with the 
doctrine of mootness. Standing and mootness often intersect at the remedial benefit point of the 
standing doctrine; standing is denied as to specific remedies that will not redress a past injury. 
Only one named Plaintiff in this case has alleged that he was improperly removed from 
the list: James Garske. The Amended Complaint states: 
On one occasion and without prior notice to Aladdin, Mr. Garske or the affected 
bail agents, the Assistant TCA removed Mr. Garske and thirty-eight other Aladdin 
bail agents under his supervision from the authorized list on the Friday prior to a 
holiday weekend based on the assistant TCA's mistaken belief that Mr. Garske 
had failed to submit to a criminal history check as part of the application renewal 
process required by the Bail Bond Guidelines. As a result, Mr. Garske and these 
bail agents were deprived of their right to practice their profession for four days. 
Amended Compluint at \n 50. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITIN TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISSIMOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION - 7 
Assuming the facts alleged are true,3 Mr. Garkse has no ongoing harm. He has already 
received his remedy - being placed on the list. This Court cannot provide him with a fbrther 
remedy, as the Court previously recognized. At the status conference on January 25, 2008, the 
Court identified the redressability/mootness problem and directed the following comment to 
Aladdin's counsel: "And I think one of the real concerns you have, and I think that the State 
defendants have, and then I can say that I have, is whether or not we're really going to come out 
in this result with something where I can give relief to anyone that they want." (Scheduling 
Hearing Transcript (1/25/08), p.7, Ls.2-6.) The answer is no: in the confines of this case, with 
the named Plaintiffs, the Court cannot grant relief to anyone. 
The relief that Plaintiffs seek - a mandatory injunction invalidating the portion of the 
Guidelines that allows the Fourth District to remove agents from the list - will not redress Mr. 
Garske's past removal. As set forth in Defendants' initial motion, Mr. Garske's real complaint is 
a clerical error: he did not receive notice / the Fourth District did not receive his background 
check. Invalidating the Guidelines will not remedy a clerical error. 
Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' argument on this point does not make sense. 
Plaintiffs write: 
Defendants contend that neither Mr. Garske nor Aladdin have standing because 
Mr. Garske alleged he and all Fourth District agents were removed as a result of a 
clerical error and this Court cannot enjoin the commission of clerical errors. 
Defendants oversimplify the situation. Mr. Garske and others were removed 
pursuant to the Guidelines that are administered at the clerical level. Further, this 
Court can enjoin the continued enforcement s f  the Guidelines that required Mr. 
Garske to submit to the Guidelines' unconstitutional and redundant licensing 
3 Defendants dispute the facts as alleged. As set forth in Diane Burrell's August 21" supplemental affidavit, 
Defendants have provided proof that: (1) Mr. Garske did receive notice and (2) the Trial Court Administrator was 
not mistaken in his belief that he lacked a criminal background check for Mr. Garske, as required by the Guidelines. 
Nevertheless, because Defendants assume Plaintiffs' allegations for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, this 
discrepancy does not create a triable issue of fact. 
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procedure. The Court can similarly enjoin the enforcement of the Guidelines' 
removal provisions.. . 
(Plaintiffs ' Opposition , pp.7-8) 
There is no difference between being removed due to a clerical error and being removed 
due to a clerical error "pursuant to the Guidelines that are administered at the clerical level." 
Further, Plaintiffs' argument regarding whether the Court can remedy Mr. Garske's alleged harm 
ignores the necessary connection between the harm and the redress and simply highlights that the 
Court has the power to enjoin enforcement of the Guidelines. This argument misses the point. 
The question is not a general inquiry into what the Court can do. The question is a pointed legal 
one: will the relief sought by the Plaintiff redress the Plaintiff's ongoing or future harm? The 
answer is simply "no ." 
3. With Ressect to Agents Who Are Denied Placement on the List, Ms. Carlock Has 
Already Received All the Relief to Which She Is Entitled; the Case Is Moot 
Only one named Plaintiff in this case has alleged that she was denied placement on the 
list: Shantara Carlock. Ms. Carlock alleges that, because she failed to disclose a dismissed 
juvenile felony, she was denied placement on the list and had to wait to be placed on the list. 
She was not denied placement on the list because of the juvenile felony itself; rather, she was 
denied placement on the list because of her failure to disclose the juvenile case. 
Ms. Carlock's situation has long been remedied. When she was denied placement on the 
list, she applied for a hearing, was granted a hearing, was immediately placed on the list, and is 
currently on the list. Removing the requirement of disclosing juvenile criminal histories will do 
nothing to redress her purported past injury. She is not alleging that, in the near future, she will 
be required to disclose her juvenile history for a second time, and, as a result, may not be placed 
i l l  
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on the list in the initial instance. Indeed, such an allegation is nonsensical, illustrating the 
numerous difficulties Plaintiffs have in bringing a justiciable case to this Court for review. 
The Plaintiffs are seeking declaratory relief as a remedy for imagined future events that 
will occur to unknown and unnamed people at a date uncertain. This is not permissible. (Harris 
v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 5 13, 68 1 P.2d 988 ( 1  984) (as a general rule, a declaratory judgment 
action can only be rendered in a case where an actual justiciable controversy exists; the 
controversy must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a 
decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would 
be upon a hypothetical state of facts.)) 
With respect to the agents who are denied placement on the list, Ms. Carlock has already 
received all the relief to which she is entitled; there is nothing more this Court can do remedy 
Ms. Carlock's situation. The case is moot. 
C. Summary of Standing and Mootness Arguments 
The table below summarizes the Defendants' arguments with respect to standing (injury 
and redressability) and mootness. 
ongoing harm or 
threat of future harm; 
Already redressed 
because currently on 
list; Case is moot 
Removed from List 
was ever re-moved 
from the list 
Amended Complaint 
of any other specific 
agents being removed 
from the list 
Plaintiff Garske 
No injury because no 
No injury because no 
ongoing harm; or threat 
of future harm; Already 
redressed because 
placed on the list afier a 
hearing and currently 
on list; Case is moot 
Plaintiff Carlock 
Has not alleged that she 
Not Placed on List No allegations in the 
Amended Complaint 
of any other specific 
agents being denied 
placement on the list 
Plaintiff Two Jinn 
No allegation in the 
Has not alleged that 
he was not placed on 
the list 
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D. Bail Agents Are Governed by the Guidelines Because the Guidelines Form a 
Contract between the Bail Agents and the Fourth Judicial District 
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants lack the authority to make bail agents or courts parties to 
the bail bond contract and to insert contractual terms that are not otherwise provided for by law. 
(Plaintiffs ' Opposition, p. 1 1). In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite State v. Abracadabra 
Bail Bonds, 13 1 Idaho 1 13, 952 P.2d 1249 (Ct. App. 1998) for the proposition that the trial court 
could not enforce payment of the forfeiture under penalty of contempt and, instead, was 
obligated to pursue statutory remedies. 
Plaintiffs' argument on this point, including the citation to Abracadabra, has nothing to do 
with this case or Defendants' motion. Defendants are not attempting to "make" bail agents or 
courts parties to the bail bond contract, as Plaintiffs' argument seem to imply. There are two 
contracts governing bail and bail agents in the Fourth Judicial District. The first is the bail bond 
contract, which binds the State in a contractual relationship with criminal defendants and their 
sureties. The second is the contract formed when a bail agent signs and agrees to the terms of the 
Fourth Judicial District's Guidelines. This second contract is at issue here. 
Defendants have cited numerous authorities supporting their ability to enter into contracts as 
consumers (Defendants ' Motion to Dismiss, pp. 12- 16)' and, understandably, Plaintiffs have cited 
no authority to the contrary. (Plaint8s ' Opposition, pp. 12- 13). Rather, Plaintiffs seem to argue 
that, because an Idaho statute does not specifically address Defendants' ability to enter into bail 
contracts, Defendants lack the power to contract, and any attempt to create a contractual 
relationship between bail agents and the court violates Idaho law and the doctrine of separation 
of powers. (Plaintiffs ' Opposition, p. 13). Plaintiffs do not support this position with caselaw or 
other authorities. 
/ / /  
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E. Courts Have Inherent Ability - as Courts - to Regulate the Conduct of 
Bail Bondsmen 
In their initial motion, Defendants also cited authority for courts' inherent ability - as 
courts - to regulate bail agents. (Dejendants ' Motion to Dismiss, p. 14; p.21). Defendants' 
memorandum referred to a Michigan Supreme Court case that cited supporting case law from 
Tennessee, Louisiana, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, Ohio, and a federal 
circuit court. (Id., p. 14.) In response, Plaintiffs merely distinguish the statutory scheme in one 
of the seven listed states (Tennessee) (Plaintiffs ' Opposition, p. 12), and argue that the Michigan 
Supreme Court case was wrongly decided. (Plaintzfls ' Opposition, p. 19). No doubt the 
Plaintiffs want to avoid the reasoning in the Michigan case since it directly undermines the 
Plaintiffs' entire argument before this Court: 
While the insurance commissioner has the power to discipline insurance agents 
and bail bondsmen, it does not follow that the statutory provisions from which the 
disciplinary powers of the insurance commissioner derive were intended to 
occupy the whole field and to preclude judges from declining to accept bonds 
from person who violate provisions of the law regulating the furnishing of bonds. 
Culvert v. Lapeer Circuit Judges, 442 Mich. 409,412,502 N.W. 2d 293,294 (1993). 
No less an authority than the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that it is courts, and not 
bondsmen, who should be in control of the workings of the bail system. Describing a bail 
bondsman system "with all its abuses.. .in full and odorous bloom in Illinois," the Court wrote: 
The results [of Illinois' system] were that a heavy and irretrievable burden fell 
upon the accused, to the excellent profit of the bondsman, and that professional 
bondsmen, and not the courts, exercised significant control over the actual 
workings of the bail system. 
Schifb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 359-360 (1972) (upholding legislation in Illinois that effectively 
destroyed commercial bail in that state). 
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When Kentucky upheld its own legislation abolishing commercial bail, its Supreme Court 
expressed little patience for the view that the courts were constrained to regulate bail bondsmen 
the same as any other profession: 
The provisions of bail related to criminal defendants are governed by the rules of 
this court. To argue that the compensated surety has the same standing as barbers, 
merchants, professions and other businesses is needless rhetoric. 
Stephens v. Bonding Association of Kentucky, 538 S. W .2d 580 (1 976). 
In the face of so much authority supporting courts' ability to regulate bail agents, 
Plaintiffs then attempt to create a factual issue where one does not exist, arguing that even if 
courts could hold bail agents individually accountable for their actions and failure to assure 
payments on forfeitures, "issues of fact remain as to whether the scope of the inquiry - which 
includes requiring bail agents to [disclose] dismissed, juvenile charges - is reasonable and relates 
to the operation of the courts." (Plaintiffs' Opposilion, p.20). There is no issue of fact because 
there is no live case-or-controversy. No matter how interesting the issue, Plaintiffs cannot create 
issues of fact in the absence of a plaintiff with an injury. Lastly, the matter sounds in contract 
and "reasonableness," is not at issue. 
F. The Necessity for a Criminal Background Check Is Supported by the Fact that the 
Department of Insurance Only Conducts One Criminal History Report for Bail 
Agents 
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have not justified the necessity for requiring a criminal 
background check for individual bail agents. (Plaintiffs ' Opposition, pp. 18-21), 
With this reply brief, Defendants are submitting an affidavit from Lisa Tjordmann at the 
Department of Insurance. She explains that the Department of Insurance only conducts one 
criminal background check; this criminal history is done at the time a bail agent first applies for a 
license. Under the Guidelines, the Fourth Judicial District requires a criminal history each time 
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that a bail agent renews their license. By requiring regular background checks, the Fourth 
Judicial District is better able to monitor new crimes that bail agents might be committing. 
Plaintiffs would contend that this information begs the question, which is to say, 
Plaintiffs claim that the Fourth Judicial District does not need to know what crimes bail agents 
are committing. ("...the character and fitness of individual bail agents has no bearing on the 
procedural function of fixing bail to ensure the presence of a criminal defendant in order for 
criminal charges to be adjudicated." Pluintiffs' Opposition, p.21). Plaintiffs' argument looks to 
a rule governing the factors setting bail (I.C.R. 46(a)) to argue that "[tlhe determination of the 
type and amount of bond, which is properly an exercise of judicial discretion, lacks any 
connection to the bail agent's character." (Id., p.22.) This argument ignores the reality of the 
practice of commercial bail, as described by the D.C. Circuit: 
... The effect of such a system is that the professional bondsmen hold the keys to 
the jail in their pockets. They determine for whom they will act as surety - who 
in their judgment is a good risk. The bad risks, in the bondsmen's judgment, and 
the ones who are unable to pay the bondsmen's fees, remain in jail. The court and 
the commissioner are relegated to the relatively unimportant chore of fixing the 
amount of bail. 
Punnell v. United Stutes, 115 U.S. App. D.C. 379, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (1963) (concurring 
opinion). A bail agent's character is extremely important to the work slhe performs in the court 
system. 
Though Defendants do not believe this Court should reach the issue of the reasonableness 
of requiring criminal history checks, because, ( I )  there is no Plaintiff with a h a m  that can be 
remedied and (2) the Plaintiffs consented to the term by contracting; nevertheless, the 
Defendants have provided this Court with justification for the Fourth Judicial District's practice 
of requiring routine criminal history check. 
/ / I  
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111. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have repeatedly, and unsuccessfully, tried to unlock the courthouse doors with 
respect to many of the same issues that are now before this court. (See State v. Robert Croghan, 
Docket No. 32323, (Ct. App. June 20, 2006); Leader v. Reiner, 143 Idaho 635, 151 P.3d 831 
(2007)). They still have not found the key. Plaintiffs must present to this Court a justiciable 
case-or-controversy, which they have failed to do. Their case should be dismissed. 
DATED this 25 day of August 2008. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Deputy Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation ) 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and ) 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and ) CASE NO. CV OC 07066 19 
Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; ) 
and SHANTARA CARLOCK, 1 
1 
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) 
VS. 1 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ) 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF ) 
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official capacity as Administrative District ) 
Judge for the District Court of the Fourth ) 
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BURRELL, in her official capacity as ) 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator for the ) 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,) 
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1 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs Two Jinn, Inc, James Garske and Shantara Carlock, through their attorneys, 
respectfully move the Court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for entry 
of summary judgment in their favor on their claim for declaratory relief as set forth in Plaintiffs' 
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief and that the Court enter a permanent injunction 
consistent therewith. This motion is supported by a contemporaneously filed memorandum and 
affidavits with exhibits, together with all of the pleadings, records, affidavits and documents on 
file herein. A proposed Order is submitted for the Court's consideration. 
DATED t h s  5th day of September, 2008. 
NEVLN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
BY .- - 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO J N ,  INC., a California corporation duly ) 
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing 1 
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime 
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and ) Case No. CV OC 07066 1 9 
SHANTARA CARLOCK, 1 
) MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiffs, ) ALLEGATIONS REGARDING 
) TRIALCOURT 
vs. ) ADMINISTRATOR'S 
) ACTIONS ON MOTIONS TO 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ) EXONERATE AND ALLEGED 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF ) INTERFERENCE WITH 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her ) RIGHT TO APPEAL 
official capacity as Administrative District Judge ) 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official ) 
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and ) 
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant ) 
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court ) 
of the Fourth Judicial District, 
1 
Defendants. 
00334 
MOTION TO DISMISS ALLEGATIONS REGARDING TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S ACTIONS ON MOTIONS TO 
EXONERATE AND ALLEGED INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHT TO APPEAL - 1 nn l r rh!  n i 
Come now, Melissa Moody and Karl Klein, Attorneys for Defendants, and move 
this Court, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l); 12(b)(6), to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims 
regarding the Trial Court Administrator purportedly acting as a party in proceedings to 
exonerate or set aside forfeiture and making notations on motions seeking exoneration. 
Amended Complaint 56-58, 61, 83. Plaintiffs have presented no live case-or-controversy 
to this Court with respect to these claims; therefore, the case is not justiciable and should 
be dismissed. 
DATED this 5 day of September 2008. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MELISSA MOODY 
Deputy Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JLNN, I[NC., a California corporation duly 
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing 
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime 
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSU?; and 
SHANTARA CARLOCK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her 
official capacity as Administrative District Judge 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
Dist~lct; LARRY D. REINER, in his official 
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and 
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant 
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 1 
) 
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) Case No. CV OC 0706619 
) 
) DEFENDANTS' iIIOT1ON FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
) 
) 
) 
1 
) 
) 
) 
Come now, Melissa Moody and Karl Klein, Attorneys for Defendants, and move 
this Court for Summary Judgment pursuant to I.C.R.P. 56(b) as a matter of law. This 
motion is based upon the fact that no genuine issue of material fact exists and, as a matter 
of law, Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on all claims. A memorandum 
and affidavits in support of this motion are being filed contemporaneously with this 
motion. 
DATED this 5 day of September 2008. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MELISSA MOODY 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5 day of September 2008, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment by the following 
method to: 
Scott McKay 
Robyn Fyffe U.S. Mail C] Hand Delivery NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT 
LLP Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
P.O. Box 2772 Requested 
303 West Bannock C] Overnight Mail C] Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 Boise, ID 83701 C] Statehouse Mail 
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Honorable James J. Judd 
6498 N. Antler Place 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, Dl AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation ) 
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and ) 
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and ) CASE NO. CV OC 0706619 
Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; ) 
and SHANTARA CARLOCK, 1 
) 
Plaintiffs, 1 
1 
VS. 1 STIPULATION R E  REVISED 
1 BAIL BOND GUIDE1,INES 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ) 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF ) 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her ) 
official capacity as Administrative District ) 
Judge for the District Court of the Fourth ) 
Judicial District; LARRY D. FEWER, in ) 
his official capacity as Trial Court 1 
Administrator for the District Court of the ) 
Fourth Judicial District; and DIANE ) 
BURRELL, in her official capacity as ) 
Assistant Trial Court Adininistrator for the ) 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,) 
1 
Defendants. ) 
1 STIPULATION RE REVISED BAIL BOND GUIDELINES 00340 
The parties, through their respective attorneys, hereby stipulate and agree that the attached 
Bail Bond Guidelines, Administrative Order and Fornls Appendix, Bates Nos. RVSD BBG 
00001 to 00060, are the Bail Bond Guidelines currently in effect in the Fourth Judicial District. 
Although the Administrative Order, Bates Nos. RVSD BBG 00001 to 00003, was signed on 
August 22, 2008, the attorneys for neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants were aware that those 
Guidelines had been implemented or put into effect at the time they filed their respective 
summary judgment motions on September 5,2008. The parties stipulate and agree that these 
revised Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District are now the Bail Bond Guidelines at 
issue in the present litigation and that the motions presently pending before the Court should be 
considered in the context of these revised Guidelines. 
/t- 
DATED this day of September, 2008. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
/ 
By: 
Scott McKay 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
L-- 
e 
DATED this / day of September. 2008. 
STATE OF IDAHO, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By: c ? & L d  
Melissa ~ o o d ~ "  
Attorneys for Defendants 
2 STIPULATION RE REVISED BAIL BOND GUIDELINES 
IN TEIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
RE: Bail Bond Guidelines for the ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 
Fourth Judicial District 1 
) No. 08-08-22 
WHEREAS, pursuant to LC. $1-907 and I.C.A.R. 42(e), the Administrative Judge in each 
judicial district has been granted administrative supervision and authority over the courts in their 
respective districts; and 
WHEREAS, the admission of bail is part of the operation of the trial courts and the 
acceptance of bail bonds is a judicial function of the courts over which courts have inherent 
power to administer their affairs; and 
WHEREAS, the posting of bail bonds relates to public safety and welfare and it is 
therefore in the best interest of the courts and the general public to ensure the appearance of the 
accused at the trial and other hearings as required by the courts and to provide for the cansistent 
and prompt payment of forfeited bail bonds; and 
WHEREAS, it is in the best interest of the general public and the court to ensure that 
persons or entities who are permitted to present for acceptance of bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial 
District possess qualifications of good character and conduct their business in an ethical, prompt 
and law-abiding manner; and 
WHEREAS, the judges of the Fourth Judicial District collectiveIy handle approximately 
3,700 motions annuaUy involving bail bond matters, and the judges need the help of the court's 
staff in reviewing these motions in order to address them thoroughly and timely; 
WHEREAS, the Fourth Judicial District desires to make .fair, reasonable, and consistent 
rules applying to all persons offering bonds for acceptance in its district, and 
WHEREAS, the Fourth Judicial District provided a drafi of the Bail Bond Guidelines to 
the judges, all bail agencies within the Fourth Judicial District and to their attorney if represented, 
the Department of Insurance, and the Ada County Prosecutor for their review and comment. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this court adopts the attxhed Bail Bond 
Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District, and these guidelines shall be followed by all persons 
or entities desiring to offer bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial District, and by the Trial Court 
Administrator, judges, clerks, and sheriffs of the Fourth Judicial District, and, 
Administrative Order re: Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District I 
nn.r%B BBG 00001 
IT I S  FURTHER ORDERED tliiii i f l ib  Older supersedes and repiaces any prevtous order 
or orders telating to the issues addressed herein, and these guidelines %hall be effective 
itnmcdiately, and the Trial Court Adrnitlistrator shall immediately mail a copy of this order with 
attached guidelines to all such currently authorized persons. 
I/!&-, 
Hon. Darla S. Wiiliarnson 
Adrnir~istrative Judge 
Fourth Judicial District 
The judges of the Fourth Judicial District approve tlie adoption of these Bail Bond 
Guideliges. 
K ; L L  -& LUt-- 
Hon. Thomas F. Neville 
Administrative Order re: Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourtli Judicial District 
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BAIL BOND GUIDELINES FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SECTION 1 
DEFINITIONS 
Bail agency - a business offering ball bonds for acceptance In the Fourth Judrc~al 
District Court. 
Bail agent - the ball; a person who offers an undertak~ng acceptable to the court for 
release of the defendant and the person to whom custody of the defendant is released 
A bail agent must be ilcensed by the ldaho Department of lnsurance as provided by 
ldaho Code T~tle 41 Chapter 10. For purposes of these Guidelines, the ball agent is 
considered the responsible party to ensure that a forfelted bond IS timely pald, 
notwithstanding the rrght of the state or county to pursue collection of a forfelted bond 
from the insurance company, and notwithstanding any agreement between the bail 
agent and the Insurance company. Bail agent also includes the supervising agent 
Bail Bond - an undertaking ensuring all future court appearances of the defendant. 
Ensure - to make sure that the insurance company or other responsible person or entity 
pays the bail bond. 
Exoneration of bail - a court order directing the release and discharge of a bait bond. 
This occurs by the surrender of the defendant to the proper authorities in the time 
allowed, by the acquittal of the defendant, when the conditions of bail have been met, or 
for other reasons determined by the trial judge. 
Forfeiture of bail - a court order declaring that the defendant who is out of custody on 
bail has breached one or more of the conditions of his release, usually the failure to 
appear at court, and the consequences of which are the bail posted for that defendant 
may be forfeited. 
insurance company - an admitted insurance company authorized in the line of surety 
pursuant to Title 41 of the ldaho Code. 
Supervising Agent - a bail agent who hires, appoints, employs, or contracts another 
bail agent to act on hidher behalf. For the purpose of these Guidelines, the supervising 
agent shall be responsible for seeing that the bail bonds posted by bail agents acting on 
behalf of the supervising agent are timely paid. Furthermore, for the purpose of these 
Guidelines, no ball agency shall llst more than one supervising agent, and the 
supervising agent shall be named on the Application to Become an Authorized Bail 
Agent Within the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho. The supervising agent must 
acknowledge hislher capacity as supervising agent by signing the application. 
Trial Court Administrator or Trial Court Administratots Office - the staff of the 
Fourth Judicial District who have the responsibilities set forth in these Guidelines. 
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SECTION 2. 
APPLICATION OF GUIDELINES 
These Guidelines shall apply in all locations within the boundaries of the Fourth Judicial 
District. 
Page 2 
SECTION 3. 
DlSCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
The Trial Court Administrator's Office will not disclose information from the bail agent's 
application except as required by Title 9 Chapter 3 of the Idaho Code. 
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SECTION 4 
REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF BAIL BONDS 
No bail bonds shall be accepted by any sheriff or Clerk of the District Court within the 
Fourth Judicial District from any person who is not on the list of authorized bail agents 
maintained by the Trial Court Administrator as stated in Section 10 of these Guidelines. 
The Trial Court Administrator shall be responsible for providing all sherrffs wrthin the 
Fourth Judrcral D~stnct an updated list of those bail agents whose bail bonds may be 
accepted as security for defendant's future appearance in court, including any recent 
additions or deletions therefrom. 
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SECTION 5. 
PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF THE BAIL AGENT'S LICENSE 
Before the expiration date of the license issued by the ldaho Department of Insurance 
pursuant to ldaho Code $41-1039, the bail agent shall, in order to remain on the List of 
Authorized Bail Agents following the expiration date: 
( I )  Have a criminal hrstory records fingerprint check completed by the ldaho State 
Police Bureau of Criminal ldentrfication (see section entitled "Criminal History 
Checks"). The results of thls crlminal history records check must be received by 
the Trial Court Administrator's Office from the ldaho State Police prior to the 
expiration of the bail agent's Resident Producer license; 
(2) Complete and submit to the Trial Court Administrator's Office, Ada County 
Courthouse, Boise, Idaho, an updated Application to Become an Authorized Bail 
Agent Within the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho. A copy of the renewed 
license issued by the ldaho Department of lnsurance must accompany the 
Application; 
(3) Provide to the Trial Court Administrator's Office a current copy of the contract 
between the bail agent and the represented insurance company andlor a current 
copy of the contract between the bail agent and the supervising agent if such 
contract has changed since it was last provided to the Trial Court Administrator's 
Office. The copy of the contract shall accompany the renewal application. 
All paragraphs of the Section entitled "Adding Agents to the List of Authorized Bail Bond 
Agents" will apply to license renewals. 
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SECTION 6. 
BOND AND POWER OF ATTORNEY FORMS 
All bail bonds and power of attorney forms used in the Fourth Judicial District shall: 
(1) Be on forms provided by the Insurance company, 
(2) Not be altered In any way; 
(3) Bear the or~ginal signature of the person posting the bond; no power of attorney 
may be used more than once or photocopied to be subm~tted as the original; 
(4) Bear the typed or pre-printed current name, address, and telephone number of the 
person posting the bond. This information must match the informat~on that is on 
record with the Trial Court Administrator's Office. 
(5) Bear the typed or pre-prlnted current name, address, and telephone number of the 
insurance company undewriting the bond; 
(6) Be accurately and completely filled out; 
(7) Not be submitted after the expiration date, if any, on the face of the Power of 
Attorney. 
The sheriffs or any person within the Fourth Judicial District having legal custody of any 
person shall have no authority to accept any bail bond that does not comply with this 
Section, and no bail agent shall attempt to submit a ball bond which does not comply 
with this Section. 
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SECTION 7 
STACKING BONDS - PROHIBITED 
Only one Power of Attorney shall be submitted with each bond, and the face value or 
face amount of the Power shall be equal to or greater than the amount of the bail or 
bond set by the Court in the case for which the bond and Power are being submitted. A 
bail agent shall not attempt to "stack" bonds or Powers by submitting more than one 
Power of Attorney for any single bond. 
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SECTION 8. 
SOLICITING IN THE COURTHOUSE - PROHIBITED 
All bail agents shall refrain from soliciting clients in any court facility in the Fourth Judicial 
District. Also prohibited is the distribution of all non-governmental posters, banners, 
signs, flyers, pamphlets, or the like in the foyers, lobbies, and corridor spaces of any 
Fourth District court facility. 
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SECTION 9. 
TAKING CUSTODY OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE COURTHOUSE 
Any bail agent or any person acting on behalf of a bail agent must obtain the approval 
and assistance of the court security officer before attempting to take custody of any 
individual andlor attempting to remove any individual from within a Fourth Judicial 
Dtstrict court facility. 
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SECTION 10. 
LIST OF AUTHORIZED BAIL AGENTS 
It shall be the responsibility of the Trial Court Administrator's Office of the Fourth Judicial 
District to maintain a list of bail agents who are authorized to present for acceptance a 
bail bond in the Fourth Judicial District. Persons authorized to accept bail bonds shall 
not accept a bail bond from a bail agent who is not on this list. The list wit1 be provided to 
the Sheriffs Department and to the Clerk of the Court for each of the four counties 
comprising the Fourth Judicial District on the day that it is updated. The purpose of the 
list is only to provide notice to the counties as to those bail agents who are authorized to 
present bonds for acceptance within the district and not for advertising or any other 
purpose not specifically authorized by the Administrative District Judge of the Fourth 
Judicial District. A copy of the list of authorized agents is available at the Trial Court 
Administrator's Office to any bail agent 
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SECTION 11 
ADDING BAIL AGENTS TO THE LIST 
OF AUTHORIZED BAIL AGENT 
The policies contained in this document will be those that are followed when an 
individual makes application to be added to the List of Authorized Bail Agents in the 
Fourth Judicial District. 
I. REQUIREMENTS 
All individuals desiring to offer for acceptance bail bonds within the Fourth Judicial 
District must: 
A. Possess and maintain a current Resident Producer - General Lines or Resident 
Producer - Surety Lines license issued by the ldaho Department of Insurance. 
B. Have a criminal history records fingerprint check completed by the ldaho State 
Police Bureau of Criminal Identification (see section entitled "Criminal History 
Checks"). 
C. Complete and submit to the Trial Court Administrator's Office, Ada County 
Courthouse, Boise, Idaho, an Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent 
Within the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho. A copy of the license from the 
ldaho Department of Insurance must accompany the Application. 
D Provide to the Trial Court Administrator's Office a current copy of the contract 
between the ball agent and the represented Insurance company andlor a current 
copy of the contract between the bail agent and the supervising agent. 
E. Be appointed by the ldaho Department of lnsurance to post bonds on behalf of the 
insurance company listed on the Application. Proof of appointment must 
accompany the application. 
11. APPLICATION 
A. All requested information and questions on the Application must be answered fully 
and truthfully. The applicant shall sign the Acknowledgement, Waiver, and 
Certification at the end of the Application. The supervising agent shall also sign 
the Acknowledgement of Supervising Agent. 
€3. The applicant may submit the Application by delivering or mailing it to the Trial 
Court Administrator's Office, 200 W. Front Street, Boise, ID 83702, or the applicant 
may submit the Application by faxing it to the Trial Court Administrator's Office at 
fax number (208)287-7509. 
C. Processing can not be completed until all information, including a typed or legibly 
printed application and the results of the criminal history records check, has k e n  
received by the Trial Court Administrator's Office. 
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Grounds far disqualification of an applicant from offering for acceptance bail bonds in the 
Fourth Judicial District indude the following: 
A. The criminal history check reveals: 
(1) any felony crime for which the applicant or the applicant's proposed insurance 
company has been convicted, pled gu~lty, received a withheld judgment, or 
otherwise sentenced. 
(2) any misdemeanor crime involving theft, fraud, or any other crime of dishonesty for 
which the applicant or the applicant's proposed insurance company has been 
convicted, pled guilty, received a withheld judgment, or otherwise sentenced within 
the last ten (10) years, including crimes committed before age 18 years. 
(3) three or more misdemeanor crimes for which the applicant or the applicant's 
proposed insurance company has been convicted, pled guilty, received a withheld 
judgment, or otherwise sentenced within the last five (5) years, including crimes 
committed before age 18 years. 
(4) any combination of three or more of the following in which the applicant has been 
convicted, pled guilty, received a withheld judgment, or otherwise sentenced: 
failure to appear, contempt of court, or probation violation within the last five (5) 
years. 
B. The applicant failed to disclose information as requested on the Application form. 
C. The applicant or the applicant's insurance company is not licensed by The 
Department of Insurance of the State of Idaho. 
D. The applicant has four or more prior violati0.n~ of these Guidelines andior previous 
Fourth Judicial District policies or guidelines for bail agents which have not been 
excused by the Administrative District Judge following a hearing. 
E. The applicant is currently employed by the state or county in a court-related 
position. 
F. The applicant was denied the ability to offer bail bonds for acceptance or was 
removed from the list of authorized bail agents in this or another jurisdiction. 
G. The application processing reveals the applicant has previously had a license 
suspensiorr or revocation imposed by the department of insurance of any state of 
the United States. 
H. The applicant or histher insurance company has previously failed to have paid a 
forfeited bond. 
I. The applicant is related by blood, marriage, or adoption to a Fourth District judge. 
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J. Financial insotvency of the applicant or hisiher insurance company. 
K. The applicant has not satisfied all obligations to any court incurred while working 
with andher ball agency. 
L. The applicant was previously removed from the list of authorized agents. 
If an applicant is dtsquahfied, the Trial Court Administrator's Offrce will so not~fy the 
applicant in writing. If the applicant disagrees with the disqualification, he or she may, 
w~thin thirty (30) days of the date of the dtsqualtfication determination notice, file a 
petition w~th the Clerk of the Court requesting a heanng before the Fourth District 
Adrn~nistrative District Judge to show why the applicant should be allowed to offer for 
acceptance bail bonds In this district. 
If an applicant is deemed to be qualified, the Trial Court Administrator's Office will notify 
the applicant in writing that his or her name has been added to the list of authorized bail 
agents. 
IV. COPIES OF COMPLETED APPLICATIONS 
Upon written request signed by the appticant, copies of a completed Application will be 
provided only to the applicant at a cost of $1 .OO per page or will be faxed to the fax 
telephone number as provided by the applicant. 
Page 13 [Rev 8-20081 
00359 VSD BEG 0001 8 
SECTION 12. 
CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECKS 
Below are the procedures for obtaining criminal history checks in the Fourth District for 
new bail agents offering for acceptance bail bonds or bail agents who are submitting an 
Application with a renewed license: 
(1) When an Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent Within the Fourth 
Judicial District is submitted for a new bail agent, or when a bail agent is renewing 
h ~ s  or her license with the Department of Insurance, the applicant must have a 
criminal history records fingerprint check completed by the ldaho State Police 
Bureau of Criminal Identification. 
(2) Applicants who reside in Ada County must have their fingerprints taken at the 
ldaho State Police headquarters, 700 S. Stratford Drive in Meridian. 
(3) Depending upon the policies of the local Sheriff's Office, applicants who reside 
outside of Ada County may have the option of having their fingerprints taken at the 
ldaho State Police headquarters in Meridian or by having the fingerprints taken at 
their local Sheriff's Office. 
(4) The results of the fingerprint check will be mailed from the Bureau of Criminal (dentification directly to the Trial Court Administrator's Office. Criminal history 
checks received from any other address will not be accepted. Bail agents should 
allow a minimum of 10 working days for completion of the criminal history checks. 
(5)  When a bail agent's license is being renewed, it is the responsibility of the bail 
agent to ensure that the Trial Court Administrator's Office receives the criminal 
history check before the license expires. 
Once criminal history check results have been received from the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification, Applications to post bail bonds in the Fourth District will be processed in 
the normal course of business. 
Page 14 [Rev 4-20041 
00360 RVSD BEG 00019 
SECTION 13. 
APPLICATION TO BECOME AN AUTHORIZED BAIL AGENT 
WITHIN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
The Appllcatlon Included In the Forms Appendlx section of these Guldeilnes IS to be 
completed by all individuals seeklng to be added to the Llst of Authonzed Bail Agents In 
the Fourth Judlclal DIS~FIC~. It IS also to be completed when a bail agent IS renewing hls 
or her request to be on the list of author~zed bat1 agents or when changes are made as 
described in these Guldellnes. Ball bonds offered by a ball agent on this list may be 
accepted by sheriffs and clerks of the Fourth Judicial District without prlor subrn~ssion to 
the court 
For renewal applications, prior to renewal, the applicant will reimburse the Trial Court 
Administrator for all certified mailing costs incurred in providing notices required by these 
Guidelines by that applicant. 
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SECTION 14. 
REMOVING A BAlL AGENT FROM THE LIST OF 
AUTHORIZED BAIL AGENTS 
The policies contained in this document will be followed when an individual's name is 
removed from the List of Authorized Bail Agents in the Fourth Judicial District. 
I. VIOLATIONS ALLOWING REMOVAL OF BAlL AGENT 
A. The Trial Court Adrn~nistrator's Office may petition the Administrative District Judge 
for the removal of a bail agent from the list of authorized bail agents for the Fourth 
Judicial District for violations listed below A separate petition will be filed for each case, 
and a notice of hear~ng Indicating the date and t~me of the hearing will be mailed to the 
bail agent's last-known mailing address. 
(1) The bail agent, bail agency, or the bait agent's insurance company has been 
subjected to disciplinary measures imposed by the Idaho Department of Insurance 
or by any judge or Trial Court Administrator in the state of Idaho. 
(2) The bail agent did not provide complete and truthful information on the Application. 
(3) The bail agent andlor bail agency has been convicted of, pled guilty to, received a 
withheld judgment for, or otherwise sentenced on any felony crime, including 
dispositions in juvenile court. 
(4) The bail agent andlor bail agency has been convicted of, pled guilty to, received a 
withheld judgment for, or otherwise sentenced on any misdemeanor crimes 
involving theft, fraud, or any other crime of dishonesty within the last ten (10) years, 
including dispositions in juvenile court. 
(5) The bail agent andlor bail agency has been convicted of, pled guilty to, received a 
withheld judgment for, or otherwise sentenced on three or more misdemeanor 
crimes within the last five (5) years, including dispositions in juvenile court. 
(6) The bail agent andlor bail agency has been convicted of, pled guilty to, received a 
withheld judgment for, or otherwise sentenced on any combination of three or more 
of the following: failure to appear, contempt of court, or probation violation within 
the last five (5) years. 
(7) The bail agent is employed by the state or county in a court-related position 
(8) The bail agent has been denied the ability to offer bonds for acceptance or was 
removed from the list of authorized agents in another jurisdiction or judicial district. 
(9) The bail agent andlor bail agency has used fraudulent or dishonest practices or 
has shown himself/herself in any way to be incompetent, untrustworthy, or a 
source of injury and loss to the public, the court, or others. 
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(10) The bail agent has provlded false, incorrect, or incomplete information in any 
format, verbal or written, to a judge, clerk, deputy clerk, or the offlce of the 7'nal 
Court Administrator of the Foulth Judicial District. 
(1 1) The bail agent has violated the Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District, 
any previous Fourth Judicial District policies or guidelines for bail agents, any 
administrative order pertaining to bail agents, ldaho Court Rules, andlor ldaho 
statutes. 
(12) The bail agent is related by blood, marriage, or adoption to a Fourth District judge. 
(13) The insurance company listed on the undertaking guaranteeing payment of the 
bond has failed to pay one or more forfeited bonds in the Fourth Judic~al District. 
In this event, the Trial Court Admln~strator's Office may petition the Administrative 
Dlstr~ct Judge to remove the name of every bail agent offering undertakings for this 
insurance company. 
(14) For a violation of these Guidelines and for those actions or inactions deemed 
detrimental to the administration of bail bonds. 
(1 5) The bail agent's insurance company is financially insolvent. 
(16) The applicant has not satisfied all obligations to any court incurred while working 
with another bail agency. 
(17) Upon mailing a fourth violation notice to a bail agent of a violation of these 
Guidelines andlor any previous Fourth Judicial District policies or guidelines for bail 
agents, the Trial Court Administrator's Office may simultaneously request a hearing 
with the Administrative District Judge for the purpose of requiring the agent to 
appear before the Administrative District Judge and present evidence and/or 
testimony to show why the agent's name should not be permanently removed from 
the list of authorized agents. 
Following the hearing, the Administrative District Judge will make a determination as to 
whether or not the bail agent's name will be removed from the List of Authorized Bail 
Agents and the period of time, if any, during which the bail agent's name will be 
removed. 
8. For violations listed in ( l) ,  (2), and (3) below, the Trial Court Administrator's Office 
may notify the bail agent, and any supervising agent of the bail agent, to correct the 
violation(s) within ten (10) calendar days. The notice will state the nature of the 
violation(s) and the date by which the violation(s) must be remedied. The date specified 
on the notice for rectifying the violation will be 10 calendar days from the date of the 
notice or the first: working day after the 10" day if the 1 0 ~  day falls on a weekend or 
holiday. 
If the bail agent or the supervising agent has not rectified the violation by 12:OO p.m. 
(noon) on the date specified on the notice, the names of the bail agent and the 
supervising agent will be immediately removed from the List of Authorized Bail Agents. 
If the removed bail agent is a supervising agent, all bail agents who have listed the 
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supervising agent on their Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent Within the 
Fourth Judic~al Dlstrtct will also be removed from the list of aui\~orized agents. 
( I )  .A forfeited bond has not been pa~d by the 181S' day after the date of the forfeiture. 
and by the 183" day after forfeiture the bail agent has not filed a sufficient motion 
In trial court to set aside the forfeiture andlor for exoneration using the forms 
prov~ded In these Guidelines or has provided proof of incarceration of the 
defendant within the required time period allowed by law. If the ball agent has filed 
a suffic~ent motion In the tnal court to set aside the forfeiture andlor for exoneration 
by the 183'* day after the forfeiture, and the judge sets aside the forfeiture in the 
underlying case, the violation for the forfeiture will no longer be considered a 
violat~on of the guidelines if the agent provides the Trial Court Administrator's 
Office a copy of the order setting as~de the forfeiture. 
(2) The bail agent fails to ensure that the forfeited bond is paid after denial by the trial judge of a motion to set aside the forfeiture andlor for exoneration, and no pending 
motions are before the trial judge for reconsideration. However, if the bail agent 
appeals the decision of the presiding judge and a stay of execution is ordered, and 
if the bail agent provides a copy of the notice of appeal and stay of execution to the 
Trial Court Administrator's Office, the agent's name will not be removed from the 
list of authorized agents while the appeal is pending. 
(3) The bail agent has not provided to the Trial Court Administrator's Office a 
photocopy of the Idaho Resident Producer - General Lines license or Resident 
Producer - Surety Lines license as of the expiration date of the temporary license 
or has not provided a renewal Application and followed all requirements for 
renewal prior to the expiration date of the agent's license. 
If the affected bail agent believes the Trial Court Administrator has committed an error in 
hislher intended action to remove the bait agent from the List of Authorized Bail Agents, 
he or she may, by the deadline stated in the notification letter, request the Trial Court 
Administrator to review the reasons for the intended action andior may, by the deadline 
stated in the notification letter, file a petition with the Clerk of the Court for a hearing 
before the Administrative District Judge for review of the Trial Court Administrator's 
intended action. In the request to the Trial Court Administrator or in the petition, the bail 
agent shall clearly and concisely provide good cause why the removal should not occur. 
The Trial Court Administrator shall review any such request prior to any removal of the 
bail agent. If a petition has been filed, the bail agent or the attorney filing the petition on 
behalf of the bail agent shall immediately provide a copy of the filed petition to the Trial 
Court Administrator's Office, and the bail agent shall not be removed before a hearing is 
held. 
If a bail agent is removed from the List of Authorized Bail Agents by the Trial Court 
Administrator and if the bail agent wishes to have his or her name reinstated, the bail 
agent may file a petition with the Clerk of the Court and request a hearing with the 
Administrative District Judge for the purpose of presenting good cause to show why the 
agent's name should be reinstated to the List of Authorized Bail Agents. As a condition 
of reinstatement, the Administrative District Judge may require the agent to reimburse 
the county for all costs incurred in having the agent's name removed. 
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C.  For violations listed in ( I ) ,  (2) ,  and (3) below the bail agent shall be immediately 
removed from the List of Authorized Bail Agents without prior notice. 
(1) The bail agent license has expired or has been suspended or revoked by the Idaho 
Department of Insurance since the date of Issuance and the Trial Court 
Administrator's Office has been not~fied of this by the ldaho Department of 
lnsurance In this eventithe bail agent's name shall immediately be removed from 
the List of Authorized Bail Agents, and the ball agent shall be notified of such 
removal. Upon reinstatement by the ldaho Department of Insurance, the bail agent 
shall be added back to the List of Authonzed Bail Agents. The bail agent may, at 
any tlme during the removai period, file a petition with the Clerk of the Court 
requesting an immediate hearing before the Administrative District Judge for 
review of the removal. 
(2) The bail agent has written a check to the Clerk of the Court in payment of one or 
more forfeited bonds and the financial institution upon which the check has been 
written has failed to pay the check. In this event, the bail agent shall be 
immediately temporarily removed from the List of Authorized Bail Agents. If the 
bail agent is a supervising agent, all bail agents working under the supervising 
agent shall also be removed from the list. The bail agent or agents shall be 
immediately notified of the temporary removal and the Trial Court Administrator's 
Office shall immediately file a petition with the Clerk of the Court requesting an 
immediate hearing before the Administrative District Judge for review of the 
removal and for the purpose of presenting evidence andlor testimony to show why 
the agent's name should be removed from the list. The bail agent may present 
evidence at the hearing requesting reinstatement to the list. As a condition of 
reinstatement, the Administrative District Judge may require the agent to reimburse 
the county for all costs incurred in having the agent's name removed. 
(3) The bail agent's insurance company or the bail agent's supervising agent requests 
in writing the removal of the bail agent's name from the list for the reason the bail 
agent no longer has authority to act on behalf of the insurance company or the 
supervising agent, or the Department of insurance has indicated the bail agent is 
no longer affiliated with its insurance company. In this event, the bail agent shall 
be immediately temporarily removed from the List of Authorized Bail Agents. If the 
bail agent is a supervising agent, all bail agents working under the supervising 
agent shall also be removed from the list. The bail agent or agents shall be 
immediately notified by mailing to the home address listed on the application of the 
temporary removal and the Trial Court Administrator's Office shall immediately file 
a petition with the Clerk of the Court requesting an immediate hearing before the 
Administrative District Judge for review of the removal and for the purpose of 
presenting evidence andlor testimony to show why the agent's name should be 
removed from the list. The petition shall be mailed to the home address listed on 
the application. The bail agent may present evidence at the hearing requesting 
reinstatement to the list. As a condition of reinstatement, the Administrative District 
Judge may require the agent to reimburse the county for all costs incurred in 
having the agent's name removed. 
D. Motions for exoneration andlor to set aside a forfeiture shall first be reviewed by 
the Trial Court Administrator's Office before referring to the presiding judge. 
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SECTION 15. 
CHANGE OF ADDRESS OR OTHER STATUS 
All bail agents authorized to present for acceptance bail bonds within the Fourth Judicial 
District shall immediately notify the Trial Court Administrator of any: 
(3) Change of ball agent's name; 
(2)  Change of ball agent's business or res~dent~al address; 
(3) Change of bail agent's business or personal phone number; 
(4) Change of name or address of the ball agent's insurance company; 
(5) Cancellation by the insurance company of the bail agent's author~ty to write bonds 
for that company; 
(6) Any change of the bail agent's insurance company; 
(7) Change of supervising agent of the bail agent, or change of employeeslagents 
whom the bail agent supervises; 
(8) Change of bad agent's status on the records of the ldaho Department of lnsurance; 
(9) Cancellat~on of a ball agent's affil~at~on with a bail agency; 
(10) Affiliation w~th or opening a new ball agency. 
(1 1) Filing of any criminal charges agalnst the ball agent or hislher supervising agent 
(12) Filing of or initiation of any civil, criminal or administrative action by the ldaho 
Department of lnsurance agalnst the ball agent or the bail agent's Insurance 
company. 
Notification of any such change must be done by completing, dating, and signing pages 
one and two of the Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent Within the Fourth 
Judicial District and delivering the same to the Trial Court Administrator's office within 
five (5) business days from the date of the change. For clarification purposes, the bail 
agent may provide a supplemental letter of explanation with the Application pages. If the 
bail agent has met all other requirements of these Guidelines, the change will be 
effective within five (5) business days after the Trial Court Administrator's Office receives 
notification. 
If a bail agent fails to comply with the requirements of these Guidelines, the bail agent 
shall not be allowed to assert as grounds for exoneration the fact that notices of 
forfe~ture were mailed to the incorrect name or address. 
In the event the bail agent did not provide notice, the supervising agent shall notify the 
Trial Court Administrator of the above changes within ten (10) business days of the 
change. 
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SECTION 16. 
POSTING BAIL BONDS UNDER MORE THAN ONE BAIL AGENCY 
For bail agents who offer for acceptance bail bonds under more than one bail agency 
andlor insurance company, the following policies will apply: 
(1) To ensure that court documents and correspondence are ma~led correctly, the 
name of the ball agency shall not be placed on notices of forfeiture or other court 
documents and correspondence Only the name of the bail agent who offered the 
ball bond for acceptance and the bail agent's ma~ling address will appear on these 
documents. 
(2) Regardless of the number of bail agencies a bail agent is offering bail bonds for 
acceptance, all court documents and correspondence will be mailed to the one 
address provided in writing by the bail agent to the Trial Court Administrator's 
Off ice. 
(3)  Applications submitted with more than one mailing address will be returned as 
"unable to process." 
(4) Each bail agent will be assigned an Ada County 3-digit number as a computer 
system identifier for each bail agency for which the bail agent offers bonds. 
(5) For the purpose of providing a list of authorized bail agents to the Sheriffs Office, 
the name of the bail agency that is entered into the computer system will be the 
first bail agency listed on the Application. 
(6) If a bail agent or supervising agent is removed from the List of Authorized Bail 
Agents, he or she will be removed for all bail agencies listed on his or her 
Application. 
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SECTION 17 
BOND EXONERATIONS AFTER FORFEITURE 
After the Clerk's Office has mailed a notice of forfeiture to the insurance company or its 
designated agent, the insurance company or its designated agent will have one hundred 
eighty (I 80) days from the date of the forfeiture to: 
(1 ) Surrender the defendant; or 
(2) Pay to the Clerk of the Court the full amount of the forfeited bond; or 
(3) F~le with the court a sufficient mot~on for exonerahon or to set aside the forfeiture 
using the forms provided in these Guidelines. 
Once a not~ce of forfeiture has been mailed to the bail agent, the agent must respond 
with one of the above three actions. 
A bail bond is not deemed to be exonerated until the order is signed by the presiding 
judge. 
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SECTION 18. 
PROOF OF INCARCERATION 
i. Surrenders of the defendant before and after forfeiture shall be done in the 
following manner: 
A. IDAHO CODE 619-2924 SURRENDERS PRIOR TO FORFEITURE 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 919-2924 at "anytime before the forfeiture of thew undertaking, 
the bail may surrender the defendant in their exonerat~on, or he may surrender himself to 
the officer in whose custody he was comm~tted at the time of giving bail, or to the county 
sheriff where the action is pending". The defendant is surrendered in the following 
manner 
(1)  "A certificate of surrender, executed by the bail, must be delivered to the officer, 
who must also attach thereto his signature, the month, day, year, and time of day as 
evidence of surrender and detain the defendant in his custody thereon as upon a 
commitment. The certificate of surrender shall contain the legal caption of the action in 
which the undertaking was given, including the name of the defendant, case number, 
name and address of the bail, and shall clearly state that the bond is being revoked by 
the bail". 
(2) The bail agent "shall, the next judicial day, file with the court in which the action 
or appeal is pending the certificate of surrender, and shall deliver a copy of the same to 
the county prosecuting attorney". 
B. IDAHO CODE 51 9-2927 SURRENDERS AFTER FORFEITURE 
For the purpose of assisting the court in determining whether or not to exonerate a bond 
after forfeiture, the bail agent shall file proof of incarceration containing the following 
information with the bail agent's motion for exoneration: 
(1) A certificate of surrender as required above (2) Power number 
(3) Name of incarcerating facility 
(4) Date of incarceration of the defendant 
(5) The law enforcement number of the officer in whose custody the defendant was 
surrendered 
(6)  The name and phone number of the incarcerating facility 
(7) A statement Indicating that the purpose of surrendering custody of the defendant 
is because the posted band was forfeited by the murk. 
I t .  INCARCERATION IN A PENITENTIARY 
In the event a defendant is being held in a penitentiary, the proof of incarceration must 
contain the following information: 
Page 23 
i 
[Rev 8-20081 
I 
O O : ~ G Q  Rvso BBG 00028 E 
(1) The legal caption of the act~on in whlch the undertaking was given, including the 
name of the defendant, csse number, name and address of the bad 
(2) Power number 
(3) Defendant's date of birth 
(4) Defendant's social security number 
(5) lncarceratlon date and hour 
(6) Parole elrgibdity date 
(7) Full-term release date 
(8) Name, location, and phone number of the facllity 
(9) Signature and tltle of the person authonzed by the fac~lity to sign the document 
(1 0) Date the document was signed 
For defendants incarcerated in an ldaho correctional facility, the incarceration 
information on the "Proof of Incarceration of Defendant in a Penal Inst~tut~on" form must 
be verlfied and signed by an ldaho Department of Corrections staff member located In 
the Central Office, Syringa Bank Building, 1299 N. Orchard, Boise, Idaho. The 
telephone number for ldaho Department of Corrections, Central Records Department, is 
(208) 424-37 1 5 
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SECTION 19. 
DEATH OF A DEFENDANT 
If a defendant for whom a bond has been posted dies prior to forfeiture or within the 180- 
day period following the forfeiture, the person posting the bond must sign and file with 
the Clerk of the Court the following documents: 
(1) "Stipulat~on to Exonerate Bond - Death of Defendant" 
(2 )  "Order to Exonerate Bond - Death of Defendant" 
(3) Certified copy of the death certificate or coroner's report from the appropriate state 
or county agency in the state In which the death occurred. 
At a minimum, the death certificate or coroner's report must specify the full name of the 
deceased, date of birth, soctal security number, and the date of death. The Trial Court 
Admtnistrator must be satisfied that the named defendant is the deceased. 
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SECTION 20. 
REINSTATEMENT OF BONDS 
Idaho Code $19-2927 provides that a forfeited bail bond may be reinstated before 
remittance of the forfeiture by the court with the written consent of the bail agent posting 
the bail bond. 
The proper form for wrrtten consent to a reinstatement is a "Motion to Set Aside 
Forfeiture and Reinstate Bond" which must be signed by the bail agent who posted the 
forfeited bond. It IS the respons~bility of the ball agent to frle the motion to reinstate the 
bond with the Clerk of the Court and to simultaneously submit a completed "Order 
Setting Aside Forfeiture and Reinstating Bond". 
Additionally, ldaho Criminal Rule 46 provides that the court may quash the warrant and 
reinstate the bond within seven (7) days of the entry of the forfeiture without the consent 
of the person posting the bond. Under this Rule, written notice of the reinstatement must 
be provided to the surety or its designated agent. 
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SECTION 21. 
REVOCATION OF EON0 BY BAIL 
AGENT PRIOR TO FORFEITURE 
A bail agent request~ng to have a bail revoked and exonerated on the basis of a 
surrender of a defendant to an ldaho peace officer pursuant to ldaho Code $19-2924, 
must file with the Clerk of the Court the Following documents: 
(1) "Motion for Exoneration of Bond Prior to Forfe~ture" 
(2) "Order for Exoneration of Bond Prior to Forfeiture" 
(3) "Cert~ficate of Surrender of Defendant", properly executed by an ldaho sheriff or 
deputy sher~ff rom the Sherlff s Office as evidence that the defendant is in custody 
The Sherrff's Certificate of Surrender must affirmatively state that the bail agent 
who posted the bond is revoking the ball. 
Prior to forfeiture of the bond, the defendant must be in the physical custody of the ldaho 
county sheriff from which the defendant in question was bonded or in the custody of the 
ldaho county sherii where the case is pending. 
The above-mentioned Motion, Order, and Certificate of Surrender must be filed with the 
Clerk of the Court the next judicial day following the surrender of the defendant. It 
should be noted that the bond is not exonerated until the order for exoneration has been 
signed by the court. A subsequently posted bond may be deemed invalid if the previous 
bond was not properly revoked, and an improperly revoked bond may be forfeited upon 
the failure to appear of the defendant. 
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SECTION 22. 
FORMS PROVIDED BY THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE 
Forms have been developed and distributed to all bail agents authorized to offer bail 
bonds for acceptance in the Fourth Judicial District. When properly completed in the~r 
entlrety by the bail agent, these forms provide all of the ~nformat~on required to 
determine if a bond motion should be approved or denied. For the sake of consistency, 
ball agents shall use only the forms provided by the Trial Court Administrator's Office. In 
rare instances, bail agents may need to modify a form only slightly to supplement the 
information provided. 
It should be noted that only the bail agent wha offered the bail bond for acceptance or 
the supervising agent or an attorney on hislher behalf may sign bail-related documents 
that are filed with the Court. 
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SECTION 23. 
PUBLIC RECORDS REQUESTS ADDRESSED TO THE 
TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE 
Bail agents or their attorneys may submit a public records request to the Trial Court 
Admin~strator's Office to obtain copies of the list of Ada County forfelted bonds that is 
maintamed by the Trial Court Administrator's Office. The information on the list provided 
under this request w~ll be only for the bail agency that is making the request and will 
contain the ~nformat~on pertaining to those Ada County notices of forfeiture received to 
date by the Trial Court Administrator's Office. The Trial Court Admintstrator's Office 
does not guarantee the accuracy of the report. 
Upon submitting the request to the Trial Court Administrator's Ofice, the list will be 
made available to the bail agency within a reasonable period of time, and a copying fee 
of $1 .OO per page must be paid by the bail agent to the Trial Court Administrator's Office 
at the time the list is picked up by the bail agent in the Trial Court Administrator's Office. 
Copies of the list will not be faxed or mailed to any office. 
Receipt of this list of forfeited bonds under a Public Records Request shall constitute 
notice to the bail agent by the Trial Court Administrator's Office pertaining to past-due 
payment or past-due document filings with the Court. 
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FORMS APPENDIX 
Application to Become an Authorized Agent Wlthln the Fourth Judlcial District, 
State of idaho 
Motlon for Exoneration of Bail After Forfeiture 
Order of Exoneration of Ball Bond After Forfe~ture 
Motion for Exoneration of Ball Bond Prior to Forfeiture 
Order Exonerating Bail Bond Prior to Forfelture 
Motion to Set Aslde Forfe~ture and Exonerate Bond 
Order Setting As~de Forfeiture and Exonerating Bond 
Certificate of Surrender of Defendant 
Proof of Incarceration of Defendant In a Penal Institution 
Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Reinstate Bond 
Order Settlng As~de Forfeiture and Reinstating Bond 
Stipulation to Exonerate Bail Bond Due to Death of Defendant 
Order Exonerating Bail Bond Due to Death of Defendant 
Motion for Substitution of Bond 
Order for Substitution of Bond 
Petitlon to Add Agent's Name 
Petit~on to Reinstate Agent's Name 
Petrtlon for Review Prior to Removal of Agent's Name 
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APPLICATION TO BECOME AN AUTHORIZED BAlL AGENT WITHIN 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO 
ALL INFORMATION MUST BE TYPEWRITTEN OR LEGIBLY PRlNTED 
USE THIS FORM ONLY 
First Name: 
Home Address: 
City: State: Zip: 
Home Phone: 1 
r- 
Bail Agent's Insurance Company: 
Contact In Bail Division: 
Address: 
City: State: Zip: 
[Phone: 
SUBMIT TO: 
APPLICATION 
TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE 
BAlL AGENT APPLICATION PROCESSiNG 
200 W. FRONT STREET 
BOISE, ID 83702 
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Name of Your Supervising Agent: 
receive notice pursuant to I.C. § 19-2927. 
I Address: I 
City: State: Zip: I 
Expiration Date of Insurance License: ii 
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nn-pt7Q RVSD BBG 00037 b 
(1 )  Other than posting bail bonds, are you currently employed or do you 
anticipate working in a position that is related to the Fourth Judicial District 
Courts? 
Yes 5 No 
I f  so, please provide the position title and department name: 
(2) Have you ever been convicted of, pled guilty to, received a withheld 
judgment for, or otherwise sentenced on a felony anywhere? 
Yes No 
If so, please provide the date(s) of the conviction, guilty plea, withheld judgment, 
or sentencing; specify the charges; and specify the city and state where the 
conviction, pIea, withheld judgment, or sentencing occurred: 
(3) In response to the following, please include both adult and juvenile offenses. 
For every offense, list the date and the outcome thereof. DO NOT INCLUDE 
TRAFFIC INFRACTIONS. (if necessary, use an additional sheet of paper and 
attach to this Application). List: 
(a) every felony for which you have been charged; 
(b) every fraud or theft-related misdemeanor for which you have been 
charaed within the last ten (10) years; and 
(c) all other misdemeanors for which you have been charqed within the last 
five (5) years. 
(4) Have you ever been previously licensed by the State of Idaho or any other 
state with regard to the posting of bail bonds or any other type of insurance? 
U Yes El No 
If so, please provide the date@), statejs), and type@) of license: 
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( 5 )  Have you ever been the subject of disciplinary proceedings by the State of 
Idaho or any other state with regard to the posting of bail bonds or any other 
type of insurance? 
D Yes Cl No 
If so, please provide the date@) and nature of the disciplinary action(sf: 
(6) Have you ever been denied the ability to post bonds or removed from a list of 
authorized bail agents in any other jurisdiction? 
U Yes • No 
If so, please provide the location, dates, and reasons for the denial or removal: 
(7) On bail bonds posted by you, have you ever failed to ensure that a forfeited 
bail bond was paid where the forfeiture was not set aside by the court? 
C1 Yes 17 No 
If so, please provide the state, judicial district, court case, and the reasons for the 
failure to pay: 
(8) If you are a supervising agent, have you ever failed to ensure that a forfeited 
bail bond was paid that was posted by a bail agent or bail agents for whom 
you were the supervising agent, and the forfeiture was not set aside by the 
court? 
U Yes R No 
If so, please provide the state, judicial district, court case, and the reasons for the 
failure to pay: 
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(9) List all bail agencies, supervising agents, and business telephone numbers 
for which you have worked in the past. 
(10) Do you have any outstanding obligations due and owing to any bail agency 
for which you have worked in the past? 
El Yes Cl No 
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECK 
Last Name First Name lnit~al 
.- 
Maiden Name Nicknames 1 Aliases 
Soc. Sec. No: Driver's L~cense No: 
Birth date: Birthplace: 
CityIState 
Sex:- Weight: Weight: Hair: Eyes: 
List any city or town in which you have lived during the last 5 years: 
CitylState CitylState 
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AGREEMENT, ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, WAIVER, AND CERTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that all information in this Application is true, correct, and 
complete. I further certify that I am duly licensed by the ldaho Department of 
insurance to act as a bail agent and that said iicense is in full force and effect as 
of the date of this Application and that said license is not currently suspended or 
revoked. I further certify that I am not under any type of probation or restrictions 
imposed by the ldaho Department of Insurance. By filing this Application, i also 
understand that the Fourth Judicial District will conduct a full criminal history 
check into my background and I hereby waive any confidentiality privilege and 
other restrictions involving the release of any or all criminal information about me 
by the sources of such information, and to verify any statements made in the 
Application, including but not limited to criminal arrests andior conviction 
information. I further agree that the information contained in this Application may 
be released by the Trial Court Administrator to my supervising agent, the 
insurance company acting as surety on bonds offered by me and the insurance 
company's legal representative, the prosecuting attorney's office, the bail agent's 
legal representative, and the Department of Insurance. I further acknowledge that 
I have read the Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District and I agree to 
be bound by and to comply with these Guidelines and any amendments thereto, 
and that my offering of bail bonds for acceptance within the Fourth Judicial 
District shall be done in conformity with these Guidelines. If this is a renewal 
application, I understand that, prior to renewal, I must reimburse the Trial Court 
Administrator's Office for certified mailing costs incurred in providing me with 
various notices related to these Guidelines. 
Applicant-Agent Date 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SUPERVISING AGENT 
I hereby acknowledge that I am the supervising agent for f 
the above referenced applicant who has executed this application, and that I 
assume responsibility to see that the agent complies with the Bail Bond 
Guidelines. If the agent fails to comply, I understand that my name may be 
removed from the list of authorized agents. 
Supervising Agent Date 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDlClAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Defendant. 1 
Case No. 
MOTION FOR EXONERATION OF 
BAIL AFTER FORFEITURE 
Bond Amt: $ 
Power No. 
Date Forfeited: 
Charge: 
PURSUANT TO THE GUIDELINES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF BAIL BONDS IN THE 
FOURTH JUDlClAL DISTRICT ADOPTED BY THIS COURT, 
MOTION IS HEREBY MADE that the undertaking of bail posted in the matter herein 
bY , on behalf of the above-named defendant, be 
exonerated; and 
IT IS FURTHER STATED that said undertaking in this matter has been forfeited by 
this court; however, the above-named defendant was surrendered to the County Sheriff 
as certified in the Certificate of Surrender of Defendant filed herein, ail within the time 
limits prescribed by said Guidelines. 
Bail Agent Date 
APPROVAL OF TRIAL COURT ADMiNISTRATOR 
Having reviewed the file in  this matter, i t  is my determination that ail requirements 
of the Court's Guidelines For the Administration of Bail Bonds in the Fourth Judicial 
District have been timely complied with in this matter. 
For Trial Court Administrator Date 
Fourth Judicial District 
MOTION FOR EXONERATION OF BALL AFTER FORFEITURE 
( FILED AT M / 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDiClAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Case No. 
1 
1 ORDER OF EXONERATION OF 
1 BAIL BOND AFTER FORFEITURE 
) 
1 Bond Arnt: $ 
f Power No. 
9 1 Date Forfeited: 
Defendant. 1 Charge: 
WHEREAS, , bail of the above-named 
defendant in this matter, has filed a motion with this court requesting an Order 
exonerating it as bail of said defendant; and 
WHEREAS, said bail has filed with this court an executed Certificate of Surrender 
of Defendant certifying that said defendant was surrendered to the 
County Sheriff; and 
WHEREAS, it appears to this court that the undertaking posted by said bail in this 
matter has heretofore been forfeited; and 
WHEREAS, the Trial Court Administrator of this District or his delegate has 
certified that all requirements of the Guidelines For the Administration of Bail Bonds in 
the Fourth Judicial District have been complied with in this matter. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that , 
bail of the above-named defendant in this matter be, and hereby is, exonerated and 
discharged from all further liability of such bail. 
JUDGE Date 
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FILED AT .M. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF M E  DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Case No. 
1 
Plaintiff, ) MOTION FOR EXONERATION OF BAIL 
1 BOND PRIOR TO FORFEITURE 
VS. 1 
1 Bond Amt: $ 
1 Power No. 
, 1  Date Posted: 
Defendant 1 Charge: 
PURSUANT TO I.C. 19-2924, MOTION IS HEREBY MADE that the undertaking of bail posted 
i n  this matter by , on behalf of the above-named defendant, be 
exonerated; and 
IT IS FURTHER STATED that subsequent to the posting of said undertaking, but prior to 
any forfeiture thereof, the above-named defendant was surrendered to with the 
County Sheriff as certified in the Certificate of Surrender of Defendant filed herein. 
For Trial Court Administrator Date Bail Agent Date 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on I served a true and correct copy of 
this Motion upon the: 
O Boise City Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, ID 83701 -0500 
Garden City Prosecutor 
201 E. 50' St. 
Garden City, ID 83114 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front S t  
Boise, ID 83702 
0 Meridian City Prosecutor 
clo Boise City Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, ID 83701-0500 
El by hand-delivering said copy to the secretary of the prosecutor at 200 W. Front S t ,  Boise, 
Idaho, for deposit in the inter-office mail basket therein. 
by depositing said copy in the US. Mail, postage prepaid, on the above date, addressed to 
the above-referenced prosecutor at the address listed above. 
Signature Date 
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNN OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Defendant. 1 
Case No. 
ORDER EXONERATING BAIL 
BOND PRIOR TO FORFEITURE 
Bond Amt $ 
Power No. 
Date Posted: 
Charge: 
WHEREAS, , bail of the above-named 
defendant in  this matter has filed a motion with this court requesting an Order 
exonerating it a s  bail of said defendant; and 
WHEREAS, said bail has filed with this court an executed Certificate of Surrender 
of defendant certifying that said defendant was incarcerated with the 
County Sheriff; and 
WHEREAS, said bail has certified to this court that timely notice of said bail's 
motion has been served upon the proper prosecuting attorney pursuant to I.C. 19-2924; 
and 
WHEREAS, said prosecuting attorney has not filed an objection to said bail's 
motion; and 
WHEREAS, it appears to this court that the undertaking posted by said bail in this 
matter has not been heretofore forfeited. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the bail of the above-named 
defendant in this matter be, and hereby is, exonerated and discharged from ail further 
liability of such bail. 
JUDGE Date 
ORDER EXONERATING BAIL BOND PRIOR TO FORFEITURE 
I 
[Rev. 8-20061 
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1 FILED AT - I 
I J. DAVID NAVARRO, CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE 
1 AND EXONERATE BOND 
1 
1 Bond Amt: $ 
1 )  Power No. 
Defendant. 1 Date Forfeited: 
, who heretofore posted the above- 
referenced undertaking of bond of the above-named defendant, said bond having been 
forfeited by this court, hereby moves this court for an Order setting aside said forfeiture of 
bail and exonerating the same pursuant to authority set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 46(e) on 
the following grounds: 
For Trial Court Administrator Date Bail Agent Date 
Fourth Judicial District 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE AND EXONERATE BOND [Rev. 3-20041 
I 00388 RVSD BBG 00047 j 
J. DAVID NAVARRO. 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT I 
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff, 
1 Case No. 
1 
1 ORDER SE-TTING ASIDE FORFEITURE 
VS. 1 AND EXONERATING BOND 
) 
1 Bond Amt: $ 
7 Power No. 
Defendant. ) Date Forfeited: 
WHEREAS, , who heretofore posted the above- 
referenced undertaking of bond of the above-named defendant, has filed a motion with this 
court requesting an Order setting aside the forfeiture previously entered in this matter and 
exonerating the bond referenced above, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the forfeiture of the undertaking previousiy issued in 
this case evidenced by power of attorney be, and hereby is, set aside. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said bond is hereby exonerated. 
JUDGE Date 
ORDER SETTING ASIDE FORFEITURE AND EXONERATING BOND 
1 
I 
[Rev. 3-20041 
00389 RVSD BBG 00048 k 
Bail Agency 
Address 
City, State, Zip 
FILED AT .M. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST RlCT 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Case No. 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 CERTIFICATE OF SURRENDER 
1 OF DEFENDANT 
VS. ) 
) Power No. 
1 Bond Amount $ 
. )  Date Posted 
Defendant, 1 
Pre-Forfeiture of Bail: 
0 For the purpose of surrender of defendant, the undersigned person certifies that 
helshe surrendered the defendant to the county sheriff in whose custody the 
defendant was committed at the time of giving bail or the county sheriff where the 
action is pending, on the day of , 2 0 ,  at  the hour 
of .m. 
Post-Forfeiture of Bail: 
C1 For the purpose of surrender of defendant after forfeiture of bail, the undersigned 
person certifies that to the best of hisiher knowledge the defendant has not been 
arrested on the warrant for failure to appear in  this case and that helshe 
surrendered the defendant to the jail of the county which issued the warrant in this 
action on the day of 2 0 -  at the hour of 
- .m. 
Signature Authorized Representative Printed Name Date 
VERIFICATION OF OFFICER 
As evidence of surrender by the bail bondsman, the undersigned officer has detained the 
defendant in hisfher custody on this case as upon a commitment on this day of 
, 2 0 ,  at the hour of .m. 
Deputy Sheriff # Phone No. Date 
CERTIFICATE OF SURRENDER [Rev. 8.20081 1 
nn '1 f if i  RVSD BBG 00049 I 
I .  Bail Agent's Name 
Address 
City, State, Zip 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, / CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Case No. 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 PROOF OF INCARCERATION 
1 OF DEFENDANT IN A PENAL 
1 INSTITUTION 
k 
1 Bond Amt: $ 
) Power No. 
, Date Forfeited: 
Defendant 1 Charge: 
Defendant's date of birth: Defendant's SSN: 
The undersigned employee of , a penal institution 
located in the state of , states as follows: 
That the above-named defendant was incarcerated in the above-referenced penal 
institution on 
That the defendanfs retained jurisdiction end date is on or about f 
the parole eligibility date is , and the full-term release date is 
Signature of Authorized Person Date 
Title ~ h o n e ~ o .  
PROOF OF INCARCERATION IN A PENAL INSTITUTION 
1 
[Rev. 9-20041 
i 
f 
I 
RVSD BBG 00050 k 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, I CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Case No. 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE 
VS. ) AND REINSTATE BOND 
1 
1 Bond Amt  $ 
, 1 Power No. 
Defendant. 1 Date Forfeited: 
, who heretofore posted the above-referenced 
undertaking of bond of the above-named defendant, said bond having been forfeited by 
this court, hereby moves this court for an Order setting aside said forfeiture of bail and 
reinstating the same pursuant to authority set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 46(e) on the 
following grounds: 
For Trial Court Administrator Date Bail Agent Date 
Fourth Judicial District 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE AND REINSTATE BOND CRev. 3-zo04] 
~ j n ~ q ~ ~  RVSD BEG 00052 
FILED AT M .  1 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT i 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) Case No. 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 ORDER SElTlNG ASIDE FORFEITURE 
VS. 1 AND REINSTATING BOND 
) 
1 Bond Amt: $ 
1 )  Power No. 
Defendant. ) Date Forfeited: 
WHEREAS, , who heretofore posted the above- 
referenced undertaking of bond of the above-named defendant, has filed a motion with this 
court requesting an Order setting aside the forfeiture previously entered in this matter and 
reinstating the bond referenced above, 
IT 1s HEREBY ORDERED that the forfeiture of the undertaking previously issued in 
this case evidenced by power of attorney be, and hereby is, set aside. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said bond is hereby reinstated. 
JUDGE Date 
ORDER SETTtNG ASIDE FORFEITURE AND REINSTATING BOND 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
1 Case No. 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 STIPULATION TO EXONERATE BAIL 
VS. 1 BOND DUE TO DEATH OF DEFENDANT 
1 
1 Bond Amt: $ 
, ) Power No. 
Defendant. 1 Date Forfeited: 
, who heretofore posted an undertaking of bail 
on behalf of the above-named defendant in  this matter, and the Trial Court Administrator 
of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho or his delegate, hereby stipulate and agree 
that said undertaking of bail should be exonerated and discharged on the grounds that 
said defendant is now deceased. Said Trial Court Administrator certifies to this Court 
that proper documentation of the defendant's death has been presented to him and filed 
with the court in  this matter and that all other appiicable requirements of the Court's 
Guidelines for the Administration of Bail Bonds have been satisfied. 
For Trial Court Administrator Date Bail Agent Date 
Fourth Judicial District 
STlPULATlON TO EXONERATE BAIL BOND DUE TO DEATH OF DEFENDANT 
I 
[Rev. 3-20041 
L 
d x n n n  - 
RVSD BBG onns? 
I J. DAVID NAVARRO, CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff, 
1 Case No. 
1 
) ORDER EXONERATING BAIL BOND 
VS. 1 DUE TO DEATH OF DEFENDANT 
1 
) Bond Amt: $ 
, 1 Power No. 
Defendant. ) Date Forfeited: 
WHEREAS, , who heretofore posted an 
undertaking of bail on behalf of the above-named defendant in this matter, and the Trial 
Court Administrator of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, having entered into a 
stipulation that said undertaking of bail should be exonerated and discharged on the 
grounds that said defendant is now deceased; and 
WHEREAS, proper documentation of the defendant's death having been filed with 
the court in this matter and all other applicable requirements of the Court's Guidetines 
for the Administration of Bail Bonds having been satisfied, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the undertaking of bail in this matter be, and hereby 
is, exonerated and discharged. 
JUDGE Date 
ORDER EXONERATING BAIL BOND DUE TO DEATH OF DEFENDANT 
i 
[Rev. 3-20041 
nn'?ac RVSD BBG 00054 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, / CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) CASE NO. 
Plaintiff, ) 
VS. 
1 
) MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION 
) OF BOND 
, I  
Defendant. ) 
The undersigned hereby moves this court for an order to  substitute bond 
which has been previously posted with this court in the above-referenced matter and 
further states that: 
IJ A CASH BOND has been posted by the undersigned with this court for 
the above-named defendant's release from custody and movant now 
desires to substitute therefor a duly executed SURETY BOND equal to 
the amount of the bond ordered by this court, thereby releasing the 
cash bond previously posted. The surety bond is attached hereto. 
A SURETY BOND has been posted with this court for the above- 
named defendant's release from custody and movant now desires to 
substitute therefor a CASH BOND equal to the amount of the bond 
ordered by this court, thereby exonerating the surety bond previously 
posted. 
Movant - Signature 
Movant - Printed Name 
MOTION FOR SUBSTlTUTlON OF BOND 
Date 
[Rev. 3-2004) 
0 0 3 9 G  
FILED AT M .  / 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
1 CASE NO. 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. 
1 
1 ORDER FOR SUBSTITUTION 
1 OF BOND 
1 
1)
Defendant. ) 
A Motion For Substitution of Bond having been filed with the court, and it 
appearing from said Motion and the Court record that: 
U A CASH BOND has been posted by the movant with this court for the 
above-named defendant's release from custody and movant now desires 
to substitute therefor a duly executed SURETY BOND equal to the 
amount of the bond ordered by this court, thereby releasing the cash 
bond previously posted. The surety bond has been lodged. 
CI A SURETY BOND has been posted with this court for the above-named 
defendant's release from custody and movant now desires to substitute 
therefor a CASH BOND equal to the amount of the bond ordered by this 
court, thereby exonerating the surety bond previously posted. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT 
0 The CASH BOND previously posted in this matter be released by the 
Clerk of the Court and returned to the party posting the same, and that 
the SURFPI BOND now lodged with this court be accepted and 
substituted therefor. 
The SURETY BOND previously posted in this matter be and hereby is 
exonerated on the condition that a CASH BOND in the full amount of the 
bond ordered by this court be posted with the Clerk of the Court and that 
said cash be substituted therefor. 
JUDGE Date 
ORDER FOR SUBSTTTUTION OF BOND 
RVSD BEG 00056 
PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT USING BLACK INK: 
PETITIONER'S NAME 
--- - - - 1 FILED AT____- "4 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, 
CLERK OF THE DlSTRlCT COURT 
ADDRESS h 
Deputy 
I 
CITY, STATE. ZIP 
-A 
PHONE NUMBER 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
RE: 1 CASE NO. 
) 
' 1 PETITION TO ADD AGENT'S NAME 
Petitioner. 1 
1 FILING FEE: $88.00 
COMES NOW, , the above-named 
Petitioner, and respectfully requests a hearing before the Administrative District Judge 
for the Fourth Judicial District. Petitioner requests a hearing to allow Petitioner the 
opportunity to submit evidence to show cause why Petitioner should be added to the 
authorized list of agents for posting bail bonds in the Fourth Judiciat District. 
Petitioner's application to write bonds in the Fourth District was denied due to the 
following reason(s): 
[check appropriate boxes] 
I3 1. The criminal history check revealed: 
a (a) a felony crime for which the above Petitioner or the Petitioner's 
proposed insurance company was convicted, pled guilty, received a 
withheld judgment, or otherwise sentenced. 
Cl fb) a misdemeanor crime involving drugs, theft, fraud, or other crime of 
moral turpitude for which the Petitioner or the Petitioner's proposed 
insurance company was convicted, pled guilty, received a withheld 
judgment, or othewise sentenced. 
C] (c) three or more misdemeanor crimes for which the Petitioner or the 
Petitioner's proposed insurance company was convicted, pled guilty, 
received a withheld judgment, or otherwise sentenced. 
C1 (d) a combination of three or more of the following in which the Petitioner 
was convicted, pled guilty, received a withheld judgment, or otherwise 
sentenced: failure to appear, contempt of court, or probation violation. 
PETITION TO ADD AGENT'S NAME - Page 1 [Rev. 8-20081 
O Q t 3 9 8  RVSD BBG 00057 
El 2. The application processing revealed the Petitioner failed to disclose information 
as requested on the Application form. 
3. The application processing revealed the Petitioner or the Petitioner's insurance 
company is not licensed by The Department of Insurance of the State of Idaho. 
0 4. The application processing revealed the Petitioner has four or more prior 
violations of these Guidelines which have not been excused by the 
Administrative District Judge following a hearing. 
5. The application processing revealed the Petitioner is currently employed in a 
Fourth District court-related position. 
6. The application processing revealed the Petitioner was denied the ability to write 
bonds or was removed from the list of authorized agents in another jurisdiction. 
17 7. The application processing revealed the Petitioner previously had a license 
suspension or revocation imposed by the department of insurance of any U.S. 
state. 
8. The application processing revealed the Petitioner or hislher insurance 
company has previously failed to have paid a forfeited bond. 
5 9. The application processing revealed the Petitioner is related by blood, marriage, 
or adoption to a Fourth District Judge. 
17 10. The application processing revealed financial insolvency of the Petitioner or 
hislher insurance company. 
Dated this day of ,20-. 
Petitioner 
PETITION TO ADO AGENTS NAME -Page 2 [Rev. 8-20081 
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PLWSE TYPE OR PRINT USING BIACK INK: 
PETITIONER'S NAME 
ADDRESS 
CITY, STATE, UP 
PHONE NUMBER 
RE: 
FILED AT .M. 
I J. DAVID NAVARRO, CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
) CASE NO. 
1 
I ) PETITION TO REINSTATE 
Petitioner. ) AGENT'S NAME 
1 FILING FEE: $88.00 
COMES NOW, I the above-named 
Petitioner, and respectfully requests a hearing before the Administrative District Judge 
for the Fourth Judicial District Petitioner requests a hearing to allow Petitioner the 
opportunity to submit evidence to show cause why Petitioner's name should be 
reinstated to the authorized list of agents for posting bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial 
District. 
Petitioner disputes the allegations of the Trial Court Administrator's Office as 
follows: 
[List Allegations] 
Dated this day of I 20-. 
Petitioner 
PETITION TO REINSTATE AGENT'S NAME [Rev. 8-20081 
88400 RVSD BBG 00059 
PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT USING BLACK INK: 
PETITIONER'S NAME 
ADDRESS 
CITY, STATE, ZIP 
FILED AT .FA. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, I I CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
PHONE NUMBER 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
RE: ) CASE NO. 
1 
I ) PETITION FOR REVIEW PRIOR TO 
Petitioner. ) REMOVAL OF AGENT'S NAME 
) FILING FEE: $88.00 
COMES NOW, , the above-named 
Petitioner, and respectfully requests a hearing before the Administrative District Judge 
for the Fourth Judicial District. Petitioner requests a hearing to allow Petitioner the 
opportunity to submit evidence to show cause why Petitioner's name should not be 
removed from the authorized list of agents for posting bail bonds in  the Fourth Judicial 
District. 
Petitioner disputes the allegations of the Trial Court Administrator's Office as 
follows: 
[List Allegations] 
Dated this day of ,20-. 
Petitioner 
PETITION FOR REVIEW PRIOR TO REMOVAL OF AGENT'S NAME [Rev. 8-20081 
00401' RVSD BBG 00060 
